The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 44
Number 2 Parameters Summer 2014

Article 1

7-1-2014

Parameters – Full Issue
USAWC Parameters

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons

Recommended Citation
USAWC Parameters, "Parameters – Full Issue," Parameters 44, no. 2 (2014), doi:10.55540/
0031-1723.2646.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

VOL. 44 NO. 2 SUMMER 2014

P A R A M E T E R S
Contemporary Strategy & Landpower

Rebalancing the Rebalance
Michael Spangler

Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea
Lukas Milevski

Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy
Raymond Millen

Private Contractors & Military Professionals
Scott L. Efflandt
Christopher Spearin
Birthe Anders

Special Commentary:
Insights from the Army's Drawdowns
Jason W. Warren

Secretary of the Army, Honorable John M. McHugh
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno
Commandant, Major General William E. Rapp
Editor, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Managing Editor, Ms. Jeanette M. Moyer
Assistant Editor, Mr. Richard K. Leach
Editorial Board Members
Dr. Hal Brands

Dr. Richard Krickus

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Dr. Matthew Pinsker

Colonel Murray R. Clark, USAF

Dr. George E. Reed, COL (USA Retired)

Dr. Martin L. Cook

Dr. Sibylle Scheipers

Dr. Conrad C. Crane, LTC (USA Retired)

Dr. Andrew C. Scobell

Prof. Audrey Kurth Cronin

Dr. Luis Simón

Dr. Jacqueline Newmyer Deal

Dr. Don M. Snider

Mark J. Eshelman, COL (USA Retired)

John F. Troxell, COL (USA Retired)

Dr. George W. Grayson

Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich

Dr. Paul Rexton Kan

Ms. Lesley Anne Warner

James O. Kievit, LTC (USA Retired)

Dr. Katarzyna Zysk

Dr. Janeen M. Klinger

Emeritus

Duke University
US Army War College, SSI
Norwich University

US Naval War College
Military History Institute

George Mason University

Long Term Strategy Group LLC
US Army War College, DDE
College of William & Mary
US Army War College, DNSS
At Large

US Army War College, DNSS

University of Mary Washington (Professor Emeritus)
Dickinson University
University of San Diego

University of St. Andrews
RAND Corporation

Vrije Universiteit Brussel
US Army War College, SSI
Strategic Studies Institute

Department of National Security and Strategy
Center for Naval Analyses
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Leonard J. Fullenkamp, COL (USA Retired)

Parameters is an official US Army Periodical, published quarterly by the US Army War College. The Secretary of the Army has determined that
publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this
publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with Army regulations.

Disclaimer: Articles and reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in Parameters are those
of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Vol. 44 No. 2 • Summer 2014

3  From the Editor
Features
Special Commentary

5  Insights from the Army's Drawdowns
Jason W. Warren
Can We Leverage the Cycles?

Strategy & Policy

11  Rebalancing the Rebalance
Michael Spangler
Are We On Track?

23  Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea
Lukas Milevski
Can Statecraft Prevail?

35  Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy
Raymond Millen
Process Over Personality?

Private Contractors & Military Professionals

49  Military Professionalism
& Private Military Contractors
Scott L. Efflandt
Professionalism at Risk?

61  Special Operations Forces
& Private Security Companies
Christopher Spearin
Toward a Global Network

75  Private Military & Security Companies:
A Review Essay
Birthe Anders
Past, Present, & Future Research

Review Essays

85  The Rise and Continuing Challenge
of Revolutionary Iran
By W. Andrew Terrill

Commentaries & Replies
81  On "Predicting Future War"
Jeff Becker
Robert A. Johnson Responds

96  The Great War: One Hundred Years
Later
By Douglas V. Mastriano

2

Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014

103  Book Reviews
Exploring Strategy

103  Strategy: A History

By Lawrence Freedman
Reviewed by James MacDougall

107  The Direction of War: Contemporary
Strategy in Historical Perspective
By Hew Strachan
Reviewed by Richard Swain

Political-Military Leadership

110  Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
By Robert M. Gates
Reviewed by Steven Metz

114  Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots
By Dennis Laich

Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their
Soldiers and Their Country
By Andrew J. Bacevich
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen

112  PROCONSULS: Delegated Political-Military
Leadership from Rome to America Today
By Carnes Lord
Reviewed by Don M. Snider

116  Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur,
Eisenhower, Arnold, Bradley
Edited by James H. Willbanks
Reviewed by David T. Zabecki

Changing Nature of Power

119  The End of Power: From Boardrooms to
Battlefields and Churches to States, Why
Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be
By Moses Naim
Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison

121  Maximalist: America in the World
from Truman to Obama
By Stephen Sestanovich
Reviewed by Michael J. Daniels

Financial War

123  Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New
Era of Financial Warfare
By Juan Zarate
Reviewed by David Katz

124  Planning Armageddon: British Economic
Warfare and the First World War
By Nicholas A. Lambert
Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos

Cartels & Gangs

127  The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most
Dangerous Criminal Organizations and
Their Impact on US Security

129  Studies in Gangs and Cartels

By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz

By George W. Grayson
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker

Stability & Instability

132  Where is the Lone Ranger? America’s Search 134  Improving the U.S. Military’s
for a Stability Force, 2nd ed
Understanding of Unstable Environments
By Robert M. Perito
Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups
Reviewed by Gordon Rudd

136  Learning to Forget: US Army
Counterinsurgency Doctrine
and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
By David Fitzgerald
Reviewed by David H. Ucko

By David E. Thaler, et al.
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker

138  One Hundred Victories: Special Ops
& the Future of American Warfare
By Linda Robinson
Reviewed by Stephen K. Van Riper

Women in Battle
141  Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are Pushing Women into Combat
By Robert L. Maginnis
Reviewed by Anna Simons, Anthony King, and John C. McKay

From the Editor

T

his issue of the US Army War College Quarterly opens with a special
commentary, “Insights from the Army’s Drawdowns,” by Jason
Warren. Perhaps the most important of his insights is the Army
has traditionally mitigated the negative effects of drawing down by
emphasizing greater education and professionalization, and can do so
again.
Our first forum, Strateg y & Policy, features three contributions
examining strategy at different levels. The lead article, “Rebalancing
the Rebalance,” by Michael Spangler, urges the United States to consider instituting new bilateral security initiatives with China, and China’s
neighbors. Economic cooperation is proceeding at a rapid pace in the
Asia-Pacific region, but it is not yet balanced with greater security cooperation. The second article, “Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea,” by
Lukas Milevski, frames Western Europe’s response to Russian aggression in the Crimean crisis as a clash between statecraft and strategy,
respectively. The author claims the latter generally has an advantage
over former, but his framework may be problematic. Regardless, the
comparison raises important questions for contemporary strategists.
The third contribution is “Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy,” by
Raymond Millen. Millen contends President Dwight D. Eisenhower
made innovative use of focused discussion groups and a re-designed
National Security Council to create a consensus for developing a US
grand strategy capable of dealing with the Soviet threat. While the
process Eisenhower implemented clearly deserves some credit for the
coherence of US strategy, readers may ask whether his professional experience and personal skill deserve even more.
The second forum, Private Contractors & Military Professionals, offers
three articles addressing an essential aspect of the changing nature of
warfare—the composition of contemporary militaries. For some, the
increased use of private contractors in (or near) the battle-space marks a
return to warfare as practiced prior to the rise of standing armies, when
states often contracted for military forces rather than maintaining their
own. Scott Efflandt’s “Military Professionalism and Private Military
Contractors,” reviews how the concept of professionalism has changed
due to greater reliance on private contractors. In “Special Operations
Forces and Private Security Companies,” Christopher Spearin considers
how private contractors might contribute to an ever expanding global
special-forces network. Birthe Anders’ “Review Essay,” brings readers
up to date with the growing body of research concerning private military
contractors and security companies.
This issue of the Quarterly offers two broader review essays, and one
review forum. “The Rise and Continuing Challenge of Revolutionary
Iran,” by W. Andrew Terrill discusses the leading scholarship explaining
both the fall of the Shah and Iran’s decline. Douglas A. Mastriano’s
“The Great War: One Hundred Years Later,” brings four of the most
important books on the origins of the First World War into sharper
focus. Even in this, the centennial of the war’s outbreak, interest in the
conflict still runs high; but as Mastriano shows, many of its questions
remain unanswered. Deadly Consequences by Robert L. Maginnis rounds
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out our book reviews; three experts comment on what they see as truly
deadly and truly consequential in this highly controversial work. ~AJE

Special Commentary

Insights from the Army's Drawdowns
Jason W. Warren
Abstract: This article provides five insights extracted from discussions concerning the Army’s long history of drawdowns. Perhaps
the most important take-away is the Army can, and should, use the
current drawdown constructively.

W

ith the termination of the recent campaign in Iraq and the
winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the US military faces
a drawdown of standing force structure and capabilities.
The policy debate concerning how best to carry out this force reduction, however, lacks proper historical perspective. Twenty-four civilian
historians and military professionals recently offered such a perspective
by focusing on previous drawdowns over the span of American history.
Beginning with a consideration of the cyclical nature of drawdowns
and whether a crisis mentality is warranted in such periods, three major
questions emerged. Was the attempt to preserve military effectiveness
during drawdowns contradictory to traditional American values? Given
the reoccurrence of force reductions in American history, how did the
military best preserve combat capabilities? What was the relationship
between the regular standing Army and militia/National Guard forces,
and how did these reflect broader attitudes towards the military? Insights
from the discussions follow.1

1. The drawdown of American forces has been a cyclical part of
the nation’s military experience.

Whether they allowed colonial forts to fall into disrepair or furloughed hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened Union troops after
the US Civil War, Americans historically have tightened their financial
belts at the conclusion of major conflicts. This attitude reflects traditional
Anglo-American values dating back to the late-Middle Ages in England.
Latent fears of regular armies surfaced before the Revolutionary War
with both the Quartering Act and the Boston Massacre. Americans
carried these attitudes forward into the twenty-first century.
The debate over the US military establishment has never been a
purely rational one with biases inherent in the American cultural framework. Concerns over previous drawdowns have not run counter to
traditional American values, and have not always been justified even
by initial combat effectiveness. For example, the Kennedy/Johnson
administrations reversed conventional drawdowns of the Eisenhower
era in time to create the most competent US Army ever to engage in the
initial battle of any war up to 1965. American forces also met with initial
successes in 2001 and 2003 after a decade of drawdowns, paralleling the
1     The US Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership & Development and the US
Army Heritage & Education Center recently hosted an academic forum on the history of America’s
military reductions after large-scale conflicts. Dr. John Bonin helped formulate the ideas for this
article and assisted in its publication.
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and Doctrine at the
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US experience nearly forty years earlier. However, American forces have
not always reconstituted effectively for battle. Significant drawdowns
left the Army unprepared for initial campaigns in the early 1790s against
Native Americans, the War of 1812, the US Civil War, the SpanishAmerican War, both World Wars, and the Korean War. Significantly,
these wars ended in American military victory, indicating the initial risk
of fielding forces based on reduced military infrastructure, though costly
in “first battles,” has often been acceptable in terms of overall strategic
costs. Put differently, US foreign policy and national strategy objectives
often exceeded military means. There was unanimous agreement among
conference participants on this point.

2. Competition between the Regular Army and National
Guard (militia) has always been part of the American military
discourse.

A number of scholars highlighted the historical importance of
this competition. This debate is both rational and irrational as it stems
from Anglo-Americans’ historic preference for “virtuous” militia
over “suspect” standing armies, while overlooking the sometimes
poor initial military performance of militia/National Guard forces. A
serving officer’s presentation detailed how the relationship between
active and reserve components works best in a complementary (but not
interchangeable) arrangement. This complementary nature was largely
evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, which reversed the mutual animosity
that appeared during the Gulf War. American attitudes changed during
the Cold War to consider active component forces as “citizen-soldiers,”
in a manner once reserved only for National Guard/militia forces, thus
the American public conflates the two components. The advent of the
all-volunteer force in 1973 solidified this outlook. Two participants
indicated the importance of reserve components increased with the termination of the draft and the unlikeliness of its reconstitution, as well as
the continuing question of the eligibility of women for selective service.
The apparent irreversibility of the all-volunteer force and the merging of
the active component’s reputation with that of the reserve components
changed the nature of the discourse over the roles and perceptions of
both components.

3. The Army has historically focused on education and professionalization as mitigating factors during drawdowns.

Participants agreed unanimously on this point, and as one historian
from the conference put it, “education is a hedge against uncertainty.”
The early 1800s witnessed the creation of West Point to address performance shortcomings, and the impetus after the War of 1812 was for
a more professional officer corps. In the decades after the Civil War,
Emory Upton and William Tecumseh Sherman attempted doctrinal
and educational reforms. Sherman established Fort Leavenworth as the
Army’s intellectual center during this period. Operational failures in the
Spanish-American War led to the establishment of the US Army War
College in 1901. At the conclusion of World War I, which was followed
by a significant military drawdown, the Army again focused its attention
on educating and broadening the next crop of officers, such as Dwight
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D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George S. Patton. With only
a skeleton standing army after 1921, leaders emphasized intellectual
preparation and solving complex problems in Army schools instead of
commanding troops. The Army’s culture of the post-1950 era, however,
shifted to emphasize tactical training at the expense of education and
broadening. With a large-standing force to combat communism, leaders
sought troop command and training assignments. The officer corps
de-emphasized broadening and education as a way to achieve high
command. For instance General William Westmoreland, who eventually rose to become Army Chief of Staff after Vietnam, never attended
professional military education. Three scholars argued the military’s
talent-management system, which reflected management principles of
the earlier Industrial Age, has been inadequate. There were few systematic attempts to connect an officer’s education with future assignments.
A number of participants said drawdown periods have often been fertile
ground for “mavericks,” whose theorizing about armor and the integration of other new technologies in the interwar period, paid dividends in
World War II. Similar hypothesizing about the structure of Army forces
during the 1990s laid the basis for the contemporary modular force.

4. Drawdowns have frequently resulted in cuts to headquarters
elements, enabling forces, and niche capabilities that have been
detrimental to future operations.

Four participants discussed headquarters reductions at the conclusions of the World Wars, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, which created gaps
in critical billets. As with Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq, a lack of
a tailored headquarters led to failed operations (and contributed to the
Abu Ghraib incident). After early disasters in North Africa during World
War II, General Eisenhower created the equivalent of a land component
command. The initial crisis in Korea caused General MacArthur to
advocate (successfully) for an increase of Army corps headquarters from
one to eight. At the outbreak of the Gulf War, the Army had reduced
US Army Central (3rd Army) staff to one-quarter capacity, which was
not unusual for the All-Volunteer Force, as General Creighton Abrams
had set the precedent for reducing various Army headquarters in the
post-Vietnam era. This reduction resulted in a much slower build-up
during Operation Desert Shield. Of course, the quantity of headquarters
personnel relates directly to increased missions, as smaller staffs have
been sufficient in peacetime.
Three scholars argued niche capabilities should not fall victim to
drawdowns. Cutting them has created shortcomings, such as failure to
develop an adequate tank corps or submarine fleet during the interwar
years. Maintaining an Army amphibious capability post-1945 proved
critical in Korea and Panama. More recent cuts to enablers such as
logistical units and military police (or placing the majority in the reserve
components) has been fraught with risk. One of the biggest issues for
planners leading up to the Iraq War was a lack of line-haul trucks (rented
mainly from Kuwaitis) to move heavy equipment to assembly areas. This
lack of equipment literally dictated where operations could be conducted
and with what forces. The US capability for power projection through
“setting the theater” relies on such enablers. Traditional allies can offset
capabilities lost during drawdowns. This offset occurred during the
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late-19th and early-20th centuries, for instance, when the British fleet and
merchant marine cooperated with limited US naval forces.
The historic precedence for maintaining brigade combat teams as
the bedrock formation of the Army stems from George Washington’s
Continental Army, which relied on brigades commanded by brigadier
generals in combined arms teams (infantry, artillery, and dragoons). Its
heir, the “Legion” of the early 1790s, also relied on a combined arms
brigade model. Four scholars discussed the cadre and expansible Army
concepts for which the brigade (or its subordinate elements) has often
been the building block. Employing a cadre concept in past eras, the
Army eliminated the lower skill levels, while maintaining a mid-ranking
cadre in the institutional Army that served as leadership in reconstituted
units. Cadre maintained basic leadership and training skills by serving
in training billets. In the 1820s, Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun,
enacted a similar option known as the “expansible Army,” where cutbacks reduced units’ junior-enlisted personnel, while retaining sergeants
and officers. After Vietnam, General Abrams instituted “roundout”
battalions and brigades, in which designated reserve component forces
filled active component formations. There is also precedence for longservice professionals manning more technical functions requiring
extensive experience, such as the War Department bureaus manned by
the Regular Army during the Civil War. One historian noted America’s
transition to an Information-Age economy, but reequipping units would
prove more problematic than in past conflicts.

5. Conventional capabilities have been a better investment over
past drawdowns than technological panaceas and unconventional forces.

A number of scholars noted technical and tactical transformations
have improved tactics and in some cases operations, but “revolutions in
military affairs” have not led directly to victory. Clausewitz maintained
war’s nature is dependent on the interplay of social, political, and military forces, rather than on new technologies and tactics. Changes in the
means of fighting − whether nuclear, cyber, or special operating forces
and airpower − have not altered the relationship of variables fundamental to war. Although Information-Age technology proved critical early
in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was indecisive in both instances. Once Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters dug elementary fighting positions, special
operations forces required Northern Alliance and US infantry formations to conduct conventional fire and maneuver to dislodge them. In
Iraq, urban conditions and the need to interact with Iraqis during the
population-centric counterinsurgency phase of operations required large
conventional capabilities. Special operations forces are also dependent
on conventional Army force structure, such as rotary-wing, intelligence,
security, medical, logistics, and quick-reaction forces − the very enablers
often ignored during the calculation of forces in planning. Atomic
weapons, prevented a major clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
did nothing to deter war more generally, as Korea, Vietnam, and many
other conflicts demonstrate. Presenters noted the foundational nature of
conventional army capabilities, often in support of joint or allied forces,
during every major conflict.
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These five insights may prove useful to today’s military and political
leaders who face the daunting prospect of reducing US military capabilities. If leaders can take any solace from history, it is that drawdowns have
proven to be a cyclical part of the American military experience, and
as irrational as the debate may become, the US military, especially the
Army, has often rebounded to meet future challenges.

Strategy & Policy

Rebalancing the Rebalance
Michael Spangler
Abstract: Since late 2011, the United States has pursued a policy
of “rebalancing toward Asia,” taking steps to expand its already significant role in the region. However, Washington has failed to check
– and may have unwittingly provoked – new Chinese measures to
erect multiple layers of security around contested areas in the South
and East China Seas. The United States should, therefore, consider
new bilateral security initiatives with China and its neighbors to ensure security cooperation catches up with economic cooperation in
the dynamic Asia-Pacific rim.

“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of
things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs
cannot be carried on to success.”
Confucius, Analects 13.3

B

eginning in late 2011, the Obama Administration unveiled its
intention to rebalance US military, diplomatic, and economic
efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. Initially described as a “pivot,”
this term was subsequently changed to “rebalance,” to describe more aptly
the repositioning of mainly military assets from a then 50-50 percent to
a 60-40 percent split, favoring the Asia-Pacific over the Atlantic side of
the world by 2020.1 In President Obama’s November 2011 address to
the Australian parliament, he emphasized the US policy goal is to ensure
“the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping [the
Asia-Pacific] region and its future.”2 In practice, the Asia-Pacific theater
was slated to gain a rotational US Marine Corps detachment (already
deployed to Australia) and an additional US carrier group: one aircraft
carrier, seven destroyers, ten littoral combat ships, and two submarines,
along with reconnaissance assets.3
In contrast to the limited permanent-base approach of the 1980s,
the US military rebalance relies upon rotational deployments through
several host-nation port facilities.4 As Commandant of the Marine
Corps General James Amos explained, dispersing US forces beyond a
few large bases makes them a harder target for ballistic missiles.5 In

1      Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, “Shangri-La Security Dialogue,” Speech at the Shangri-La
Hotel in Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681.
2      The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011.
3     Prem Mahadevan, Strategic Trends 2013: Key Developments in Global Affairs (Zurich: Eidgenössische
Technische Hochschule, 2013), 51, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Strategic-Trends2013-EastAsia.pdf.
4      J. Taylor Rushing, “Pentagon: No need for rotational troops as US aids Philippines
after Haiyan,” Stars and Stripes, November 12, 2013, http://www.stripes.com/
pentagon-no-need-for-rotational-troops-as-us-aids-philippines-after-haiyan-1.252563.
5      Zachary Keck, “Marine Corps Chief: Not Sure About Asia Force Posture,” Thediplomat.
com,February 12, 2014. .
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addition, rotational deployments are more cost-effective by using air
travel to rotate military personnel, while the power of the rebalance is
augmented by US foreign military sales to the region.6
Scholars such as Christopher Layne have relabeled the US rebalancing strategy as “off-shore balancing” - an attempt to contain the rise of
a potential hegemon, such as China, by relying on global and regional
power balances to attain that goal. As Layne explains:
•• Economic limitations are pushing the United States to reset priorities,
withdrawing and downsizing its forces in Europe and the Middle East
and concentrating its military power in East Asia.
•• By reducing its military footprint in the Middle East, the United
States may decrease the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism
directed against it. Safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gulf oil can
be ensured largely by naval and air power.
•• America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air
power, not land power, to manage security issues in Asia.
•• Off-shore balancing is a strategy of burden-sharing with Pacific Rim
allies to protect freedom of navigation in East Asia. 7
Consistent with the above interpretation, the US Defense Strategic
Guidance announced in January 2012 the United States will no longer
size its forces for long-term, prolonged stability operations (such as
those in Iraq and Afghanistan) while projecting power in areas that are
challenged by “asymmetric means,” notably, anti-access and area-denial
environments in the South and East China Seas.8
Close on the heels of President Obama’s announcement, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton amplified the importance of the AsiaPacific region, where half of the world’s population resides, indicating
its development is vital to American strategic and economic interests.
As she noted:
Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented
opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is
increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts
of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the
region’s key players.

The rebalance strategy, as described by Clinton, proceeds along six tracks:
(1) strengthening bilateral security alliances; (2) deepening America’s
relationships with emerging powers such as China; (3) engaging with
regional multilateral institutions; (4) expanding trade and investment;

6      Michael Fabey, “U.S. Leads International Defense Aircraft Suppliers In Asia Pacific,”
Aviation Week, November 26, 2013, http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/
awx_11_26_2013_p0-640906.xml
7      Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Off-shore Balancing,” National Interest, January
27, 2012.
8      Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Security Guidance
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 13, 2013), 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/R42146.pdf.

Strategy & Policy

Spangler

13

(5) forging a broad-based military presence; (6) and advancing democracy and human rights.9
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific thus demonstrates US leadership,
acknowledges the economic importance of the region, and highlights
freedom of navigation and military transparency as strategic goals. In
light of such comprehensive, transparent, and compelling security justifications, one might ask whether the rebalance has had the salutary
effect of assuring friendly and allied countries while deterring China as
a potential adversary in the region?
This paper argues the regional shaping benefits of the rebalance
have not yet materialized, and odds remain low they can be realized in
the absence of new efforts. In particular, China has become increasingly
assertive of its claims to disputed maritime territories in the East and
South China Seas, and remains committed to a relatively high rate of
military spending to project its power into the region in the coming
years. At the same time, some countries, notably US allies, Japan and
the Philippines, have become more vocal in their objections to Chinese
maritime claims and more convinced of their need for American military support as maritime disputes unfold. Indeed, US allies appear to
perceive the rebalancing as designed to put them on a more equal footing
to resolve their disputes with China -- and not leave them to face rising
Chinese power alone.10 It is therefore incumbent on Washington to
manage the contradictory aims of the rebalancing strategy more effectively: militarily bolstering allies while fostering peaceful cooperation.

Phase One: 2011-2012
Rebalancing Perceived as Military
From late 2011 through 2012, the United States took the following
concrete steps to implement its rebalancing initiative:
•• Created a new Pentagon office, the Air-Sea Strategy Office, in
November 2011, to refine the concept of a new joint air-sea battle
(first broached in 2009) to counter anti-access, area-denial operations,
principally in the Pacific.11
•• Announced new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore, and new military cooperation with the Philippines;
•• Emphasized American military presence in the Asia-Pacific would be
increased, become more broadly distributed, flexible, and politically

9      Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011. Her policy statement appears to have been partly influenced by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo’s assertion at the May 2010 US –China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that South China Sea maritime
claims were one of his country’s “core interests.” See Greg Sheridan, “China Actions Meant as a
Test, Hillary Clinton Says,” The Australian, November 9, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
national-affairs/china-actions-meant-as-test-hillary-clinton-says/story-fn59niix-1225949666285.
10      J. Kugler and D. Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) discusses the likelihood of conflict between states sharing a perceived parity or balance of power.
11      Stephen Glain, “The Pentagon’s New China War Plan,” Salon, August 13, 2011, http://www.
salon.com/2011/08/13/sino_us_stephen_glain/.
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sustainable;12
•• Made progress in negotiations to form a multi-national Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.13
Most countries in East and Southeast Asia were publicly receptive
to a stronger US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Regional
powers such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia took pains, however,
to avoid choosing sides between the United States and China. On the
other hand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore
explicitly welcomed greater US presence in the region. Tellingly, the
Philippines, along with Vietnam, remain embroiled in a protracted,
intense dispute with China over maritime and territorial claims in the
South China Sea. Singapore as a small city-state, and Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea as long-standing allies appear to have embraced the US
initiative as a stabilizing influence in the region.14
China’s initial reaction to the rebalance initiative was carefully
measured in official media and harshly critical in non-official media.
Many unofficial commentators, including military academics, asserted
the United States had unveiled the initiative as a new post-Cold-War
conspiracy to “contain” China as a rising power, and heir-apparent to
the former Soviet Union, as a potential adversary of the United States.
Indeed, some commentators argued this “conspiracy” could eventually
align China and Russia more closely together in joint economic and
defense efforts to mitigate US-led containment efforts.15 To date, most
Chinese bloggers remain vociferously nationalistic and critical of the US
rebalancing policy, although government-employed commentators may
be covertly shaping this ostensibly public phenomenon.16

Phase Two: Defanging the Rebalancing Initiative

In the lead-up to and aftermath of their June 2013 summit, Presidents
Barack Obama and Xi Jinping ushered in a new phase of the initiative
characterized by repeated calls for moderation. Chinese officials noted
there were “no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences”
between the two countries. Chinese military leaders also stressed that,
as the rebalancing initiative evolved, the United States has placed less

12      Thomas Donilon, “America is Back in the Pacific and will Uphold the Rules,” Financial Times,
November 27, 2011.
13      The twelve negotiating countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Some countries expressing
interest in TPP include South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Colombia, and Costa Rica. China, despite
its initial opposition, has more recently shown interest in considering eventual TPP membership.
Vicki Needham, “China’s Interest Grows in Joining an Asia-Pacific Trade Deal,” The Hill, September
17, 2013.
14      Robert G. Sutter, et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Washington,
DC: George Washington University: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, August 2013), 2. Also see
Alexander C.-C. Huang, “Taiwan in an Asian “Game of Thrones,” National Bureau of Asian Research,
Asian Policy No. 15 (January 2013): 18-19.
15      In fact, China and Russia concluded a long-sought natural gas deal and conducted joint military exercises in disputed waters off the coast of Japan this May. See Timothy Heritage and Vladimir
Soldatkin, “Putin Looks to Asia as West Threatens to Isolate Russia,” Reuters, March 21, 2014, and
“China Media: ‘Rise of Russia’,” BBC, March 20, 2014.
16      Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, On-line Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 257.
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emphasis on military initiatives and on China as a focus for the US
policy.17
Partly reflecting these moderating influences, People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Zhaozhoung described China’s
growing military activity in the South and East China Seas as a “cabbage
strategy” in a May 2013 television interview.18 This strategy seems
aimed at “defanging” the rebalancing policy by putting in place concentric circles of Chinese fishing boats, fishery administration ships,
maritime enforcement vessels, and warships (resembling a layer-by-layer
cabbage wrap) around disputed maritime areas in the China Seas. The
goal of the strategy is to assert China’s sovereignty over these areas via
a slow accumulation of small incremental changes, none of which in
itself constitutes a casus belli but together substantiate China’s claims of
sovereignty over the long term.
Another way to look at this strategy is to imagine a Chinese game
of weiqi, the popular Asian game of black-and-white pieces in which two
opposing players strive to surround the other. China’s July 2012 establishment of Sansha City on a Paracel island seized by force from Vietnam
in 1974 was the precursor of its new weiqi games with the Philippines and
Japan. Repeated Chinese navy standoffs with Philippine Coast Guard
vessels at Scarborough Reef from 2012 to 2013, and its imposition of
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Japanese-claimed
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in November 2013, are recent moves in these
games. China’s imposition of its ADIZ prompted South Korea, in
turn, to expand its own ADIZ into Japanese and Chinese ADIZs in
December 2013.19 Clearly, the busy East Asian coastal seas, with their
presumed underwater natural resources, are becoming hot points of
potential military conflict.
Indeed, as Robert Ross predicted in late 2012, the rebalancing
initiative has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby US policy
“unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and feeds China’s
aggressiveness, undermines regional stability, and decreases the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.”20

Phase Three: 2014-? Uncertainty

To address China’s concerns and to strengthen the cooperative
engagement, Brookings Institution fellows Jonathan Pollack and Jeffrey
Bader made several US policy recommendations in January 2014:
•• Ensure budget cuts do not affect the rebalance;
•• Complete Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in the first half of

17      Robert G. Sutter, et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Washington,
DC: George Washington University: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, August 2013), 2.
18     Robert Haddick, “America has no answer to China’s Salami-slicing,” War on the Rocks , February
6, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-chinas-salami-slicing.
19      David Lai, “A Few Questions about China’s Air Defense Identification Zone and its
Aftermath,” US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, March 21, 2014, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/A-Few-Questions-About-Chinas-Air-DefenseIdentification-Zone-and-Its-Aftermath/2014/03/21
20      Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and
Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November-December 2012): 70–82.
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2014 and support China’s eventual entry;
•• Encourage China’s economic reforms by, inter alia, completing a bilateral investment treaty with China by 2016;
•• Support Japanese security efforts while urging Prime Minister Abe
to avoid stirring up fractious historical issues that undercut Japanese
relations with China and South Korea;
•• Support negotiation of a code of conduct in the East and South China
Seas to de-escalate territorial disputes.21
Unfortunately, events since the publication of their Brookings
article put in doubt the likelihood most of their policy prescriptions will
be implemented in the near term. On the budgetary front alone, US
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland has
stated the rebalance was being reconsidered in light of budget pressures.22
Chinese commentators also asserted the US budget sequestration begun
in 2013 will likely prevent the United States from committing enough
resources to the rebalancing, thereby transforming the initiative into a
“strategic retreat.”23 Indeed, Pacific Air Forces Commander General
Herbert J. Carlisle has acknowledged resources have not yet been made
available to key elements of the policy due to other commitments.24
Just as important, President Obama’s State of the Union Speech in
January 2014 did not mention Asia-Pacific issues ranging from SinoJapanese tensions to larger concerns over maritime disputes and the
potential for an East Asian arms race. US Secretary of Defense Hagel’s
April 2014 visit to Beijing, however, did prominently acknowledge those
tensions. Secretary Hagel criticized China for unilaterally establishing
its ADIZ in the East China Sea without conferring with Japan and its
other neighbors. “That adds to tensions, misunderstandings and could
eventually add to, and eventually get to, a dangerous conflict,” Hagel
noted, while emphatically wagging his finger in a joint press conference
with Defense Minister and PLA General Chang Wanquan.25 PLA Major
General Zhu Chenghu, a military academic, later dismissed Hagel’s
remarks as “groundless,” suggesting the United States believes “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”26
In the lead up to Secretary Hagel’s visit, China decided to exclude
Japan from the international fleet review of the upcoming PLA-hosted
Western Pacific Naval Symposium, bringing together Pacific-rim countries. Since Japan will not participate in the fleet review, the United
States has also decided not to take part in a show of support, according
21      Jonathan D. Pollack and J.A. Bader, “Return to the Asia Rebalance,” Brookings
Research Paper, January 23, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/
asia-rebalance-us-china-relationship-pollack-bader
22      Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DoD Official: Asia Pivot ‘Can’t Happen,” Gannett Government
Media, Defense News, March 4, 2014.
23      Feitao Liu, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific,” China Institute of International Studies
Journal, September 4, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-09/04/content_6272923.htm
24      Aaron Mehta, “Interview: Gen. Hawk Carlisle, Commander, US Pacific Air Forces,” Gannett
Government Media, DefenseNews, February 10, 2014,.
25      Donald Nissenbaum, “U.S.-China Defense Chiefs Trade Barbs over Regional Ambitions,”
Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2014.
26      Fox News, “Chinese General Warns that U.S. is Making ‘Important’ Mistakes in the
Region,” Wall Street Journal By-line, May 31, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/31/
chinese-general-warns-that-us-is-making-imporant-mistakes-in-region/.
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to press reports.27 These events do not bode well for casting the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium as a venue for working out an acceptable
code of military practice to manage potential conflicts in the region. A
number of years ago, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium developed a
voluntary Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. However, the Chinese
have refused to accept any revisions to it, even though they acknowledge
their use of parts of it. China takes exception to the use of the word
“Code” in the title since it implies a “legally binding force.”28 Moreover,
the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea does not address other basic
issues although it constitutes a good start to defusing potential confrontations between navy fleets.29
As President Obama embarked on his April 2014 trip to Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the official Chinese Xinhua news
agency underscored Beijing’s sensitivity about his stops in Tokyo and
Manila: “The United States should reappraise its anachronistic hegemonic alliance system and stop pampering its chums like Japan and the
Philippines that have been igniting regional tensions with provocative
moves.”30 To date, Chinese media have chosen to spotlight these “hegemonic” US defense treaty obligations rather than equally firm American
enjoiners for the disputants to settle their maritime claims peacefully.31 Just as important, press coverage by US allies has failed, so far, to
highlight American emphasis on peaceful dispute-settlement. Instead,
foreign media dwell on the rebalancing strategy as leaving military
options on the table to counter China’s long-term intentions. Chances
for miscalculation and conflict have, therefore, risen on both sides. It
is striking that shortly after President Obama returned to Washington,
Vietnam issued a stiff warning to Beijing about new Chinese oil drilling
moves near the Paracel Islands; and Chinese vessels reportedly rammed
Vietnamese vessels in those waters, provoking anti-Chinese riots in Ho
Chi Minh City’s foreign investment area.32

Rebalancing the Rebalance?

Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the East and South
China Seas, Chinese scholars generally expect the United States to
delay or slow down the military rebalance in order to accommodate
US budgetary strictures and to preserve enough strategic military assets
to address seemingly chronic problems in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Northeast Asia. Professor Liu Feitao of the China Institute of
International Studies argues the United States may increasingly focus on
an “economic rebalancing” effort, such as expanding the Trans-Pacific

27      H. Cooper, “In a Test of Wills with China, the U.S. Sticks up for Japan,” New York Times, April
6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/world/asia/hagel-asia.html?_r=0.
28      Anthony Bergin, “Maritime Incidents at Sea,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog, March
2013. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reader-response-maritime-incidents-at-sea/.
29      CUES is inadequate because China asserts that military activities in its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) are subject to its approval. Until China agrees that its EEZ is not to be treated as territorial water, CUES is irrelevant, offering only a partial solution.
30      Deng Yushan, “Dynamic Asia needs U.S. to reshape anachronistic policy,” Xinhua News
Agency, April 23, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/23/c_133282220.
htm.
31      J. Eilperin, “President Obama Affirms U.S. Will Stand By Treaty Obligations to Japan,”
Washington Post, April 24, 2014.
32      Deutsche Welle, “Vietnam Protests China Drilling for Oil in Disputed Waters Near Paracel
Islands,” May 5, 2014; C. Doan and T. Fuller, “Foreign Factories in China Weigh Damage in antiChina Riots,” New York Times, May 14, 2014.
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Partnership and promoting military sales, to help sustain a scaled-back
effort.33
At the same time, Liu maintains the United States “will increasingly
try to control Asian territorial disputes through legal means and multiple
channels.” Highlighting Washington's unsuccessful attempt to ratify
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea during President
Obama’s first term, Liu predicts US policy:
...will undertake similar [multilateral] efforts and bring legality into the forefront of dispute intervention. The United States will try to turn multilateral
mechanisms like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus and the East Asia Summit into acceptable
platforms to discuss territorial disputes.34

It is likely Chinese policy makers will continue to reject US efforts
to promote multilateral fora and international norms as means to work
out China’s emerging maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing
is, so far, rigidly committed to addressing these disputes “reasonably
and peacefully” with its neighbors only on a bilateral basis. Chinese
leaders also seem adamant about refusing to recognize the “authority”
or “expertise” of international bodies, such as the international arbitration panel currently reviewing the Sino-Philippines dispute as a result of
a unilateral Philippine request in early 2013.35 Few Chinese academics,
military or otherwise, are swimming against this tide and calling for a
critical reappraisal of China’s bilateral approach.36

A New Initiative

Given this apparently intractable stalemate, the United States should
consider encouraging its treaty partner, the Philippines, to take the lead
in launching bilateral negotiations with Beijing on the resolution of
conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. The United States
should no longer insist on multilateral fora and legalistic platforms
against which China harbors deep suspicions regarding their fairness
and track record.37 Indeed, since China’s land border disputes with its
neighbors have largely been worked out, through bilateral talks, Beijing
is highly likely to hew to what it knows. China may calculate it can exert

33      Feitao Liu, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific,” China Institute of International Studies
Journal, September 4, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-09/04/content_6272923.htm.
34      Ibid. Also see Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s article, “Securing the Rule of Law at
Sea,” Project-Syndicate, June 2, 2014. Prime Minister Abe advocates the use of ASEAN’s 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a multilateral basis for resolving
maritime issues.
35      The International Court of Arbitration comprises more than 100 members from about 90
countries; http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-of-arbitration/. Peter A. Dutton, “The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row,” Center for
New American Security, East and South China Sea Bulletin, no. 10 (March 15, 2013): 2.
36      This stance could change in the future, if Chinese academics believe China’s defense has
succeeded in gradually strengthening its maritime claims and altering the international order to its
benefit. At present, however, Chinese elites generally reject the “international order” as a set of
rules created by the victors of World Wars I and II without meaningful Chinese (and developing
world) input.
37      Interestingly, China has (1) recognized the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as the
key legal framework applicable in the Arctic and (2) acknowledged the “sovereign rights” of Arctic
littoral states there, the latter apparently consistent with China’s own maritime claims in the East and
South China Seas. See J. Kapyla and H. Mikkola, “The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China,
the U.S., and the European Union,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Paper no. 133, August
2013, http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/347/the_global_arctic/.
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finer control over such negotiations, in terms of both content and pace,
by conducting them on a bilateral basis.38
For its part, Manila may wish to supplement its ongoing arbitration
case with a bilateral negotiation approach to demonstrate its commitment to the peaceful resolution of its maritime disputes. In an effort
to establish consistent standards and precedents to serve as the basis
for resolving other disputes, the Philippines could also exchange notes
regularly on its negotiations with China and its neighbors. This measure
will ensure the talks can inform and encourage other countries to initiate similar measures in the future. It is key that Manila’s talks not
give Beijing any preponderant advantage by isolating or leveraging the
Philippines against other disputants. In other words, this weiqi-like
diplomatic negotiation can be completed as China’s future negotiation
partners consult with each other.
An information-sharing approach to Sino-Philippine talks would
also help ensure the terms of the agreement (including the delimitation of
maritime borders and resource exploitation) are worked out consistently,
while checking off necessary security objectives, ranging from protocols
for military and law enforcement encounters at sea to the establishment
of procedures and hotlines for military exercise notifications and the
avoidance of military confrontation. Other countries such as Vietnam,
Japan, and South Korea may later elect to pursue similar negotiations
with China, to resolve inter-connected defense and resource management issues just as critical to their own economic development and to
foreign relations with their neighbors.39
In addition, separate Sino-American talks could aim to avoid
another “USS Cowpens” situation in which Chinese and US military
vessels nearly collided in the South China Sea in December 2013.40 A
US defense official underscored the importance of establishing communication protocols to prevent such accidents in the future: “Sustained
and reliable communication mitigates the risk of mishaps, which is in
the interest of both the United States and China.”41 In short, China,
the United States and their Pacific-rim neighbors can jointly pursue Sun
Tzu’s dictum, “To be prepared for any contingency is the greatest of
virtues.”42
38      Malaysia follows a bilateral course with China and appears committed to accommodating
China’s maritime claims while pursuing cooperative initiatives with China including joint maritime
exercises beginning in 2014. Vietnam has, so far, had mixed results in pursuing bilateral talks with
China, both sides having agreed on their land border and maritime rights in the Gulf of Tonkin,
but not on the sensitive Paracel and Spratly Islands disputes. See K. Bradsher, “China and Vietnam
at Impasse over Oil Rig in South China Sea,” New York Times, May 12, 2014. As a result, Vietnam
is considering the filing of an international arbitration case against China, similar to that submitted
by the Philippines in 2013. K. Kwok, “China Wants to Avoid Court over Maritime Disputes, Says
Vietnam Official,” South China Morning Post, June 2, 2014.
39      In the absence of any meaningful progress on maritime issues, Japan, the Philippines, and
Vietnam could begin to cooperate more closely on defensive measures in the South China Sea. See
“Australia backs U.S., Japan against China,” Inquirer Global Nation, June 3, 2014. However, implementing such defensive measures should be preceded by utilizing both bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic means to explain the measures to China and to seek a peaceful resolution. H.B. Minh
and B. Blanchard, “China Scolds Vietnam for Hyping Up South China Sea Oil Rig Row,” Yahoo
News, June 18, 2014.
40      Carl Thayer, “USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust between the U.S. and
China,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2013.
41      Ibid.
42      Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” Art of War blog, 2001, http://www.artofwar.net/suntzu/quotes.
html.
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Managing Blow-Back

The US sponsorship of Sino-Philippine talks concerning South
China Sea raises some serious questions. First, would such a US action
undermine US preference for multilateral negotiations and frameworks?
Does such a bilateral strategy ultimately play into the hands of a rising
China seeking to use its growing economic clout to impose its will on
small countries by dividing and overwhelming them in serial order?
Finally, would the bilateral approach be interpreted by China as a sign of
US weakness in standing by its treaty partners in East Asia? Some critics
would answer these questions affirmatively, arguing Washington should
eschew a bilateral approach and simply stay the course in deterring
Beijing by accelerating the implementation of military rebalancing measures coupled with a more vigorous definition of US treaty obligations.
The basic answer to these criticisms is Washington and its partners
can and should accommodate several complementary initiatives in their
effort to pursue a peaceful resolution of East and South China Sea disputes. By reviewing China’s concerns in bilateral fora, the United States
and its partners open new avenues capable of leading to a break-through
in the resolution of these disputes. Moreover, progress on the bilateral
front does not undermine, deny, or contradict any multi-lateral or international framework, but rather creates new opportunities to bring those
organizations and platforms into the talks and to incorporate them into
bilaterally accepted decisions. Such progress does not signal a lack of
resolve on the parts of the United States and its allies -- but a flexibility
to exhaust all possible channels before imposing specific red-lines that
could trigger the use of military power.

Conclusion

To maintain the momentum of its rebalancing policy, the United
States must help bridge the growing impasse between American-led
multilateral and Chinese bilateral efforts to resolve Asian-Pacific maritime disputes. Indeed, it may also be vital for the United States to recast
the strategic thrust of its rebalancing initiative. Sino-American progress
on key issues has been made over the past few decades by pursuing a
constructive, systematic engagement process that works through issues
on a flexible, cooperative, and pragmatic basis. Drawing on this historical theme of “constructive engagement” means recasting the inherent
thrust of the rebalance – harnessing it to the purpose of "catching up"
security cooperation with economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.43
In this way, the rebalancing initiative may be better labeled as “keeping
pace” to match international security cooperation with robust economic
activity within the Pacific Rim.
It is far from an easy task for the United States to persuade the
Philippines and other regional actors to enter into a complicated bilateral
talks with China. Such talks will require Washington to walk a tightrope
between Realpolitik and normative diplomacy, the former characterized
by bilateral agreements and the latter by calling for international integration within a multilateral approach. Throughout, Washinton will
need to emphasize both the inviolability of its treaty obligations to its

43     “Clinton Defends Constructive Engagement of China,” All Politics, October 24, 1997, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/.
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allies and the value of accepted international legal norms, as Pacific Rim
nations are encouraged to conclude inter-locking bilateral maritime
arrangements with China.
Bilateral talks may evolve over time into trilateral ones with the
United States encouraging parties to stay on a constructive track and
avoid increased tensions and hostility. American support could assure
allies they risk little -- and may make more headway -- by acknowledging
China’s reluctance to engage with multilateral institutions. The alternative to this tri-bilateral hybrid approach seems both short-sighted and
dangerous: pursuing a waiting game that juxtaposes growing military
forces, posits mutually exclusive economic interests, fuels nationalistic
over-reactions, and inadvertently risks a new arms race hampering the
development of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
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Abstract: The March 2014 annexation of Crimea may be interpreted as a contest between Russian strategy and Western statecraft.
The respective natures of strategy and statecraft differ substantially,
which predetermined the parameters and outcome of the Crimean
crisis. This makes an excellent case study of the interaction between
strategy and statecraft, and shows why strategy trumps statecraft in
direct confrontations.

E

ven as Russia continues to undermine eastern Ukraine with
provocateurs from within and massed troops from without, it
is fair to say the Crimean component of the ongoing Ukrainian
crisis has concluded. This clearly important historical event will be mined
for further insight into Russian foreign policy, as well as statecraft and
international relations, for years to come. Contemporary commentary
on the crisis ranges from blame to the vociferous defense by Russia’s
premier international propaganda arm, Russia Today. Academics blogged
throughout to consider political, economic, and other implications in real
time as the crisis developed.
With Crimea now annexed by Russia (even though questions about
Russian intentions toward the rest of Ukraine continue), it is possible to
step back and consider the crisis as a whole. Why and how did Russia so
easily impose its will upon the course of events? Why did the statecraft
practiced by the Western powers appear so weak and anemic?
This article suggests the dynamics and outcome of the Crimean
crisis were determined by disparate assumptions and methods of thinking on the part of the West and of Russia. The West practiced statecraft.
Russia entered into Crimea anticipating the need for strategy as classically understood—using force to gain its political ends though ultimately
their threat of force sufficed. This difference between statecraft and
strategy dominated the entire affair. To illustrate the importance of
this distinction, the respective natures of strategy and statecraft will be
explored as lenses through which to examine the crisis. Finally, because
strategy and statecraft differ so significantly, the real and anticipated
post-crisis consequences of statecraft will be considered, even though
that statecraft now no longer opposes strategy in any immediate sense.
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However, strategy approaches the question of freedom of action differently from statecraft, a divergence stemming from the fundamental
assumptions and ways of thinking which respectively underpin the two,
particularly concerning the role of military force. It is because of the
sheer difference between the nature of force, on the one hand, and all
other instruments of political power, on the other hand, that one must
make a clear distinction between the threat or use of force and the
employment of all other political tools. This difference renders many
modern definitions of strategy obscure by implying functional equality
between all instruments of power. Strategy, in its classical sense (as a
concept solely dedicated to understanding and mastering military force)
when employed side-by-side with the wider concept of statecraft, adopts
the natures of the instruments available.
Force and its political utility are thus the primary concerns of strategy. Colin Gray has defined strategy as “the use that is made of force and
the threat of force for the ends of policy.”2 Threatened (or actual) violence is,
therefore, the first instrument in the strategist’s toolkit. Such threat of or
use of force may well be reciprocated by the opposing party, giving rise
to the adversarial, reciprocal nature of strategy. Beaufre has similarly
defined strategy as “the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely,
the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.”3 A
strategic mindset focuses on directing violence in a context where the
other party is likely to respond in kind. But for what purpose?
Clausewitz clearly understood the purpose of force, encapsulating
it in his definition of war. “War is thus an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will.”4 A strategist uses force to impose an unwelcome
situation upon his enemy. The American admiral and strategic theorist
J.C. Wylie similarly asserted “the aim of war is some measure of control
over the enemy” and further clarified “control sought in war should be
neither so extreme as to amount to extermination…nor should it be so
tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to
the victory.”5 The threat, or actual use of force is meant to be converted
to a non-violent purpose or end. “[T]his dilemma of currency conversion is central to the difficulty of strategy.”6 This difficulty is, of course,
eased when force does not actually have to be used.
Statecraft is the use of power in international relations. As the larger
idea, it subsumes strategy within it. However, statecraft beyond the realm
of strategy rests upon contrasting assumptions and ways of thinking,
being typically conducted via diplomacy, “a field where success, in the
last analysis, was best assured by agreements that provided mutuality of
advantage.” 7 It tends, therefore, toward persuasive means of achieving
political objectives, though as a whole statecraft constitutes a spectrum
ranging from persuasion to coercion. Yet, even coercive diplomacy is
2      Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
3      Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 22.
4      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.
5      J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press 1989), 66, 70.
6      Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 136.
7      Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of
Our Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 15.
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closer to diplomacy than to strategy. “Coercive diplomacy needs to be
distinguished from pure coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to
cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. In contrast
to the crude use of force to repel the opponent, coercive diplomacy
emphasizes the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to
persuade him to back down.”8 Coercive diplomacy, thus, overlaps with
strategy to some extent—the primary difference stemming from how
force is understood.
One may engage in coercive diplomacy, or at least attempt to do so,
without understanding the nature of military force as an instrument,
or the nature of strategy. Such use tends to rely on force as bluff. If
force must actually be employed in coercive diplomacy, it is frequently
ineffective. This is an important distinction because “[t]he declaration
of war, and more immediately the use of violence, alters everything.
From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more
than the direction of policy shapes war.”9 The reciprocal use of force
can and does take on a life of its own which may be mastered only with
difficulty. Strategy accepts this reciprocality; whereas diplomacy and
statecraft rarely do. The presence of force also changes the significance
of all other instruments of statecraft, including diplomacy, economic or
financial pressure, propaganda, and so on. These instruments do not
wholly lose their worth—far from it—but their actual specific utility is
inevitably modified by the serious threat of or use of force.
The principal differences between strategy and statecraft are the sets
of fundamental assumptions and ways of thinking respective to each.
Strategy is by definition adversarial and seeks victory; whereas statecraft
is merely competitive and seeks common ground and agreement, even
within the coercive use of force. Most writing on strategy assumes the
presence of a reciprocating enemy; most writing on statecraft assumes
common ground may be found and reached through diplomacy and
persuasion. Their accepted mechanisms to resolve conflict differ fundamentally, giving strategy the advantage due to the respective images
each side of the conflict has of the other. The mindset of the strategist
is thus at odds with, perhaps even opposed to, the manner of thinking
inherent in most of statecraft. Moreover, their mutual interaction has
not been extensively investigated. What happens when one political
actor enters into a confrontation with strategic assumptions, and his
opposite with the assumptions underpinning statecraft? The Crimean
takeover of March 2014 makes an excellent case study not only of such a
confrontation, but of why statecraft fails in the face of classical strategy.

The Crimean Crisis

The Crimean crisis began with a Russian move. Yanukovich ordered
snipers to shoot into the crowds at Maidan (Independence) Square.
When this act of violence inflamed the protestors’ passions rather than
suppressing them, he fled or, as reported by Ukrainian investigators, was
perhaps abducted to Russia. Russian armed forces thereafter moved
into Crimea, an invasion that violated the sovereign territory of another

8      Ibid., 189.
9      Hew Strachan, “Strategy in the Twenty-First Century,” in The Changing Character of War,
eds. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 508.
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state. Together with Russian and pro-Russian paramilitary forces, they
besieged Ukrainian army and navy posts and attempted to disarm those
inside, limiting their freedom of action. Thereafter, Russian armed
forces largely remained a tactically latent threat but one being up by
constant reinforcement. Ukrainians did not resist with force, which
suited Russian purposes. After all, as Clausewitz noted, “[t]he aggressor
is always peace-loving…he would prefer to take over our country unopposed…To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and
be prepared for it.”10 The result in Crimea was a foregone conclusion as
soon as Ukraine had chosen not to reply to the Russian invasion with
armed force. Ukrainians were not willing or able to make war, rightly
or wrongly, and so could not prevent the loss of Crimea.
The result of the crisis was a foregone conclusion because the
Russians understood a basic tenet of strategy: “[T]he ultimate determinant
in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in war.
He is in control. He determines who wins.”11 Russia established control
in Crimea through its military and paramilitary presence. It is immaterial that this presence did not begin causing bloodshed and inflicting
casualties upon Ukrainian armed forces in the region; control had been
established.12 With this move, Russia had achieved two conditions.
First, it had unambiguously demonstrated its political resolve by going
to the extreme of introducing military force into the situation, a resolve
unlikely to be shaken by countermeasures short of force. Second, the
end result could not be in doubt as long as Russian forces remained.
They would have prevented Ukraine from exercising its sovereignty in
the region in any case, with or without bloodshed, much as the United
Nations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
were prevented from entering Crimea to observe the situation.
Having imposed control over the future of Crimea, Russia could
allow the slower-acting non-military instruments of political power to
guide the peninsula toward its fate. Russia could afford to take its time
because it was already in effective control of Crimea, a control which
further amplified the efficacy of its slower non-military tools. This
fact also gave the false impression that the crisis could still be resolved
through western statecraft in some manner other than that desired by
the Kremlin. Russia employed two primary non-military instruments
to consolidate its hold on Crimea: propaganda, as conveyed internationally by Russia Today as well as across large swaths of eastern Europe by
Russian media such as the First Baltic Channel; and local and imported
pro-Russian supporters in Crimea, who took over the power structure
and bent it to Putin’s will.
Russia has disseminated propaganda in Ukraine for years through
print media, television, and radio. It has deep roots in Ukraine and
many, particularly in the south and east of the country, may read, watch,
or listen only to Russian media for all their news consumption. For
example, in 2009 Russian newspapers accounted for 66.7 percent of all
those circulated. This “creates a threat to Ukrainian national security
10      Clausewitz, On War, 370.
11      Wylie, Military Strategy, 72.
12      Russian forces did slowly assault border posts in Crimea to evict the guards and their
families, and gradually assaulted all Ukrainian army posts after the conclusion of the internationally unrecognized referendum.
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due to the aggressive informative policy of some Russian TV channels
in relation to Ukraine and its citizens.”13 This aggressive information
flow aims to influence Ukrainian policy toward Russia, such as by agitating against joining NATO and promoting the Russian language as an
official language while casting a defamatory shadow by accusing various
Ukrainian center-right parties of ultra-nationalism or even fascism.14
Russian propaganda, therefore, lent local legitimacy to its invasion of
Crimea; and reciprocally the Russian invasion of Crimea lent credence to
its propaganda. Why else would the Russian armed forces be in Crimea,
save to protect ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian government?
Russia’s supporters in Crimea, its second non-military tool, were—
and are—led by Sergey Aksyonov. He illegitimately assumed power in
Crimea largely due to the presence of Russian forces. He was allegedly
supported by fifty-five of the sixty-four invited delegates, of the one
hundred who normally make up the legislature. Yet controversy persists
as to whether a physical quorum was reached. A number of the delegates
alleged they were not actually present—“at least 10 votes…were cast
for people who were not in the chamber.” The utility of latent force
becomes apparent, given that Aksyonov received only four percent of
the vote in the most recent election in Crimea in 2010.15 This practice
has been the pattern in Crimea throughout the crisis. Gallup conducted
a public opinion poll amongst the residents of Crimea in May 2013,
which revealed 23 percent of Crimea’s inhabitants believed the peninsula
should be separated from Ukraine and ceded to Russia. This actually
indicated a downward trend, as 33 percent held such views in 2011.16 Yet
the results of the internationally unrecognized referendum in Crimea
indicate over 95 percent voted for joining Russia. Only the threat of
Russian force enabled these results, based in large part on widespread
propaganda and further rigging of the outcomes.
Ultimately, once Russia had introduced armed force into Crimea,
it was virtually impossible for it to fail to annex it, barring an effective
armed response from Ukraine or the West. When this move was not
forthcoming, the game was up—and Russia had won Crimea through
non-military instruments whose utility and effectiveness was entirely
premised upon the presence of Russian forces.
The enabling and strengthening effect that the presence and threat
of Russian armed forces in Crimea had on other Russian tools of political power may be contrasted with the weakening effect that same threat
of force had on Western statecraft. The Western practice of statecraft
throughout the crisis has been primarily based upon rhetoric and appeals
to international norms and laws, as well as upon targeted sanctions
against individuals in Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia. To a lesser but ever
increasing degree, the West has also acted to shore up the confidence
13      Gatis Pelnēns, ed., The “Humanitarian Dimension” of Russian Foreign Policy Toward
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, trans. Rihards Kalniņš (Riga: Center for East
European Policy Studies, 2009), figures on Russian media share 295, quote 293.
14      Ibid., 295.
15      “RPT-INSIGHT-How the separatists delivered Crimea to Moscow,” Reuters, 13 March
2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-idINL6N0M93AH20140313, accessed 23 March 2014.
16      Baltic Surveys Ltd./The Gallup Organization & Rating Group Ukraine, Public Opinion
Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea May 16 – 30, 2013 (International
Republican Institute, 2013).
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of the easternmost constituents of NATO—Poland, the Baltic States,
Romania—through closer military cooperation. Most of the West’s
actions have not, however, had much bearing on the course of the crisis.
Western statecraft throughout the early days of the Crimean crisis
was variable and evidenced differences of opinion between the United
States and Europe, as well as among European countries themselves, on
the necessary level of stringency suitable for any response. Responses
consisted largely of diplomatic and legal rhetoric, and varying degrees
of condemnation. Most spoke out in support of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and deplored the introduction of armed forces into Crimean
Ukraine as illegal and against the Budapest Memorandum of 1994; at
times these statements were balanced by calls for Ukraine to respect
the minority rights of ethnic Russians. The West largely considered
the Russian intervention to be both illegal and against common norms
enshrined in international law. Vladimir Putin, however, insisted his
actions aligned with international law, in part because he denied the
presence of any Russian forces in Crimea, save for those allowed by
treaty on their leased naval base at Sevastopol. Moreover, he attempted
to contrast this practice with what he considered the Western approach.
Our partners, especially in the United Sates, always clearly formulate their
own geopolitical and state interests and follow them with persistence. Then,
using the principle “You’re either with us or against us” they draw the whole
world in. And those who do not join in get ‘beaten’ until they do.
Our approach is different. We proceed from the conviction that we always
act legitimately...[I]f I do decide to use the armed forces, this will be a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international
law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate President, and with our
commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the
people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties.17

Russia rebuffed all of the West’s diplomatic and legal rhetoric. Having
already established the facts it desired on the ground, and in doing so
having created the crisis, Russia could afford to ignore the West’s rhetoric. That rhetoric could not change the parameters of the crisis unless
it influenced Russian political and strategic decision-making, which, as
Putin’s words clearly indicate, was not likely.
Similarly, economic considerations were unlikely ever to deter
a territorially and demographically nationalistic Russia. Putin would
well have known that Crimea constituted a net cost to Ukraine of $1.1
billion a year and would for Russia as well. Moreover, Crimea’s entire
infrastructure is geared toward a northward connection with Ukraine
rather than an eastward connection toward Russia, requiring further
investment.18 In this context of expected economic costs for Russia,
the West also raised the possibility of economic sanctions in its rhetoric and, eventually, also in its actions. Economic pressures generally
work slowly, and rarely take effect directly against military units in the
field. Sanctions were, thus, never likely to influence the outcome of the
17      Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine,”
Press Conference, 4 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6763, accessed 27 March 2014.
18      Alexander Kolyandr, “Crimea Could Prove Expensive Acquisition for Russia,” The Wall
Street Journal, 7 March 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304732804
579425110479303926, accessed 29 March 2014.
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crisis, unless they swayed Russian political decision-making in Moscow.
Their slow pace has begun affecting Russia only after the annexation of
Crimea.
The presence of Russian forces in Crimea, and the political will
behind it, largely muted much of the West’s practice of statecraft. The
approaches the West and Russia took in relation to Crimea reflected
their respective political wills. Russia had the will to employ force, and
therefore also had the will to ignore the anticipated consequences of
Western statecraft, though it also attempted rhetorically to mitigate
those consequences. The West had no plausibly effective levers with
which to pry Crimea away from Russia short of the use of force, but
it was not nearly as invested in the status of Crimea; and, therefore,
practiced statecraft, even though such a course of action could never
change the outcome. If the West had had the will to maintain Crimea
as Ukrainian territory, it also would have practiced strategy—and war
would have resulted. Strategy thus trumped statecraft both in defining
the range of possible outcomes in Crimea, and in ensuring the actual
end result as well. Western statecraft, due both to its slow escalation and
to the nature of the instruments used and actions chosen, has become
more about punishing Russia for its action in Crimea than trying to
prevent or reverse what occurred. Actions taken to reassure Poland and
the Baltic States are also meant to deter Russia from considering similar
interventions. These wider, punishing, effects of the Western reaction
will now be considered as one final aspect of statecraft and its interaction
with strategy.

Post-Crisis Consequences

In conflict, statecraft and strategy are mismatched, as the former
generally cannot overturn the latter due to the natures of their respective instruments. Strategy, focused on force, is about consequences and
conclusions. Strategy must end; sooner or later force must be lifted.
“It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make
someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can be withheld or inflicted, or that a victim
believes can be withheld or inflicted.”19 It may also achieve effects
quickly—indeed, the rapid achievement of effects is usually supremely
desirable, as strategy assumes the mutual imposition of damage.
Statecraft, by contrast, usually employs means which take effect only
slowly. Economic sanctions mean nothing if implemented for a single
day. Statecraft is also, like strategy, about consequences. But unlike
strategy, statecraft is less about conclusions than about continuation.
The coercive tools of statecraft may come to an end if the policy goal
is achieved, but persuasive or rewarding instruments do not necessarily
conclude. For this reason western statecraft has taken on the character
of imposing punishment after the end of the crisis rather than of preventing it from reaching the conclusion desired by Russia. Economic
pressure and diplomatic isolation are long-term instruments which
comprise the major elements of Western statecraft for punishing and
restricting Russia, alongside NATO’s military reassurance of its easternmost constituents.
19      Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 3.

30

Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014

One aspect of the West’s diplomacy— in both rhetoric and action—
was the threat of diplomatic isolation. All cooperation between NATO
and Russia has been suspended, including a joint mission to escort
chemical weapons out of Syria.20 However, diplomatic isolation is not
an instrument which can achieve effects quickly—if at all. It impinges
upon the target’s freedom of action during the time it is in effect and
therefore increases the difficulty of accomplishing foreign policy goals.
It can only sway the target’s policies if the increased difficulty and costs
of achieving policy outweigh the benefits of the policy itself. For this
reason, diplomatic isolation must be sustained even to have a chance at
achieving effect. Yet even difficulty fulfilling policy does not guarantee
actual change in policy. Moreover, not all are in agreement with the aim
of diplomatically isolating Russia. Russia’s fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa) members have diplomatically supported
it, denouncing the West’s rhetoric and asserting Russia’s right to attend
the G20 (Group of Twenty) summit in Brisbane in November 2014.21
The BRICS are also in the process of establishing institutions whose
functions parallel those of the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, a sign that Russia’s ability to practice statecraft has been only partially damaged. This partial isolation will provide even less possibility
for effect. Given its stated foreign policy goals of looking after ethnic
Russians beyond its borders, Russian foreign policy is unlikely to be
influenced by diplomatic isolation in any case. Indeed, some observers
have drawn parallels between Russia’s actions in Crimea in light of these
foreign policy goals and the Soviet Union’s old Brezhnev Doctrine.22
The West targeted sanctions against blacklisted figures in the former
Ukrainian and current Russian governments, as well as some oligarchs
who support them, although Putin had reportedly already pressured
some to repatriate their assets in previous years. To date, the sanctions
themselves have not aimed to damage the whole of the Russian economy,
but they suffice to interfere with some aspects of Russian diplomatic and
commercial activity, such as blocking Bank Rossiya transactions and
reinforcing Russia’s diplomatic isolation. The resulting instability has
led to fear in the financial markets and capital flight. The ruble has also
fallen, causing Russian companies, which hold foreign currency debts
amounting to over half a trillion dollars, to struggle to pay their debts.23
To date, these sanctions have failed to influence Russia’s policy toward
Crimea and Ukraine, although outside observers suggest Russia may
face recession if the financial and economic pressure continues.24 Of all
the long-term results of Western statecraft, the economic consequences
in Russia may be among the most important for its future freedom of
20      Adrian Croft and Sabine Siebold, “NATO suspends cooperation with Russia,” Reuters, 2
April 2014.; John Vandiver, “NATO to cancel activities with Russia, step up military cooperation
with Ukraine,” Stars and Stripes, 6 March 2014.
21      Geoffrey York, “Putin’s BRICS allies reject sanctions, condemn West’s ‘hostile language’,” The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/
putins-brics-allies-reject-sanctions-condemn-hostile-language/article17638238/.
22      Rinalds Gulbis, “Putins: Krima. Brežņeva doktrīnas atdzimšana,” ir, 21 March 2014, http://
www.ir.lv/2014/3/21/putins-krima-brezneva-doktrinas-atdzimsana, accessed 3 April 2014.
23      Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Capital controls feared in Russia after $70bn flight,” Telegraph, 24
March 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10720226/Capital-controls-fearedin-Russia-after-70bn-flight.html.
24      Andra Timu, Henry Meyer and Olga Tanas, “Russia Facing Recession as Sanctions Likely
to Intensify,” 24 March 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-23/russia-staring-atrecession-on-sanctions-that-could-get-tougher.html.
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action. Not only do they require Russia to focus more on economic
problems than on foreign policy goals, but they weaken Russia’s ability
to maintain its hard power and to fund its soft power. As Paul Kennedy
noted in 1989, “the historical record suggests there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power’s economic
rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power
(or world empire).”25 Only time will tell whether the economic consequences for Russia will be so great or not.
Military reassurance of NATO’s eastern constituents has occurred
through a handful of ways. Its Baltic and Polish air policing contingents
have increased substantially with supplementary fighters and refueling
aircraft from various countries. Discussion has also begun concerning
the opening of a new air base, possibly in Estonia, and the adaptation
of one port to suit NATO naval vessels, possibly in Latvia. Poland has
also requested 10,000 troops to be based on its territory.26 Explicit confirmations of adherence to NATO’s article five have also been made by
highly placed officials and ministers both within the alliance structure
and from some member states; and consultations between the United
States and NATO’s eastern members have increased in frequency and
visibility. Although this military reassurance has been an important
aspect of the west’s statecraft throughout and after the Crimean crisis,
it has had no bearing on the course of the crisis itself. Rather, its
purpose, besides reassuring the most potentially vulnerable members of
NATO, has been to deter potential future Russian incursions into those
countries. As with all attempts at deterrence, it is impossible to know
whether it will succeed. Whether or not Russia may be deterred from
undertaking interventions similar to the one in Crimea, such military
reassurance has likely affected—and limited—Russia’s future freedom
of action. Yet, despite this real effect, NATO’s military reassurance is
the least painful of all the elements of Western statecraft, because it does
not directly influence Russia, its diplomatic position, or its economic
strength. Although this military reassurance response was fairly muted
at the beginning, it has become one of the main pillars of Western statecraft surrounding the crisis.
Western statecraft has necessarily been practiced even after the end,
through fait accompli, of the Crimean crisis; the nature of the instruments
available to statecraft to achieve effect must be employed over a much
longer duration. Because the crisis ended before Western statecraft
could possibly become effective, statecraft has taken on a character
meant to punish Russia and deter it from taking such actions in the
future. This change of character from prevention and resolution to
punishment and deterrence was due to the shift in context, as Russia
effectively annexed Crimea. This is an almost inevitable result of any
conflict between the practice of statecraft by one polity and the practice of strategy by another, because strategy generally achieves quicker
results through the threat and employment of force to impose one’s will
upon the other party.
25      Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxii.
26      Bruno Waterfield and Tony Paterson, “Ukraine Crisis: Poland Asks NATO to Station 10,000
Troops on its Territory,” Telegraph, 1 April 2014.
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Besides statecraft’s need for more time than strategy, its practice
by the West has also been fuelled by the ongoing activities in Ukraine’s
eastern portions. The crisis and context, however, have changed from
the Crimean focus in March. Throughout the spring and summer of
2014 both Western and Russian statecraft have mutually opposed each
other, while Ukraine began practicing strategy through military action
against the separatists in the east. Russia’s statecraft-based interventions
have failed to restrain Ukraine’s strategic actions, much as the West’s
statecraft failed to overturn Russia’s strategy in Crimea. Moreover,
Ukraine is making progress against the separatists in the east by finally
employing force without regard for Russian statecraft, thereby upsetting
Russian policy.

Conclusion

Russia and the West approached the Crimean crisis from fundamentally different assumptions and modes of thinking. Russia acted
strategically, thereby instigating the crisis, and the West responded
with statecraft. Russia ultimately won in Crimea thanks to its choice
of approach—though this is not to argue they would not have won if
the West had acted strategically as well, for the choice of approach also
gives insight into relative political will and operational capability. Russia
did not practice strategy in its reciprocally adversarial form only because
no one actively resisted Russia’s invasion with armed force—but it had
entered Crimea with the assumptions, ways of thinking, and desire to
impose its will upon the other party which characterizes strategy as
opposed to statecraft.
Edward Luttwak has identified the apex of strategic performance as
“the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of the entire predicament of strateg y.”27
The predicament of strategy is the enemy and his independent will and
capability to act against one’s own purposes. The apex, therefore, is
the removal of the enemy’s ability, however temporarily, to influence
outcomes. Judged by this narrow standard, Russia’s actions in Crimea
represent an effective strategy. Russia did not have an enemy in Crimea.
Even Ukraine did not fight Russia. The West practiced statecraft; it explicitly discounted the threat, or actual use of force, as publicly announced
by Obama and a number of other officials throughout Western countries. The West, therefore, could not influence the outcome of the crisis,
it could (and can) only impose punishment after the fact in an attempt
to preclude any such future interventions by Russia. This latter point,
which may become an important factor for Russia in the longer term,
represents the only disadvantageous consequence to Russia of its actions
in Crimea; these otherwise have been de facto accepted. Russia’s practice
of strategy in Crimea was exemplary, but its choice to do so may eventually incur crippling costs arising from Western statecraft—though this
remains to be seen.28

27      Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 4.
28      The Russians acted much as the elder Helmuth von Moltke preferred, combining a strategic
offensive with a tactical defensive. The strategic offensive puts pressure on the other party to act
to reverse its losses, but the tactical defensive places the burden of initiating the bloodshed on the
opponent.
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In any direct clash between a political actor practicing strategy and
one practicing statecraft, strategy will always win in the short term. The
polity employing force asserts its political will to enforce its political goals
in the face of resistance. Moreover, the polity which employs force first
establishes the parameters both of the conflict and of its possible results,
unless subsequently out-strategized and outfought. Strategy, through
the threat and use of force, also allows for quick action. Statecraft
simply cannot achieve effects with the means available to it within the
time limit set by an opposing strategy. Non-military instruments cannot
directly challenge force in an immediate sense.
As a final point, because the inability of statecraft to challenge strategy effectively in an immediate situation, one might suggest employing
force in Crimea against the Russians would have been acceptable
according to one of the tenets of just war theory. The tenet of last resort
requires that “[w]e must not take up arms unless we have tried, or have
good grounds for ruling out as likely to be ineffective, every other way
of adequately securing our just aim.”29 This is not to argue a war over
Crimea would have been a just war. Rather, such an unequal contest
as between strategy and statecraft suggests when one side uses force,
even if it remains latent, every means and method available to statecraft
is likely to be ineffective. The policy question thereafter must be to
determine which course of action is most palatable: accepting either the
reciprocal employment of force, or a change to the status quo wrought
by unilateral force? This time the West has chosen to accept Russia’s
unilateral change to the status quo in Crimea. Will it in the future be
faced with a similar choice?

29      Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, Just War: The Just War Tradition, Ethics in Modern Warfare
(London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 12-13.
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Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy
Raymond Millen
Abstract: Dwight D. Eisenhower infused deliberate planning processes into US grand strategy. Due to lack of consensus regarding
how to address the Soviet threat, Eisenhower directed the formation
of a six-week exercise (Solarium) to study three alternative strategies. Upon completion of the exercise, the National Security Council crafted the Basic National Security Policy over a period of three
months, reviewing it annually and revising it as the international security environment changed.

A

s remarkable as it may seem, the only time the United States
has had a formal grand strategy was during the Dwight D.
Eisenhower administration. While some might scoff, recalling
the National Security Council Report (NSC) 68, Flexible Response as
implemented by President John F. Kennedy, and a host of other doctrines associated with presidents, none of these came close to assessing
the strategic environment, developing and vetting various strategic
options, and articulating an overarching strategic concept that promoted
and protected US interests in a purposeful manner.
A product of the US Army’s deliberative planning process, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower brought a wealth of executive experience, organizational skill, and knowledge of strategy development to the White
House. His first fundamental task as president was to design a National
Security Council system to serve his leadership and management style
needs. Once the NSC mechanism began to function in March 1953,
Eisenhower had a system that provided him and the NSC with integrated staff work, education on the issues, and meaningful debate—all
of which cultivated strategic thinking.
The development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)
was a much more involved process than many consider. It began with
a six-week exercise (the Solarium Project), studying alternative policies
to counter the Soviet objective of world domination. Upon completion
of the exercise, the real work began with the NSC Planning Board and
NSC Staff providing drafts over the next three months for NSC discussion. The final product was NSC 162/2—the BNSP. Contrary to popular
speculation at the time, the BNSP continued to evolve throughout the
Eisenhower administration as the strategic environment changed. The
final section of this article explores some of the mischaracterizations
and realities associated with the BNSP.

Project Solarium

While the Eisenhower Administration immediately began work on a
national security policy (NSC 149/2, 29 April 1953), consensus remained
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elusive. 1 Of course, similar divisions over national security policy had
erupted in the Truman Administration, but Eisenhower initially thought
he could avoid this recurrence through NSC deliberations.2 Still, fundamental differences remained. For example, while Eisenhower was in
general agreement with Truman’s containment strategy as reflected in
NSC 149/2, Secretary of State Foster Dulles was dissatisfied with it,
urging a more aggressive policy to contract Soviet power and influence;
Republican congressmen opposed it because it implied a large defense
budget; others wanted even greater defense expenditures to challenge
the Soviet threat directly. 3
The problem was not just a matter of consensus; other factors warranted a more comprehensive review of national security policy as well.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 created uncertainties pursuant to
Soviet designs, especially after the Kremlin’s rebuff of Eisenhower’s
“The Chance for Peace” speech on 16 April 1953. The Korean War
continued with no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. The autocratic,
populist governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Egypt were candidates
for Soviet opportunism. And at this stage of the Cold War, the advance
of the Communist bloc appeared to be gaining momentum. Clearly,
the United States needed to address these emerging national security
challenges through a deliberative process.
Accordingly, on 8 May 1953, Eisenhower met informally with key
advisers Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency [DIA]), George Humphrey (Treasury Secretary), Bedell Smith
(Undersecretary of State), C. D. Jackson (Special Assistant for Cold War
Psychology Planning), and Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs) in the White House solarium to discuss the nature
of the Soviet threat. During the discussion, Eisenhower proposed the
formation of an exercise to “analyze competing national strategies for
dealing with the Soviet Union.” Eisenhower suggested forming three
study teams from State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to examine the following alternatives over a six-week period:
continuing containment, drawing a line around the Soviet bloc, and
diminishing the Soviet empire, particularly in Eastern Europe. Thus
was born Project Solarium.4
Aside from the general desire to reexamine national security policy,
Eisenhower had three ulterior objectives with the Solarium exercise.
Foremost, he wanted to “provide a counter to his secretary of state’s pessimism and more unilateralist proposals,” in particular Dulles’s public
platform that the United States “regain the foreign policy initiative, seek
1     Robert R. Bowie provides the most comprehensive account of the BNSP development.
Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold
War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Meena Bose provides an excellent synopsis of the New Look strategy development. Meena Bose, Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy:
The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy (College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press, 1998), 19-41.
2     Report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary (Lay), “NSC 149/2,” 29 April
1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/pg_305.
3     Robert R. Bowie, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview by Robert Gerald Livingston,
Philipp Gassert, Richard Immerman, Paul Steege, Charles Stuart Kennedy, February 18, 2008, The National
Archives And Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
4     Bowie Interview, The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training, March 15, 1988, 15,
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Bowie,%20Robert%20R.toc.pdf; Bose, Shaping and Signaling,
29; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 123-125.
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a free, democratic, and unified Germany, and even ‘roll back’ communist control from Eastern Europe.”5 Second, he sought to bring together
some of the best thinkers and most experienced individuals to explore
dispassionately (and free from public scrutiny) the three most feasible
approaches for the desired policy outcome. With access to the full array
of intelligence tools, participants could debate among themselves and
other teams during the preparation phase and argue their positions in
front of the National Security Council. In short, he wanted to educate
the participants on the issues at stake.6 Finally,
[T]he Solarium exercise served important administrative purposes—enabling
Eisenhower to learn from and to brief his newly appointed national security
officials and providing a common awareness of his purposes and expectations, a starting point for policy deliberations, and guidelines for action in
the event of a crisis.7

In addition to these objectives, Eisenhower had a more expansive
design for the NSC system: fostering a sense of teamwork among NSC
officials and encouraging the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to think as a
corporate body, rather than succumbing to service parochialisms. As
Eisenhower was fond of saying, “The plans are nothing, but the planning is everything.”8 This design was infused in Solarium.
With these seeds planted, Eisenhower directed the formation of
an NSC working committee (Robert Cutler, Bedell Smith, and Allen
Dulles) to select a panel of five experts, provide the president’s guidance
regarding the terms of reference, select the members of the three teams,
and specify the parameters of each alternative for study.9 Accordingly,
each team would study its assigned alternative strategy
[W]ith a real belief in it just the way a good advocate tackles a law case—and
then when the teams are prepared, each should put on in some White House
room, with maps, charts, all the basic supporting figures and estimates, just
what each alternative would mean in terms of goal, risk, cost in money and
men and world relations.10

The panel of experts (General James Doolittle—chairman; Robert
Amory; Lieutenant General Lyman Lemnitzer; Dean Rusk; and Admiral
Leslie C. Stevens) drafted the “precise and detailed terms of reference for
each alternative.”11 Since expertise was crucial to team member assignments, Eisenhower took particular interest in the selection process.
5     Bowie believed that Eisenhower wanted “to bury the rollback idea,” but it was bandied about
during the presidential campaign, particularly by the press. “He wanted to make that clearly a thing
of the past and finish it.” William B. Pickett, ed., George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower’s New
Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Institute for International and
Regional Studies, 2004), 2-3, 10, 24, 30.
6     Ibid., 11-12, 30.
7    Ibid., 10.
8     As Goodpaster recalled, Eisenhower attributed this quotation to von Moltke the elder. Andrew
Goodpaster, “Foreword,” in Bowie and Immerman, vii; Greenstein cited a similar Eisenhower
quote: “Rely on planning, but never trust plans.” Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency:
Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore: Basic books, Inc., 1982; Johns Hopkins Paperbacks, 1992), 133.
9     Memorandum for the Record by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs (Cutler), “Project Solarium,” 9 May 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1952-54v02p1/d62
10     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 125.
11     Memorandum for the Record by the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (Cutler), “Solarium,” 15 May 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1952-54v02p1/d64.
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He personally enlisted the services of the National War College for its
facilities, staff and administrative support, and temporary assignment
of additional senior officers in support of Solarium. Naturally, strict
secrecy complete with a cover story was mandated to give the teams
time for study and reflection.12 Completing its task on 1 June 1953, the
Doolittle Committee provided the teams with National Intelligence
Estimate No. 65 (along with supplemental intelligence and studies) and
the terms of reference memorandum, which included 15 framework
questions, assumptions, and each team’s policy alternatives for study.13
In the meantime, Eisenhower shaped public opinion on national
security policy with a national radio and television address on 19 May
1953. Similar to the themes expressed in his Inaugural Address and State
of the Union message (among other speeches), Eisenhower stressed that
national security policy must reflect a patient, steadfast commitment to
a long-term strategy rather than reacting impulsively to every perceived
threat. He warned that attempts to create complete national security
would require substantial mobilization, the effects of which would create
a garrison state mentality. In his judgment, a balanced military with sufficient force ceilings coupled with alliances would provide the necessary
security for an enduring defense. He concluded that his administration
would remain dedicated to deterring war rather than war-fighting—a
theme which has always resonated with Americans.14
From 15 June to mid-July, the three study teams developed their
alternative strategies. Team A, led by George Kennan, used NSC 153/1
(Restatement of National Security Policy, 10 June 1953) as the base
document for analysis, which was a revision of the containment strategy.
According to Kennan, the task of his team “was to clarify the general
outlook of a new political administration and to prod a lot of people in
the Washington bureaucracy—military and civilian—into taking a new
look at the things we [the United States] had been trying to do, to see
whether they could improve on the previous performance.”15
According to Robert Bowie (Chairman of the State Department’s
Policy Planning Board and a member of the NSC Planning Board),
Team B under Major General James McCormack was tasked:
(1) to complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western
Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet bloc beyond which
the U.S. will not permit Soviet or satellite military forces to advance without
general war; (2) to make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and
unmistakable way that the U.S. has established and determined to carry out
this policy; and (3) to reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous
Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all

12     Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, “Project Solarium,” May 20, 1953,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d66.
13     National Intelligence Estimate, “NIE-65: Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957,” June 16,
1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d599, 23 February 2014;
Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, “Project Solarium,” 1 June 1953, http://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d68
14     Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1952-1956: The White House Years, A Personal Account
(New York: Doubleday, 1963),122-124, 132-133, 145; Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace
(New York: Random House, Inc., 2012), 641.
15     George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium, 15,
21, Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, “Project Solarium,” June 1, 1953,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d68;
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measures necessary to re-establish a situation compatible with the security
interests of the U.S. and its allies.16

Finally, Vice Admiral Richard Conolly’s Team C looked at a more
assertive rollback strategy, which Bowie summarized: “(1) to increase
efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the
consolidation and strengthening of the free world” and “(2) to create
the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet
Bloc.”17 The Doolittle Committee informed Team C that it was aware
this course of action carried a high risk of igniting a general war, but
the team was not to examine a preventive war strategy because Soviet
advancements in its nuclear forces made this option problematic.18 The
committee might have added that preventive war also contravened
American strategic values.
On 26 June 1953, each team presented its line of thinking in
a plenary session (that is, a dress rehearsal), which helped the teams
articulate their findings and listen to the other teams’ presentations.19
Subsequently, the teams made their presentations to the NSC on 16 July,
after which Eisenhower expressed how impressed he was by the staff
work and the presentations, stating they were the best and most persuasive arguments he had ever experienced. From Bowie’s perspective, “No
president before or after Eisenhower . . . ever received such a systematic
and focused briefing on the threats facing the nation’s security and the
possible strategies for coping with them.”20
At the end of the presentations, Eisenhower shared his thoughts in
the form of initial guidance:
•• The only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one; there
would be no individual freedom after the next global war.
•• To demand of a free people over a long period of time more than
they want to give, one can obtain what one wants only by using more
and more controls; and the more one does this, the more one loses
individual liberties and becomes a garrison state (American model).
•• The American people have demonstrated their reluctance after a war
is ended to take the necessary action properly to occupy the territory
conquered in order to gain our legitimate ends. What would we do
with Russia, if we should win in a global war?
•• The United States has to persuade her allies to go along with her,
because American forward bases are in the territories of US allies.
•• To obtain more money in taxes, there must be a vigorous campaign to

16     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 126; The other members were Major General J. R.
Deane, James K. Penfield, Philip Mosely, Calvin Hoover, J.C. Campbell, and Colonel E. S. Ligon.
George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower’s New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium, 15; Paper
Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, “Project Solarium,” 1 June 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d68.
17     Interview with Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin.
18     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 126.
19     Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session of Project Solarium, Washington, June 26, 1953,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d75.
20     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 127, 137, 139-140; Bose, Shaping and Signaling, 33.
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educate the people—and to educate the people of US allies.21
According to Bowie, Eisenhower made it clear the Solarium exercise
was not an end in itself but only "input to making strategy.” Accordingly,
the President instructed Cutler to have the NSC special staff and the
Planning Board integrate the primary parts of all three reports into a
draft policy paper as a starting point for NSC discussion.22 The concept
paper titled “Proposed New Basic Concept,” rendered the three presentations into five key components for NSC study and comment:
•• A capability for a strong retaliatory offensive, a base for mobilization,
and continental defense;
•• Creating strong, friendly groupings centered on Western Europe
(including [West] Germany) and on Japan in the Far East;
•• Restricting U.S. foreign aid to such groupings and designated other
free nations;
•• Defining where Soviet bloc aggression would trigger general war;
•• Taking selected aggressive actions of a limited scope, involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate Soviet-dominated
areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power in the Satellite
periphery.
After receiving initial comments on this paper, Cutler returned to the
Planning Board, presenting a paper titled "Points for Consideration in
Drafting New Policy." Thus, began the policy formulation process in
earnest.23

The Basic National Security Policy

The development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)
spanned from 30 July to 30 October 1953 with the adoption of NSC
162/2.24 Resolving policy splits (irreconcilable differences)—in regards
to defense spending, threats to the economy, the proper course for
reducing the Soviet threat, the question of redeploying US forces abroad,
and the issue of reducing foreign assistance—were the central issues
of NSC discussions and presidential decisions. Political scientist Mena
Bose and Robert Bowie noted that NSC 162/2 was an amalgam of the
best features of the three study teams. It confirmed Team A’s framework
of containment to resist Soviet aggression and domination of countries
outside its sphere, but it would not interfere with Soviet internal political
and economic structures. While it rejected Team B’s circumscribed line
as a statement of US policy, it did advocate the use of military force, to
include nuclear weapons, against Soviet military aggression in Europe.
Lastly, it adopted Team C’s use of propaganda and covert actions to
exploit Soviet problems and complicate governance in Soviet-dominated
countries. Even with the completion of NSC 162/2, policy split issues
continued to arise in discussions, signifying that though the BNSP was

21     Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 16, 1953,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d78.
22     Ibid.; Bowie Interview, February 18, 2008, ADST, 15; Bowie and Immerman,, Waging Peace,
137-138.
23      Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 139.
24     A Report of the National Security Council: Basic National Security Policy, “NSC 162/2,”
October 30, 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d100.
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accepted policy, the NSC continued to seek improvements through subsequent security policies and reviews of the BNSP.25
It bears noting that development of the BNSP coincided with US
demobilization following the Korean War armistice on 27 July 1953.
From his experiences as Chief of Staff of the Army during the precipitous post-World War II demobilization, President Eisenhower wanted
a balanced restructuring of the military forces to meet Cold War challenges, but without incurring exorbitant military expenditures. Unlike
previous post-war demobilizations, the size and composition of the US
armed forces would be based on a rationally considered national security
policy, and not political parochialism or whim.
Popularly coined as the “New Look” strategy, Eisenhower described
the policy as a “horizontal analysis,” aligning national security requirements with necessary military capabilities without regard to service
parochialism. The analysis included nuclear retaliatory forces, deployed
forces overseas, forces to secure strategic sea lanes, forces to protect the
continental United States from air attack, and reserve forces. Eisenhower
explained that the assessment called for a reallocation of resources to
rationalize national defense. Thus, the administration placed greater
emphasis on deterrent forces through improved nuclear capabilities,
better delivery systems, and increased air defense capabilities. Active
duty combat units would modernize with emphasis on greater readiness
and mobility, decreased manpower, and lower readiness for the reserves.
In short, the post-Korean War realignment meant an increase in Air
Force capabilities, downsizing of the Army, and a slight decrease in the
Navy and Marine Corps.26
The evolution of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and delivery systems
required the NSC to review and revise the BNSP annually. As a consequence of these reviews, supplemented occasionally by outside
consultative committees (namely, Killian, von Neumann, and Gaither),
the NSC revised NSC 162/2, first with NSC 5810/1 (5 May 1958), and
finally with NSC 5906/1 (5 August 1958), each showing the evolution of
strategy as the strategic environment changed. 27 Each BNSP recognized
the Soviet and Chinese communist threats, which were devoting military and economic power in support of an expansionist foreign policy.
Each BNSP acknowledged the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, but
underscored the US unequivocal commitment to deterrence as an appropriate response. Each BNSP assessment concluded that the Soviets did
not seek to start a general war but were committed to continuing political division and subversion of the free world. NSC 162/2 judged that
deterring Soviet designs would profit the United States in the long run
as the Soviet regime experienced “the slackening of revolutionary zeal,
the growth of vested managerial and bureaucratic interests, and popular
25     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 144-146; Bose, Shaping and Signaling, 34-41; Bowie said
that Eisenhower placed great worth in covert action and propaganda against the Soviet hold on its
satellites in Eastern Europe and in countries where the Soviets were trying to extend their influence,
like Iran and Guatemala. Covert action was not used against the Soviet Union directly and was used
sparingly. CNN Cold War Episode 7, Interview with Bowie: “After Stalin”; Jim Newton, Eisenhower:
The White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 128-129.
26     Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 449-451.
27     NSC 162/2; A Report of the National Security Council: Basic National Security Policy,
“NSC 5810/1,” May 5 1958, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/
d24; National Security Council Report, “NSC 5906/1,” August 5, 1959, http://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d70.
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pressures for consumption goods . . . [as well as] the growing strength
of the free world and the failure to break its cohesion and possible
aggravation of weaknesses within the Soviet bloc.”28 The overarching
expectation was that successful containment would ameliorate Soviet
behavior or it would collapse from its inherent contradictions. While
NSC 5810/1 acknowledged nuclear parity was inevitable, it specifically
rejected preventive war as a means of forestalling parity, implying it
contradicted Western strategic values. Instead, the document regarded
nonmilitary initiatives, such as arms control, as more pragmatic. NSC
5906/1 resolved that future conflicts were more likely in underdeveloped
countries, so the United States needed an appropriate means to prevent
or keep them from escalating. Here, economic and military assistance
received greater attention.29 All three policies formally recognized that
maintaining the trinity of a vibrant economy, free institutions, and
American morale was a national security imperative.30
Despite charges the New Look depended overly on massive retaliation for the West’s national security, the BNSP was actually intellectually
agile. Eisenhower intended that massive retaliation apply only to deterrence in Europe—not everywhere.31 In NSC 162/2, defense of the free
world would depend on the maintenance of a:
[S]trong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting
massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power . . . U.S. and allied
forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to counter aggression by Soviet
bloc forces and to hold vital areas and lines of communication . . . and a
mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, adequate to
insure victory in the event of general war.32

Eisenhower recognized the limitations of the US nuclear arsenal,
especially once the Soviet Union neared nuclear parity. Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke recalled the president addressing the
issue with the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We’ve got to have a military force
that can handle any situation. And that means, in a small situation we’ve
got to have the proper equipment and proper plans to it, and it doesn’t
mean that we will have to launch for everything.”33
Accordingly, NSC 5810/1 addressed the need “to place main, but
not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons
with other weapons in the arsenal . . . to consider them as conventional
weapons from a military point of view . . . to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve
national objectives.”34 Adapting to changes in the strategic environment, NSC 5810/1 underscored the need for a flexible response, in which
28     NSC 162/2, 5.
29     NSC 162/2, 2, 4; NSC 5810/1, 2, 4, 8; NSC 5906/1, 7-9.
30     NSC 5810/1 sought to extend this trinity to other free world states. NSC 162/2, 6, 14-16,
17; NSC 5810/1, 3, 9-12.
31     In regards to the famous Dulles speech on massive retaliation, Bowie said it was Eisenhower
who had written the sentence that caused confusion. He had not intended it to mean massive retaliation would be used anywhere. Nonetheless, it was Eisenhower who wrote it, not Dulles. Interview
with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: “After Stalin.”
32     NSC 162/2, 5.
33     Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Interview with Arleigh A. Burke: 2 of 4, Interview by John T.
Mason Jr., Columbia Oral History Interview, November 14 1972 (OH-284), Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library, 71-72.
34     NSC 5810/1, 4.
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US military readiness would serve to counter local threats. If deterrence failed, US expeditionary forces in conjunction with indigenous
and allied forces would defeat local aggression. The final BNSP, NSC
5906/1, also emphasized flexible response and was formally provided to
the incoming John F. Kennedy administration for study.
The BNSP placed great value on collective defense and providing
economic and military assistance, not only to allies but also to vulnerable states in key regions as an alternative to their accepting Soviet aid
and entanglement. Another essential element of the security policy was
investment in research and development without fielding weapons or
equipment other than prototypes. This approach not only minimized
military expenditures, but also ensured the military would have the
most modern and sophisticated equipment in the event of sustained
hostilities.35 Moreover, the BNSP served as the foundational policy for
the development of supporting policies and strategies within the government bureaucracy (for example, departments, agencies, and bureaus).
What is unique about the development, implementation, and revision of the BNSP is the fact that no other presidency has devoted such
focused discipline, energy, and thought to US national security strategy.

Separating Myth from Reality

Not everyone agreed with the policy conclusions of the BNSP,
regardless of its rational approach. The most prevalent charge was
that military cuts weakened US national security. Army Chief of Staff
General Matthew Ridgeway, for one, disagreed passionately with any
reductions in the Army, believing anything less than a large standing
army would increase the probability of war. Ridgeway never specified
the size needed to deter communist aggression, but in view of the millions in Soviet ranks (not to mention China), a very large standing force
in his opinion would be needed for an indeterminate number of years.36
Eisenhower reasoned that alliances buttressed by nuclear forces were
sufficient to deter Soviet overt aggression. Because US commitment to
allies was based on several forward-based divisions, naval and air power,
as well as forward deployed nuclear weapons, the Soviets could never be
certain that even minor aggression would not escalate into general war,
including the use of nuclear weapons; to underscore this uncertainty,
Eisenhower never revealed under what conditions he would use nuclear
weapons—this uncertainty was the cornerstone of credible deterrence.37
Hence, containment of the Soviet bloc relied on a holistic deterrence of a
diverse nuclear arsenal, collective defense, sufficient conventional forces
held at high readiness, a robust mobilization base, and a strong economy.
The starkest difference between Eisenhower and Ridgeway (and
Ridgeway’s successor General Maxwell Taylor) was in perspective.
Ridgway’s focus was on fighting wars; Eisenhower’s focus was on deterring them. To him, a general war would be catastrophic regardless of
who the victor was.38 Ironically, General Maxwell Taylor, was “struck

35     NSC 162/2, 7-8, 11-16; NSC 5810/1, 6-7, 8-13.
36     Matthew B. Ridgeway and Harold H. Martin, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgeway
(New York: Harper, 1956), 272-273, 288, 290-294, 319.
37     Evan Thomas, Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World (New York: Little,
Brown, and Company, 2012), 300, 321, 396-397, 408, 413.
38     Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 179, 200.
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by the breadth of its [the BNSP] language and the degree of departure
from the dogma of Massive Retaliation,” writing a supporting paper in
October 1955 titled A National Military Program introducing the concept
of flexible response.39 Like Ridgway, Taylor took issue with what he
deemed excessive manpower cuts, which he felt undermined the flexible
response aspects of the BNSP. Specifically, Taylor wanted a capability
to fight small brushfire wars even in Europe, an idea which appalled
Eisenhower because it undercut deterrence in Europe.40
Robert Cutler recalled the Pentagon’s main complaint with the
BNSP was the lack of specificity, permitting subordinates to interpret
policy as they liked. Cutler countered that this complaint was a ploy to
resist policies the Pentagon did not like.41 Cutler had a point, since the
mandate of the NSC Operations Coordinating Board was to assist in the
coordination of presidential policy decisions, provide policy clarifications, and elicit feedback from the government bureaucracy on policy
implementation. This was undoubtedly true, but the Pentagon abhorred
the budget restrictions imposed by the BNSP, so its argument was
decreased military spending meant decreased security. Since the BNSP
was a classified document, the Eisenhower administration could not
counter public accusations without disclosing the classified details of
the policy. Thereforce, military officials, politicians, and pundits could
mischaracterize the contents of the BNSP to further their own agendas.
During the period of demobilization and reorganization of the military, criticism was unavoidable as partisans denounced favored service
cuts, military installation closures, or lost defense contracts. Eisenhower
pointed out that peacetime readiness was unprecedented for all three
services, and that his proposed defense budget was three times that
of Truman’s pre-Korean War budget. The president also counseled
critics not to become prisoners of unwarranted fears, demanding large
conventional forces to intervene in every possible conflict. Specifically,
Eisenhower insisted on maintaining “an adequate but not extravagant
defense establishment over an extended period of time (perhaps, half a
century) . . . that we do our best to create a national climate favorable to
dynamic industrial effort.”42 Eisenhower often repeated that, as opposed
to the Soviet maintenance of 175 divisions in Europe, the United States
maintained twenty divisions, five of which were stationed in Europe.
Against this correlation of ground forces, two or even ten more US
divisions would not make much difference. Hence, a nuclear—instead
of conventional—deterrent would have to serve to prevent a general
war in Europe.43
Apparently, this ratio was a myth Eisenhower conveniently allowed
to perpetuate. The purported Soviet conventional superiority was vastly
exaggerated, a fact the president most likely knew but never divulged.
39     General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1960), 29-30, 37.
40     Taylor wrote that the administration clung to the strategy of Massive Retaliation throughout
Eisenhower’s Presidency, stating “it was doubtful whether either the Soviets or our allies believed
that we would use our retaliatory power for anything other than to preserve our own existence.”
Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 61.
41     Robert Cutler, “The National Security Council under President Eisenhower,” in The National
Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level, ed. Senator Henry
M. Jackson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 125.
42     Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 452.
43     Ibid., 451-454.
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Instead of 175 combat-ready divisions, the Soviets maintained approximately 50, which was equivalent to NATO’s strength.44 It suited the
commander-in-chief’s purposes to preserve this fiction for two reasons:
the truth would likely induce the European allies to relax defensive
efforts; worse, near conventional parity might encourage the Pentagon
to clamor for conventional superiority and roll-back strategies. Below
the threshold of a general war in Europe, Eisenhower reasoned that
the size of US ground forces was sufficient to fight and win small wars,
but also warned that “seeing danger behind every tree or bush” was
an unwarranted fear of threats rather than a national security strategy.
He refused to turn America into an armed camp in a myopic quest of
absolute security.45
The underpinnings of American national security, however, transcended the parochialism of the service chiefs. Eisenhower waged a
multidimensional struggle to curb military expenditures because he
understood the multi-ordered effects of large conventional forces. The
military-industrial complex (Congress was complicit in this relationship)
as articulated in his farewell address needlessly diverted revenues, scientific pursuit, and intellectual thinking away from the betterment of
democratic society. If left unbridled, the United States could descend
into an Orwellian state of perpetual conflict. Thus, nuclear deterrence
dovetailed with the vision of the New Look by limiting the size of conventional forces.
Eisenhower never highlighted the flexible response features in the
BNSP publicly because these features were inherently destabilizing. It
was a nuanced argument. A flexible response policy was beguiling,
promising that expansive conventional forces would enhance national
security by permitting the United States to counter the full spectrum of
aggression. Yet it signaled to the Soviets that the United States might
be willing to fight a conventional war in Europe rather than offering an
automatic nuclear response, thereby increasing the probability of conflict
through miscalculation. Greater conventional capabilities incentivized
policymakers to gravitate towards military solutions because increased
investment in the military clamored for its use, because they promised
silver bullet solutions to otherwise complex problems, and because
they offered senior political and military leaders with a way to counter
lower-level aggression with less risk of escalation. Perhaps, but military
solutions tend to gravitate towards adventurism and entanglement in
local conflicts—conflicts which the New Look vision sought to avoid
because this was a realm in which the Communists held the initiative.
Even a prudent president, following the logic of a military solution, could
find himself fighting the wrong war, at the wrong place, and against the
wrong enemy.46
The development of the BNSP was intimately tied to the NSC mechanism, which the president painstakingly organized. The cultivation of
44     Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security 7, no 3
(Winter, 1982-1983): 110-138.
45      Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 451-454.
46      “Eisenhower sought a structural solution to the problems of service parochialism and inefficiency. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 aimed to centralize control over the services,
remove redundancies, streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control at the
Pentagon." H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 14.
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strategic thinking set the Eisenhower administration apart from other
presidencies. Eisenhower’s NSC mechanism serviced the president with
the information and diverse viewpoints he needed to optimize decisions regardless of circumstances and obstacles. Like other presidents,
Eisenhower devoted his speeches, messages, and addresses to inspire
and inform both domestic and foreign audiences, but they were based
on a process of staffed initiatives, discussion, and practical feedback.
Strategy and policy formulations are often tedious, unexciting work,
and while the substance is vitally important, it is unlikely to excite the
imagination. However, without a foundation of rationally derived policy,
inspirational speeches do not just amount to more than hot air; such
rhetoric can lead a nation to rash policy decisions or even a national
disaster, create social unrest as rising expectations are not met, and result
in frivolous spending. In short, inspirational speeches do not necessarily
translate to good policy.
A crucial benefit of the Eisenhower NSC mechanism lay in the
continuity of policies, procedures, and knowledge for successive administrations. Through the NSC mechanism, the government bureaucracy
could provide an orderly continuity of information and processes on
national policies and strategies for new administrations, permitting a
seamless transition. Fully acquainted with the system, the government
bureaucracy could continue to fulfill the needs of a new administration
without pause. Through the NSC system, successive administrations
could access information on old reforms, initiatives, and studies as a
check on new ideas that are bound to crop up in a new administration.
Lastly, the new president could adapt the NSC mechanism to his leadership and management style once he became familiar with it, but keeping
the fundamental parts intact.

Conclusion

The Solarium exercise was an essential start point for the development of the BNSP. As this article has demonstrated, the exercise was
highly organized with the NSC working committee and the Doolittle
Committee developing the terms of reference for the three study teams.
As a useful insight, such preparations permitted the three teams to study
their policy alternatives with the full support of the engaged agencies
and without distractions. Solarium also demonstrated Eisenhower’s
deep involvement in the process and the derived objectives he desired.
As Eisenhower stated at the end of the exercise, the process had just
begun, with the BNSP formulation phase lasting another three months.
Accordingly, multiple drafts of NSC 161 by the NSC Planning Board,
NSC deliberations on each draft, and the final NSC 161/2 illustrate the
deliberative process which epitomized the Eisenhower NSC system.
More importantly, the NSC reviewed the BNSP annually and revised it
when the strategic environment changed.
While the New Look strategy was much maligned and mischaracterized throughout the Eisenhower administration, it did set the
foundation for US Cold War strategy. Eisenhower believed avoiding a
general war was the surest way to persevere over the Soviet Union in
the long term. Accordingly, a balanced military with high readiness and
buttressed by alliances would be sufficient to deter the Soviet bloc and
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safeguard against Communist miscalculation. Despite the near hysterical
claims of Soviet domination, there was no bomber, missile, or industrial
gap. American missile and space programs were much more robust than
their Soviet counterparts, creating the nuclear triad, intelligence surveillance satellites, and the NASA space program in far greater numbers
and sophistication. The administration accomplished these without
crash programs and immense budget expenditures. Eisenhower’s policy
successes were a result of superb organization, the deliberative process,
and his cultivation of strategic thinking.
Eisenhower weaved his political philosophy into the BNSP.
Economic prosperity through the free market, protection of democratic
institutions and American morale, and adherence to Western values represented the strategic pillars of the US grand strategy which cultivated
American prosperity, freedom, and optimism. Hence, these pillars—not
an excessive military-industrial complex—eventually paid off with the
collapse of the Soviet political system.
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Abstract: The post-9/11 use of private security companies in a
combat role has credentialed them in the workplace, public arena, and legal system, thus meeting Andrew Abbott’s criteria of an
emerging profession. Fiscal challenges and global instability will likely perpetuate this condition and in so doing change the US military
profession and its associated civil-military relations that underwrite
the all-volunteer force.

A

s the United States concludes two long wars while facing increasing internal fiscal problems, its government must make tough
budget choices. The first decisions will identify the prudence
of reducing military expenditures; however, subsequent decisions as to
how the Department of Defense should implement these reductions will
become problematic. In this environment political leaders seek to rely on
current military overmatch to justify budget cuts that reduce near-term
readiness. At the same time, they program the remaining monies against
science and technology to achieve future overmatch, all while satisfying their constituents. The processes required to make these decisions
rely heavily on impartial professional military advice. The robust field
of contemporary research on the military profession has largely used
functional models to examine and evaluate the military profession. By
applying Andrew Abbott’s established systems model of professions,
this paper argues the use of private security companies in overseas
combat theaters has changed the scope of the US military’s professional
jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction serves as an indicator of the trust
relationship between society and the military, this boundary shift could
foretell a change in civil-military relations and the associated viability of
the all-volunteer force. After establishing the context of the problem
and defining the military profession paradigm, this article explains how
private security companies are contesting the US military’s preeminence.
It concludes by recommending an expanded view of the risk associated
with military budget decisions so as to preserve the all-volunteer force.
With the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there
is a heightened risk of perpetuating the historical pattern of post-war
decline of the US military. The end of a conflict is often marked by
social fatigue with war and a desire to reap peace dividends. In the
20th century these combined pressures typically yielded a reduction
in the military’s budget, resulting in a degraded force structure and
a decrease in quality of the defense establishment. The full effects of
such reductions frequently become apparent at the start of the next
conflict, when the US military is found inadequately sized, burdened
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with old equipment, and trapped with an ill-suited doctrine.1 Unlike past
interwar periods, contemporary actions short of war (such as regional
security and “mil to mil” exchanges) as well as the need to restructure
the force for other forms of conflict besides counterinsurgency, will
place a significant peacetime operational demand on the military. To
save monies and reconcile these tensions, national leaders will debate
how best to fund the competing demands of force structure, near-term
readiness, and long-term modernization. There are no easy answers; it is
a debate about where to assume the risk of under-resourcing. This is not
a new conundrum for America; historically, the employment of shortterm contractors mitigated associated risks until resources increased
and allowed the military to adjust and negate its need. This pattern was
broken in Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractor use in general, and private
security companies in particular, did not proportionally decline.
The quality of the US military profession defines the nature of civil–
military relations, which is the cornerstone of an effective American
all-volunteer force. Therefore, identifying and understanding how
private security companies compete with the military profession is
important for two reasons. First, it adds context from which to assess the
ongoing Department of Defense’s campaign to increase the professionalization of the military. Second, senior civilian and military leaders can
understand how an unrestrained reliance on private security companies
as risk mitigation affects the military profession’s long-term capabilities,
responsibilities, and relationships with society.

Defining the Military Profession

Sociologists generally define a profession as an occupation with both
theoretical and practical knowledge that conducts special training and
self-regulates its members and is thus credentialed by society with special
authority.2 Continued fulfillment of these expectations allows society to
renew the profession’s authority and autonomy. Society credentials two
agents with the authority to employ lethal force—law enforcement and
the military. The military profession serves society by molding an institution—capable of managing violence toward policy ends—that ensures
the members maintain technical currency, doctrinal relevance, a culture
subservient to the state’s authority, and reflects civilian values.

The 21st Century US Military Profession

In 2012, the Secretary of Defense recognized the indicators of a
strained military profession, and, anticipating the latent detrimental
effects from ten years of war, instructed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to take remedial action. The resulting campaign encompassed
all military departments by calling for a “Rededication to the Profession

1     Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 1986), ii-ix; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 1st ed. (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2005), 50-51,
115-16.
2     Allan G. Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A User’s Guide to Sociological Language, 1st
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 216-217.
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of Arms” (RPA).3 Their efforts are intended to improve organizational
effectiveness (over efficiency) and in so doing maintain society’s trust
and preserve the pattern of civil-military relations enjoyed since the
advent of the all-volunteer force.4 With a volunteer force, society represents the sum authority granted by three groups of actors—civilian
chain of command, public at large, and servicemembers—with whom
a trust relationship must be maintained.5 The RPA explicitly recognizes
the importance of these three relationships yet the program follows
precedent by addressing just one relationship—the nurturing of the
profession by strengthening servicemembers’ trust.
Peter Feaver’s application of Agency Theory to recent US civil-military relations explains both the difficulty and necessity of maintaining
all three relationships.6 As such, the military (agent) and civilian leadership (principal) reconcile discreet objectives by aligning their interests.
Historically, the dilemmas have centered on how the military profession
would dissent with civilian leadership.7 As private security companies
become alternative agents to apply lethal force for the state a competitive
situation emerges. The presence of multiple agents becomes a disincentive for civilian leadership to align its interests with the military and in
doing so weakens the military’s relationships with civil leaders and the
public. In this type of environment, the Rededication to the Profession
of Arms’ single focus on one of three relationships becomes inadequate
to strengthen the US military profession.

Part of a System of Professions

The challenge for military and civilian leaders in the current environment is to strengthen the profession of arms to ensure adequate military
capacity responsive to the state. Recent scholarship suggests the military
profession can be better understood with the application of a systems
paradigm. Abbott argued that professions form a complex and dynamic
social system in a competitive environment where they will adapt or
disappear based on their relative performance of work. This system is
influenced not only by its own processes but also by larger social forces
and other individual professions which also change in response to the
same social and environmental forces.8
In contrast to the functional models of Samuel Huntington and
Morris Janowitz which measured a profession by its ability to develop
and apply abstract knowledge, Abbot’s systems model gauges the

3     Martin E. Dempsey, America’s Military—A Profession of Arms White Paper (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense, 2012), Joint Chiefs of Staff; Jim Garamone, “Dempsey Calls for
Rededication to Profession of Arms,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67307.
4     Dempsey, America’s Military—A Profession of Arms White Paper, 3-6; Martin E. Dempsey, Joint
Education White Paper (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 4-6.
5     Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008), 11-13..
6     Peter D. Feaver, “Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of
American Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 407-34.
7     Charles D. Allen and Breena E. Coates, “The Engagement of Military Voice,” Parameters 39, no.
4 (Winter 2009-10): 73-87.; Donald Drechsler and Charles D. Allen, “Why Senior Military Leaders
Fail: And What We Can Learn from Their Mistakes,” Armed Forces Journal 146 (July/August 2009);
and Charles D. Allen, “Lessons Not Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Afghanistan,” Armed
Forces Journal 148, no. 2 (September 2010).
8     Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 19, 33.
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strength of a profession by the breadth, scope, and social value of its
work—the greater these characteristics, the larger its jurisdiction. In his
model, a change of professional jurisdictions results when the demand
for the services provided by a profession increase faster than the profession can respond. When this happens, either emerging professions or
other existing professions complete the work instead. The outcomes of
such jurisdictional challenges are not fixed, but are heavily influenced by
the type and nature of the response of the actors within the system.9 The
current jurisdiction of the military profession reflects the actions of its
members as well as its history as part of a larger system of professions.10
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 was a watershed event for
the US military profession as the all-volunteer force encountered two
conditions for the first time: (a) core task expansion as the military
undertook peacekeeping missions, and (b) an American desire for a
“peace dividend” that reduced the Army end strength from 780,815 to
495,000.11 To mitigate the shortfall in manpower, the Army developed
the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program.12 The consequences of
this shift remained masked until the 1990s when the demand for forces
in the Balkans resulted in the Army ceding some jurisdiction for base
support operations, first to the Joint Force and then to contractors in an
effort to husband resources for combat operations.13
The subsequent recognition of an inadequate force structure, as
well as a desire to harness a perceived Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA), and increase Department of Defense efficiency by introducing market competitiveness, created significant environmental change.
Accordingly, Office of Management and Budget Circular 76 accelerated and expanded the scope of contractor utilization across all the
Department of Defense to increase military capability without raising
end-strength.14 The magnitude of the consequences that resulted from
increased outsourcing became evident early in Operation Iraqi Freedom
when the contractor-to-servicemember ratio became 1 to 10 (an increase
from 1 to 50 for Desert Storm in 1991).15 While the military was arguably
more cost efficient, the reduced force structure proved inadequate for
the military to train itself and coalition partners, or protect the force on
the modern noncontiguous battlefield.
Prior to this expansion of contractor roles and duties, jurisdictional
competition over military work was framed in one of three relationships. First, competition was framed as interservice rivalry within the
Department of Defense—a condition for resolution by civilian authority
9     Abbott, The System of Professions, 225-227 and 267-279.
10     As an example see the emergence of USAF fighter pilots as detailed by Brian J. Collins, “The
Officer Corps and the Profession,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 45 (2007), 110.
11     Andrew Feickert, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2013), 7.
12     Often referred to as LOGCAP or AR 700-137. Camile M. Nichols, “The Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program,” Military Review, no. 76 (1996), 65–79.
13     Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Serving the American People: A Historical View
of the Army Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed., eds. Don Snider and Lloyd
Matthews (Boston, MA: Learning Solutions, 2005), 93–112.
14     Christopher Spearin, “The Emperor’s Leased Clothes: Military Contractors and Their
Implications in Combating International Terrorism,” International Politics 41 (2004):243-64..
15     Jonathan A. Johnson, Private Security Contractors: The Other Force, Strategy Research Project
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2011), 3, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560096.pdf.
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based on expert knowledge of each service.16 Second, scholars detailed
intrastate jurisdictional competition between governmental agencies—
such as the Department of State.17 Lastly, jurisdictional competition
occurred transnationally where the US military competed with other
militaries to perform international missions—such as counterterrorism
training.18 As the Global War on Terror progressed, additional second
order effects of contracting became more apparent. A fourth competitive relationship emerged where private companies began to compete
with the military for jurisdiction over its core task—the employment of
lethal force. In 2004, Deborah Avant argued that the Army’s:
. . . ready use of contractors for tasks that are crucial to both the development of the profession in the future and to the success of new missions
[such as stabilization], however, has generated competition between the
Army and private security companies over who will shape the development
of the future professionals and has degraded the Army’s ability to undertake
successful missions on its own.19

The increased use of private security and training companies in a
combat zone sanctioned other agents to compete for a portion of what
was previously the US military profession’s sole jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction Competition

Abbott’s research identified that the competition for professional
jurisdiction can occur in three arenas and result in five outcomes.
Jurisdiction competition occurs in the arenas of legal action, public
opinion, or in the workplace, and with each actor when and where they
perceive an advantage. Because these jurisdictional conflicts can produce
conflicting decisions (i.e., when the normative workplace behavior does
not reflect public perception or the law), final resolution takes time.20
During the period of jurisdiction contest, work and task quality varies
as no single profession can fully police the participants. The allocation
of resources and the social need for consistent task fulfillment ultimately
force resolution of competing jurisdiction claims, but this takes time and
is marked by contention and task failure. An analysis of the jurisdictional
competition and the settlements related to the use of private contractors
indicate the state of the US military profession.

Claims for Military Jurisdiction

During the Global War on Terror, private security contractors
comprised roughly 10 percent of the contract workforce in Iraq and
Afghanistan.21 Private contractor duties are limited by law to those
deemed “defensive in nature” such as providing security for sites,

16     Richard Lacquement, “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of
Practice,” in The Future of the Army Profession, 213–235.
17     For example see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military,
1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 11-13.
18     Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and the Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” 50-51.
19     Deborah Avant, “Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing?” in The Future of
the Army Profession, 272.
20     Abbott, The System of Professions, 59-63.
21     Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and
Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 June 2010), 7-11, www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.
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convoys, select personnel, and special escort.22 While this scope of work
sounds benign, defensive duties placed private security companies at
critical points of US counterinsurgency doctrine as it strived to secure
and maintain legitimacy with the populous. On the modern battlefield
the nominally weaker enemy attacks (with little cost) public officials,
supply lines, and base camps to destroy the public’s confidence in the
local and national governments’ ability to secure its population and
infrastructure. In this environment, US contractors comprise 25 percent
of the US personnel killed in action in Iraq.23 An armed security contractor was 1.5 to 4.8 times more likely to be killed in Iraq or Afghanistan
than US uniformed personnel.24 In 2009, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) recognized the magnitude and ramifications
of contractors on the battlefield and published a report that stated contract security personnel who are assigned to protect an embassy from
attack would likely be considered combatants, “as would private security
providers assigned to protect military supply convoys from insurgents
because their purpose, although defensive in nature, would affect hostilities and could require engagement with enemy forces.”25
In addition to the number of contractors being greater than any
time in American history, the duration, and scope of their role is likewise
without precedent. While previous force design decisions deliberately
increased the role of contractors on the battlefield to improve efficiency,
Avant contends the Global War on Terror increase “was a tool to fill the
mobilization gap created by poor judgment about force requirements
after 9/11.”26 With the absence of a precedent to govern contractors as
combatants and the absence of guidance for the US government to stop
using private security companies, there is no reason to expect private
security contractors to retire from the workplace—the new battlefield—
and disappear. According to Abbot, this condition where actors perform
similar work in the same environment inherently invites competition in
the arenas of legal, public opinion, and the workplace.27

Legal Jurisdiction

Allegations of abuse and war crimes by private security contractors
during the Global War on Terror have led to a series of Congressional
hearings, investigations, and legal measures in an attempt to establish
oversight.28 Contracted forces, such as private security companies, work
in a contingency area and “operate under three levels of legal authority:
(a) the international order of the laws and usages of war, resolutions of
22     Eugene Shearer, The U.S. Government’s Employment of Private Security Companies Abroad, Strategy
Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 1-2, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/
u2/a562046.pdf.
23     T. X. Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic
Impact,” INSS Strategic Forum, National Defense University, SF No. 260, 3 http://psm.du.edu/
media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/inss_hammes-private-contractors.pdf
24     Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors, 8-12.
25     Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 January 2010), 6, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf.
26     Deborah Avant, “The Mobilization of Private Forces After 9/11: Ad Hoc Response
to Inadequate Planning,” in How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War, ed. James Burk (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, in press), 8-28.
27     Abbott, The System of Professions, 59-60.
28     Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, Private Security Contractors
in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,
August 25, 2008), 1.
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the United Nations Security Council, and relevant treaties; (b) U.S. law;
and (c) the domestic law of the host countries.”29 This condition allows
for jurisdictional claims in three different legal systems, whose respective authorities remain largely unchallenged and without codification.
Prior to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007, legal
precedent held that civilians acting within a combat zone during “time
of war” were subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
the legal authority of the military profession.30
The changes in the 2008 NDAA required the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, and the US Agency for International
Development to establish a memorandum of understanding that specified the responsibility of the parent department to investigate and refer
possible violations of the UCMJ or the Military Extraterritorial Judicial
Act (MEJA)—in the case of civilians.31 The expanded application of the
MEJA to a combat zone required the Department of Justice be notified
if a civilian employee (to include those of a private security company) is
suspected of having committed a felony.32 This 2008 NDAA instituted
two changes. First, it removed private security contractors employed in
a combat zone by other governmental agencies and civilian contractors
from military oversight and investigation authority. Second, it removed
the military’s legal authority to enforce professional standards against
those security contractors it employed. By omission, this division of legal
jurisdiction moved some private security companies completely outside
any US oversight as:
. . . some contractor personnel who commit crimes might not fall within the
statutory definitions described [above], and thus might fall outside the jurisdiction of U.S. criminal law, even though the United States is responsible
for their conduct as a matter of state responsibility under international law.33

Public Jurisdiction

The websites of private security companies such as Academi (formerly Blackwater, then Xe), DynCorps and Triple Canopy illustrate
private security companies’ open declaration of their qualifications
and their offer of an alternative to traditional military forces. In a free
market society, however, the public contests for jurisdiction are often
more oblique and insidious. The highly publicized stories and detailed
investigations associated with the role of private security contractors in
Fallujah and Nisoor Square (Baghdad), Iraq are public examples of the
new combat role of private contracting companies.34 The acceptance
of news and periodical stories of private contractors as warriors on the
front lines provides a third indicator of the ongoing security companies’
29     Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 5.
30     The John Warner National Defense Act 2007 made provisions for those contractors employed by DOD to be subjected to UCMJ jurisdiction. This authority remained largely untested, as
any exercise of this law would likely be challenged as unconstitutional or superseded by subsequent
legislation. See Shearer, The U.S. Government’s Employment of Private Security Companies Abroad, 23.
31     Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 19.
32     Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, Title 18 Part II, Chapter 212, Sec. 3261 (January 3,
2012) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partIIchap212-sec3261/content-detail.html
33     Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18.
34     “Contractors - The High-Risk Contracting Business,” Frontline PBS, 2005 http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html; Doug Miller, “Blackwater
Settles With Families of Nisoor Square Victims,” Charlotte Observer, January 7, 2012.
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public claims for jurisdiction over state-sanctioned application of lethal
force.35 Lastly, and arguably most compelling, private security companies maintain publicly they are more cost effective (as a result of no
long-term obligations to the institution or the workforce) and timely
(rapid mobilization) than the military.36 Private security companies publicly claim immediate cost savings without a counterargument as to the
long-term effects on military force structure and capabilities.37
Because the eroded US military jurisdiction has not yet produced
a crisis, public efforts to restore the military profession’s jurisdiction
have not been compelling and thus are ineffective. For example, national
security scholars Fontaine and Nagl concluded:
Most experts agree that contracting out logistics and construction activities
tends to result in significant cost savings to the government, while more
skilled labor—and private security functions in particular—tends toward
parity with the cost of using federal employees.38

While these and similar findings challenge the economic rationale for
private contractors, such findings do not resonate with the American
public in a manner that encourages strengthening of the military
profession.
The use of private contractors and the subsequent erosion of the
military profession’s jurisdiction resulted from the inability of the military to meet an increase in demand for operational forces—not from an
attempted cost savings measure. The debate on the level of resourcing
required by the military to protect the profession’s jurisdiction over its
core competency—and sustain the pattern of US civil-military relations—lacks a public audience. In this instance, the military may be a
victim of its own success. The trust relationship between the military
and the public is now so strong tactical success is taken for granted,
with little regard by civilian leaders or the public for the profession’s
requirements beyond having sufficient resources.

Workplace Jurisdiction

The current military to civilian contractor ratio of 1:1 in the Global
War on Terror reflects the degree of privatization that has occurred
within the Department of Defense. It is accepted and expected that
civilians now perform tasks previously accomplished by uniformed
personnel. This ratio reflects the increased number of nonmilitary personnel performing security operations for the US government. At the
end of the Iraq troop surge in 2009, the Department of Defense and the
Department of State employed 16,263 private security personnel in Iraq
and 5,062 in Afghanistan.39 For perspective, the totals are equivalent to

35     For examples of public acceptance of private security contractors as warriors, see Lee Sharon,
“Private Security Contractors: Sifting Out the Wannabes, Never-Have Beens and Never-Will-Bes,”
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 2008, 24–25, http://www.sofmag.com/; Suzanne Kelly, “Confessions
of a Private Security Contractor,” Security Clearance CNN, Dec 27, 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.
com/2011/12/27/confessions-of-a-private-security-contractor/.
36     Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones,” 2.
37     Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 36.
38     Richard Fontaine and John A. Nagl, Contracting In Conflicts: The Path to Reform (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 6 June 2010),18-19, http://www.cnas.org/node/4560.
39     Department of Defense figures as of March 31, 2009, Commission on Wartime Contracting,
At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 2009), 62.
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six Brigade Combat Teams. With 2010 beginning the operational withdrawal of US forces from both theaters of war, private security company
personnel totaled over 28,000 and represented over 10 percent of the
total contractors employed by the Departments of Defense and State in
Iraq and Afghanistan.40 These trends indicate significant incursion by
private contractors into the workplace and that the jurisdictional claim
of these contractors has expanded—rather than contracted—as US
military involvement in a combat zone declined.

Jurisdiction Settlements

Competition between professions requires each to adapt and secure
its jurisdiction or become a bureaucracy or occupation.41 Conversely,
adaptation by an emerging profession or a challenger produces the
means to claim a jurisdiction in legal, public, or workplace arenas.
These claims, in turn, produce five types of settlements, arranged on a
continuum. First, one of the actors can be awarded full jurisdiction in a
zero sum gain arrangement. Second, one of the actors can be subordinated to the other. Third, the claim could be divided among the actors
with each becoming a formal profession, independently responsible
to society. Midway between a formal division and subordination lies
the intellectual settlement, where one profession retains authority and
responsibility for the abstract knowledge while competitors operate on
an unrestricted basis. The final settlement type—and least enduring—is
advisory jurisdiction. Such arrangements grant one group independent
authority to interpret another profession’s actions as its jurisdiction
(i.e., the clergy may interpret and explain the larger meaning of medical
conditions to patients).42 Recent jurisdiction settlements resulting from
competition in the three arenas illustrate the ongoing challenges to the
US military profession.

Full Jurisdiction

In the 2009 NDAA, Congress expressed that:
. . . private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such
as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments,
and that DOD regulations ‘should ensure that private security contractors
are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area
of combat operations.43

This legal directive acknowledged the military had come to rely
heavily on private contractors to complete its mission and required the
Department of Defense to reconcile the intent of the law with conditions
on the ground. It presented a nuanced interpretation that did “not prohibit the use of contract personnel for security, but . . . limits the extent to
which contract personnel may be hired to guard military installations.”44
The same legislation also specified that the “Combatant Commander
has the authority to decide whether to classify security functions as
40     John P. Carrell, Government Contractors – Do We Really Need Them?, Strategic Research Project
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011) 2, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a553013.pdf, 2.
41     Don M. Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008), 9, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
42     Snider, Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions, 69-77.
43     Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 15.
44     Ibid., 16.
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commercial.”45 In theory this caveat allows military commanders some
degree of authority to protect the US military’s professional jurisdiction
based on their ability to define the scope of security tasks suitable for
contract work.
In reality, senior commanders (the agent) met political leaders’ (the
principal) expectations to “do more with less,” by resorting to private
contractors. The increased use of such contractors allowed commanders
to remain under theater of operation force-level caps and have sufficient
combat power to achieve the mission. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the
numbers of such personnel did not count against “force caps” or troop
strength limitations, and thus minimized the public exposure as to the
level of US involvement.46 Despite the intent of the legislation, senior
leaders were placed in an ethical dilemma—use private security contractors to meet the workplace requirements for security with reduced troop
levels, or employ only the authorized number of US military professionals (as the state’s sole agent of lethal force) and risk mission failure/
increased casualties.

Subordination

The enactment of the 2008 NDAA intended to give the military
oversight of private security contractors but did little to enable the US
military profession to defend its jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the
military cannot write or execute security contracts for the multitude
of other government agencies—such as the Department of State, and
private companies that employ private security contractors in a combat
zone—so there is no clear subordination of authority. Second, the
large demand for contractors during the Global War on Terror had the
compounding effect of overwhelming the work capacity of the government’s contracting officers. Military contracting professionals lacked the
capacity to respond to the anticipated demand foreseen in the military
reduction of the 1990s.47 Consequently, the military had to hire private
security companies to hire sufficient contractors.

Divided Settlements

Some political leaders recognized that in some instances effectiveness over efficiency is appropriate and thus granted the military the
legal authority to avoid being forced to outsource its own demise. For
example, Presidential Policy Letter 11-01 allows any agency or department to in-source any capability they determine is essential to performing
core missions regardless of comparative costs.48 While well intended, the
policy does not address the root problem of inadequate Department
of Defense capacity to meet a sudden increase in demand. Moreover,
these prescriptive attempts to divide and define jurisdiction in order
to protect the military profession remain subject to interpretation in
the workplace. For example, because of the large presence of military
and contract personnel working on the same task in the same environment, migration from one profession to the other is not uncommon.
45     Ibid., 17.
46     John P. Carrell, Government Contractors – Do We Really Need Them?, 4-5.
47     Karen L. Coccio, Outsourcing, In-sourcing, and Maintaining the Acquisition Workforce Profession,
Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 11-12.
48     Ibid., 12.
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The greater the resources or legitimacy of one profession as compared
to the other, then the greater the propensity for personnel to join the
competing profession, which in this case forces the US military to incur
significant second order costs and loss of social capital.49

Intellectual Settlements

The 2011 National Defense Acquisition Act (Section 833) mandated
“third-party certification processes for determining whether private
security contractors adhere to standards for operational and business
practices” (currently under development).50 This legal action moved the
authority to conduct lethal force training for combat operations outside
the military’s jurisdiction and sanctioned the associated development
of abstract knowledge to competing nongovernmental professions. The
initial migration of uniformed personnel to private security companies made for great congruence of the governing abstract knowledge;
however, the demand for contractors drove many companies to meet
manpower and cost savings by employing large numbers of people from
other nations who have no association with, or training from, the US
military profession. For example, in 2004 private security companies in
Iraq employed approximately 30,000 personnel from over 30 countries.51

Advisory Settlements

The military profession briefly held jurisdiction over private security companies via the National Defense Act of 2008 which required
all Department of Defense, Department of State, and governmental
agencies employing these contractors to comply with DOD Instruction
3020-50.52 However, market forces made this settlement brief as other
legal actions, such as NDAA 2011, nullified the provision by clouding
the combatant commander’s ability to enforce this law with competing
sets of guidance, such as references to an industry standard.

Conclusion

An examination of the recent roles of private contracting companies
during the Global War on Terror indicates they are actively and passively contesting the US military profession’s jurisdiction over its core
task—the authority to employ lethal force as the agent of the state. The
US military profession is under assault in all three arenas: the workplace
(predominantly), the legal system, and the public. Since this contest is
without precedence it is not surprising that the jurisdictional settlements
to date have been inconclusive and contradictory, thus leaving the final
outcome undetermined.

49     Fontaine and Nagl, Contracting In Conflicts, 18; also Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and the
Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” 56.
50     “DoD Issues Interim Rule for Contractors Performing Private Security Functions,” August
19, 2011, National Contract Management Association at Legislative and Regulator Alerts, http://www.
ncmahq.org/NewsPublications/LegAlertDetail.cfm?itemnumber=10336.
51     Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 3; also Sarah K. Cotton et
al, Hired Guns : Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, 2010), 20.
52     Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs)
Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 22, 2009, Incorporating Change 1, August 1, 2011)..
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There are two countervailing arguments to these findings. First,
private security contractors are numerically niche players whose involvement is strategically insignificant. Second, the problem is self-correcting at
the end of conflict demand for these contractors will decrease. Accepting
these counterarguments is not wise for three reasons. In regards to the
former, the magnitude of contractor involvement is strategically significant as are the consequences of their actions—regardless of aggregate
numbers—as shown by the actions in Nisoor Square. As to the latter,
the pattern of private security contractor involvement is not self-correcting as evidenced by the patterns established in the Balkans, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Lastly, other research on the use of security contractors
in combat zones has come to critical conclusions about cost efficiency,
congruence within COIN doctrine, and organizational ethics.
Recommendations from previous scholarship included increasing
military capacity to negate the need for security companies, severely
restricting them to locations where rule of law prevails, and increasing
Congressional oversight of them.53 While valid structural recommendations, they are either too narrow or unrealistically broad, and risk
repeating past mistakes. In the absence of deliberate effort, the erosion
of the US military’s jurisdiction can be expected to continue. At issue
here is not the military profession’s jurisdiction per se, but how to
nurture the profession so it can ensure future military effectiveness. The
answer to this question must recognize that because the four services
are subordinate to civilian leaders, they cannot be solely responsible
for the US military profession in today’s environment. Additionally,
current operating environment and domestic fiscal constraints dictate
the United States will almost certainly have to continue to use private
security companies.
Thus, the current fiscal debate among military and civilian leaders as
to whether to assume risk with short-term readiness or long-term technological superiority is a false dichotomy. The concept of risk in the ongoing
“build down” must be expanded to include an institutional dimension to
recognize second order detrimental effects to the military profession.
Decisions based solely on efficiency arguments related to near-term cost
and future program development timelines do not provide for a military
profession of sufficient caliber to protect and nurture the all-volunteer
force. As an alternative, requisite military fiscal decisions should be
informed by their effect on services’ core jurisdictions, and implemented
with deliberate settlements to protect them. This is a new approach and
requires additional research and a larger shared sense of responsibility.

53     Molly Dunigan, Considerations for the Use of Private Security Contractors in Future U.S. Military
Deployments (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, June 2010), 10; Moshe Schwartz, The Department
of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 20.
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Abstract: This article examines the potential role of private security companies as part of a global special forces network. It reveals
three factors that may influence the utility of such companies: (1)
the industry’s largely defensive focus; (2) the implications of serving
a humanitarian and development clientele; and (3) the challenges of
retired special forces personnel moving to the private sector.

W

estern states frequently use the word “network” to describe
contemporary military dynamics. Not only are special forces
beneficiaries of this reference, they are often proponents
for it.1 These forces are ideally suited for networks given their “specialness” and flexibility at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
war. They have a relatively small footprint, whether in the context of
budgets, “boots on the ground,” or with respect to much larger and more
expensive conventional forces.
While these factors are often beneficial, national special forces
organizations recognize their quantitative and qualitative shortcomings, especially as they increasingly become a “force of choice.” Thus,
there is a perceived need to develop a network of like-minded actors.
The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has led the way in
response to these pressures and, relatedly, to the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance. For instance, the objective of 2012 International Special
Operations Forces Conference was to solidify USSOCOM’s prominence
and allow others to “gain a better understanding on how to become
active members of that network.”2 Similarly, in 2013, the Joint Special
Operations University (JSOU), alongside experts and practitioners from
other countries, held a conference on “The Role of the Global SOF
Network in a Resource Constrained Environment.”3
While these ventures are, in part, about international interoperability, they are also about reaching out and understanding other,
non-national, players such as private security companies. Indeed, these
firms participated in the JSOU endeavor. Conceiving them as part of a
1     To facilitate readability, the term “special forces” is used here instead of “special operations
forces” or “SOF,” and does not refer to a specific country's command or organization, unless indicated. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Canadian Department of National Defence or the government of Canada.
2     Nigel Chamberlain, “Networks of Special Forces Worldwide,” NATO Watch, June 18, 2012,
http://www.natowatch.org/node/728.
3     The irony is that some of these developing ties between national special forces may be
bureaucratic and rule-based rather than based on relationships, thus potentially negating network
flexibility. The author wishes to thank Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley for raising this point. Please
see Jessica Glicken Turnley, “Implications for Network-Centric Warfare,” JSOU Report 06-3 (Joint
Special Operations University, March 2006).
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global special forces network speaks both to the seeming ubiquity of the
private security industry and the challenges special forces, especially the
US variety, currently encounter. Such a conception, however, also raises
some questions. What are the assumed and actual links between these
forces and private security companies? Are the ways in which these firms
construct security a hindrance or an asset to special forces?
This article answers these questions. First, the article identifies linkages and similarities between these two actors. It underscores why one
might think private security companies are appropriate for this network.
The goal is not to rehearse the various supply, demand, and ideational
rationales contributing to the rise in prominence of both—others have
done this sufficiently.4 Instead, the article illustrates the unique organizational character and people-centric nature of each actor. It also reveals
that although companies are increasingly seen as security experts in their
own right, there are significant relationships with special forces.
The article’s second part is inspired by a recent assessment concerning how nodal security dynamics have to be “imagined before they can
be enacted.” This article’s goal is not to advocate. Instead, it is to consider
how firms might enhance special forces given their “strategic interests,
tools, resources, and ways of thinking.”5 In so doing, the article moves
beyond replacing military forces with private security organizations as
was often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 Rather, it examines the
prospects for independent cooperation and interaction and what private
presence, made real through contracts with other types of actors, means
for special forces.
As such, this second part focuses on three matters. One, it reveals
how, because of the industry’s largely defensive focus, firms exercise a
particular form of territorial control on behalf of corporate clients—a
type of control that differs from the approach of special forces. While
the private security company stance helps businesses function, the security and welfare of local populations is not its immediate concern. This
shortfall may, or may not, affect the desired outcome from the perspective of special forces. Two, it contends that, although private security
companies may draw their skillsets and notions of professionalism from
the state, they also rely on other actors. In particular, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) provide private companies both financial opportunities and enhanced status as legitimate security actors. However,
appealing to such an audience may reduce the likelihood of private
companies interacting with special forces due to sensitivities. Finally, it
is plain that the movement of military personnel to the private sphere
4     Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means (New York:
Routledge, 2008); Anthony King, “The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military
Power,” Armed Forces & Society 35, no. 4 (July 2009): 646–666; Deborah Avant, The Market for Force:
The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); P. W. Singer,
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
5     Patrick Cullen, “Privatized Maritime Security Governance in War-tom Sierra Leone,” in
Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st
Century, eds. Claude Berube and Patrick Cullen (New York: Routledge, 2012), 107.
6     Similarly, the article does not consider the operational and strategic implications stemming
from this state employment. Indeed, assessments of private security company activity range from the
positive to the negative. See, for example, Erik Prince, Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater
and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror (New York: Penguin Group, 2013); Swiss Peace, Private
Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola, November
2007.
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places manpower policies under stress. Just as states responded earlier
this century with retention measures that pressured defense budgets,
similar measures may again be warranted as the fear of special forces
burnout grows and the private sphere alternative remains.

Organizing for Violence
Special Forces

Historically, conventional commanders have often pushed special
forces to the periphery. This trend speaks to Jeffrey Legro’s description of military cultures: “[B]eliefs and norms about the optimal means
to fight wars are important because they have a pervasive impact on
the preferences and actions of both armies and states.” 7 Conventional
forces’ concerns are evident in several ways: (1) special forces take skilled
manpower away from conventional forces; (2) they conduct “sideshow
operations,” though their increasing prominence and importance in the
contemporary environment may be leading to attitudinal change; (3)
“specialness” implies that conventional forces are somehow not special,
and; (4) as both a cause and effect of organizational separation, they
feature social dynamics with a lower degree of formality compared to
conventional forces.8 It is telling that, in a pejorative fashion, special
forces have been referred to as “private armies” because of their relative
independence and unique attributes.9
As such, these organizations stand apart from conventional elements in following attributes: (1) quality is better than quantity;10 (2)
they cannot be mass produced; (3) competent special forces cannot be
created after emergencies occur; and (4) humans are more important
than hardware. Focusing, for now, on the latter attribute does not mean
these forces are anti-technology. Instead, to borrow an old phrase, technology equips special forces; they do not man the technology. Special
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan capitalized on technologies characteristic
of the Revolution of Military Affairs, and its reliance on unmanned
aerial vehicles, intelligence infrastructures, and stealth capabilities.11
Technology helps them stand out as “special” and assists them in completing their often sensitive tasks.
In contrast, conventional forces are usually organized, defined, and
distinguished by, or around, certain military platforms such as tanks,
aircraft, and ships. This difference is more than functional adaptation
7     Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” International
Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 109.
8     Anthony King, “The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power,” Armed
Forces & Society 35, no. 4 (July 2009): 647; Matthew Johnson, “The Growing Relevance of Special
Operations Forces in U.S. Military Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 25, no. 4 (October–November
2006): 274; Bernd Horn, “When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military/SOF Chasm,”
Canadian Military Journal 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 3–16.
9     Finlan, Special Forces, 4.
10     The author would like to acknowledge a reviewer’s point that with post-Cold War downsizing,
increasing emphasis has been placed on “quality over quantity” in the US Army. This comment likely
relates to more than doing “better with what is left” in conventional forces; it speaks to increased
professionalization and socio-political rationales about when and how force is to be applied. In this
vein and in the larger Western context, conventional forces may increasingly be developing SOF
characteristics, at least at the tactical level. Anthony King, The Combat Solider: Infantry Tactics and
Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
11     John R. Lindsay, “Reinventing the Revolution: Technological Visions, Counterinsurgent
Criticism, and the Rise of Special Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 422–453.
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and recognition that humans need machines to operate in austere
environments like the sea and air.12 It is representative of an “armament culture,” a normative predilection among Western states favoring
capital-intensive militaries over labor-intensive ones.13 The formative
cultural effect is no small one because, as Alastair Finlan describes,
“military institutions have artificially created the reality that permeates
the day-to-day life of its personnel, from the social space in which they
work to the psychological realm that binds them together.”14 At state
level, the pursuit and possession of expensive military platforms goes
beyond merely responding to the capabilities and challenges offered by
adversaries. These instruments of violence symbolize modernity; they
are indicative of membership in the prestigious club of statehood.15
The fact that special forces are becoming increasingly important is
significant because of some high hurdles. During the Cold War, some
scholars suggested weaning Western militaries off their “baroque” military technology would demand nothing less than “institutional change
at every level: within the armed forces, within the wider geopolitical
system, within the defence industry, and within the economy as a whole.”16
Today, though “big” armies, navies, and air forces are far from gone; the
trends and developments mentioned earlier underscore change. While
these solutions did perceive change through the rise of less hierarchical,
less capital-intensive structures and relationships, they emphasized the
labor-intensive alternative largely in terms of mass. Special forces, in
contrast, follow the principle that “quality is better than quantity.” As
we shall see, this qualitative emphasis resonates among private security
companies.

Private Security Companies

Whereas special forces are, for some, at the edges of the state’s
infrastructure to apply sanctioned violence, private security companies
stand outside the structure altogether. While they possess many military
skillsets, they are not permanent or official fixtures in a state’s apparatus.
These companies, as a result, can tap into the neoliberal rhetoric of commercial firms being adaptable, innovative, and cost effective compared
to state actors. They also tap into the rationales that other actors should
increasingly be responsible for their own security.17 Hence, firms access
a client-base beyond the state, one that includes international organizations, NGOs, and corporations. It literally pays, therefore, to be on the
outside.
Unlike other commercial fields, however, being on the outside is
controversial and politically contested. To be sure, civilians have an

12     The author would like to acknowledge a reviewer’s point that the US Army also advocates
“equipping the man.” Indeed, unlike naval and air forces, there exists a tension within armies among
the infantry, artillery, and cavalry/tank forces.
13     Robin Luckham, “Of Arms and Culture,” Current Research on Peace and Violence 7, no. 1 (1984):
1–64.
14     Finlan, Special Forces, 85.
15     Ibid., 97; Edward A. Kolodziej, “National Security and Modernization: Drive Wheels of
Militarization,” Arms Control 6, no. 1 (May 1985): 17–40; Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett,
“Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization,” Review of International Studies 19, no.
4 (October 1993): 321–347.
16     Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), 220.
17     Christopher Spearin, “Against the Current? Somali Pirates, Private Security, and American
Responsibilization,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 3 (December 2010): 553–568.
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important role in military operations. Acknowledging longstanding
practice, Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention (1949) recognizes the legality of civilians accompanying armed forces. Yet while
mercenaries were once commonplace, functional developments related
to training and equipment and normative shifts regarding who should
apply violence, and to what ends, led to their decline over the nineteenth
century. Indeed, we can now speak of an “anti-mercenary norm.”18 A
private security company’s use of violence, therefore, does not fall neatly
between binary distinctions: (1) the aforementioned convention and the
Law of Armed Conflict; (2) strategic studies and international relations
studies which privilege states and their militaries; and (3) Weberian
bureaucratic notions about the role of the state vis-à-vis legitimate violence. The challenge for private companies, as we shall see, is how to be
recognized as important security actors, and be conceived as legitimate
in security activities, while skirting the pejorative mercenary label.19
Like special forces, private security companies are not platformcentric. One can approach this principle from two angles, the first being
cost. With sophisticated, high-technology military platforms doubling
in price perhaps every seven to eight years, most firms are not financially
able to absorb purchase, basing, operating, and maintenance costs. If
profit streams are uncertain and costs not recoupable, firms will adopt a
service rather than hardware model to reduce overhead.20 Some experts
describe commercial dynamics this way: “Additional personnel and
equipment are only procured on a case-by-case basis—usually after a
contract with a client has been signed—allowing these firms to run
their operations with limited capital outlays.”21 In addition, relying on
smaller weaponry and utilizing personnel not optimized for (and limited
to) operating certain platforms arguably allows for greater commercial
opportunities.22 For the second angle, states have long dominated the
management and dispersion of major weapon systems for both geostrategic reasons and to ensure state control over the possession and
movement of weapons deemed significant (recall the armament culture
above).23 In short, military entrepreneurism is strongly bounded by economic disincentives and state control; platform availability for private
security companies is constrained.

18     Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007); Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear
Sometimes,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 4 (2011): 719–742.
19     Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, 220; Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of
Territorial Defence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).
20     Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, 193; Armin Krishnan, War as Business: Technological Change and
Military Service Contracting (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 151, 171.
21     Peter Chalk, “Maritime Terrorism: Scope, Dimensions and Potential Threat Contingencies,”
in Maritime Private Security: Market responses to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century,
eds. Claude Berube and Patrick Cullen (New York: Routledge, 2012), 166.
22     Eric Fredland and Adrian Kendry, “The Privatisation of Military Force: Economic Virtues,
Vices and Government Responsibility,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13, no. 1 (Autumn/
Winter 1999): 152, 163.
23     Owen Greene and Nicholas Marsh, “Governance and Small Arms and Light Weapons,” in
Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global governance and the threat of armed violence, eds. Owen Greene and
Nicholas Marsh (New York: Routledge, 2012), 168; Nicholas Marsh, “The Tools of Insurgency: A
Review of the Role of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Warfare” in Small Arms, Crime and Conflict:
Global governance and the threat of armed violence, eds. Owen Greene and Nicholas Marsh (New York:
Routledge, 2012), 26.
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Relationships

It is important not to overdraw the distinction between states and
private security companies, at least in terms of expertise, because “private
security actors often obtain legitimacy precisely from their connections
to the state.”24 Put differently, security professionals are individuals,
“who gain their legitimacy of and power over defining policy problems
from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these
in their work.”25 Indeed, notions of the industry’s professionalism often
draw explicitly on previous service for and training by the state. In fact,
a trade-marked logo for the firm Triple Canopy is “Quiet Professionals,
Still Serving ®.”26
Here a number of the “organic” connections between state-organized special forces and private security companies are evident. First,
upon retirement, many special forces officers have formed their own
companies. For example, Sir David Stirling, one of the British Special
Air Service’s (SAS) founders in the Second World War, established
Watchguard International in 1967, arguably the precursor firm to today’s
industry. As well, Alastair Morrison, decorated for his part in the 1977
Mogadishu Lufthansa hostage rescue, upon leaving the British SAS,
formed Defence Systems Limited. This firm was one of the formative parts of ArmorGroup. Gordon Conroy, a former Australian SAS
commander, created Unity and former members of the Swedish Special
Forces created Scandinavian Special Projects (now Vesper Group) and
Scandinavian Risk Solutions. Similarly, Triple Canopy and Trident
Group derive their “parentage,” in order, from Delta Force and US
Navy SEALs.
Second, if not forming companies, officers, particularly those of high
rank, often accept executive leadership positions. For instance, General
Peter Schoomaker (retired) and Admiral Eric T. Olsen (retired), both
one-time USSOCOM commanders, serve on the boards of directors
for DynCorp International and Mission Essential respectively. Similarly,
Lieutenant-General Sir Cedric Delves and Major-General John Holmes,
two retired former British DSOs (Director Special Operations), are correspondingly directors for Olive Group and Erinys. As another example,
Brigadier Aldwin Wight, formerly head of the British SAS, worked as the
Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Kroll Security International. Finally,
firms often locate their offices and recruitment centers near special
forces bases. Vinnell has offices close to USSOCOM in Tampa and
Military Professional Resources, Inc., and K2 Solutions, Inc., are close
to Fort Bragg, the home of US Army Special Operations Command.
AKE and GardaWorld, among others, have offices around Hereford,
home to the British SAS.

24     Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, “Securing the City: Private Security Companies
and Non-State Authority in Global Governance,” in Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits, and Empires: Private
Violence in Historical Context, eds. Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2010), 216.
25     Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge,
2006), 8–9.
26     Paul Higate, “‘Cowboys and Professionals’: The Politics of Identity Work in the Private and
Military Security Company,” Millennium 40, no. 2 (January 2012): 334. See also this website: http://
www.triplecanopy.com/careers/.
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This special forces cachet in the private security industry has both
functional and associative rationales. Functionally, special forces personnel frequently come with desirable skillsets: advanced educations,
language abilities, and considerable field experience.27 What is more, the
small team organization characteristic of special forces translates well
in the private security context. It promotes self-reliance in challenging
environments, especially those in which back-up forces, whether they
are from the public or private sphere, may not be forthcoming. It values
flexibility and innovation in tasks such as close protection. Similarly,
an appreciation of austere environments helps firms in advising clients
about travel routings and securing their facilities.28
As for association, the link between special forces and private security companies serves to substantiate firms and heighten their allure.
While not all companies possess a special forces pedigree, examinations
of contractors reveal that many transfer their professional understandings and standards to the private sector.29 Claiming this pedigree,
therefore, helps to instill in the minds of potential clients that the
industry does possess security expertise and that it is a heralded expertise.
Indeed, experts such as Finlan note that special forces hold a dominant
place in Western culture and in appreciations of military expertise. They
worry that descriptions of these forces as the “perfect soldiers” advance a
mythology rather than an accurate picture of reality.30 Nevertheless, this
image is a marketing boon for firms. It allows Rubicon International,
for instance, to reflect on its SAS-trained personnel: “[T]hey are the
crème de la crème.” In this vein, the observation underscoring Maersk’s
reputation as the “Tiffany of shipping companies,” is that it only hires
companies employing former US Navy SEALs.31

Private Security Companies and Special Forces
Control

Though Western states increasingly wish to pursue strategic
objectives in many parts of the world through less costly political and
economic means (indeed, US Special Operations Forces alone are in as
many as 75 countries), different forms of territorial control, and their
associated benefits and tradeoffs, are clear. As one scholar noted, the
control of territorial space relates to three components: “[O]ne may
deny control to others, one may take it for oneself, and one may subsequently exercise it.” In a context in which special forces are less and less

27     Arguably, special forces personnel, particularly those with considerable experience, may be
more attuned to the development and value of networks compared to conventional personnel.
The author recognizes Dr. William Mitchell of Royal Danish Defence College for this observation.
28     “U.S. Military Spending Heavily to Keep Experienced Commandos,” International Herald
Tribune, October 11, 2007.; “Paramilitary: The Civilian Security Experts,” Strategy Page, September
29, 2006, http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htpara/articles/20060929.aspx; United States,
Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private
Security Providers,” GAO-05-737 (July 2005), 36, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05737.pdf;
David Isenberg, “Corporate Mercenaries - Part 1: Profit Comes with a Price,” Asia Times, May 19,
2004..
29     Kateri Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 30.
30     Finlan, Special Forces, 5–7.
31     Pratap Chatterjee, “Ex-SAS Men Cash in on Iraq Bonanza,” Corpwatch, 9 June 2004, http://
www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11355; Sandra I. Erwin, “War on Somali Pirates: Big Business
and Growing,” National Defense Magazine, August 14, 2012.
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operating in support of, or alongside, an intervening conventional force,
emphasis is on the first component in the direct sense, made plain in
the inability of adversaries to secure key personnel and infrastructure.32
The second component is problematic, especially over time, because of
limited numbers and it follows the third is even more difficult. It is only
indirectly, through Foreign Internal Defense measures (FID), that local
security sectors are mentored, often by special forces, to control space
across the three components. In sum, for Paul Rogers, endeavors such
as those stressing special forces are, at best, “liddism… keeping the lid
on rather than reducing the heat.”33
When considering how territorial control is exercised in a global
special forces network, private security companies do offer a different approach. Firms emphasize the “one may subsequently exercise it”
aspect because of the industry’s defensive focus. While private security
companies arguably first came to prominence in the 1990s because of
South Africa’s Executive Outcomes, a firm that controlled space in all
three manners, the industry has developed a strong defensive identity.
Past analysis has revealed the various ingredients instilling the defensive
mindset: (1) the desire of private security companies to avoid the pejorative “mercenary” label and its “offensive” activities; (2) the wish of
clients to deny that they use mercenaries; (3) the underscoring by state
clients and their militaries, particularly, that there are certain things the
private sector does not do; and (4) the iterative development of codes
of conduct, best practices, and operating principles by industry, states,
and nongovernmental organizations.34 Admittedly, these firms do
employ violence. Yet, there is a doctrinal difference for private security
companies between the defensive and the offensive: “Operations in
which forces await for the approach of the enemy before attacking”
over “Operations in which forces seek out the enemy in order to attack
him.”35 Put differently, companies exercise control in support of their
clients; they benefit from others first taking control.
Such an approach would not necessarily preclude firms working for
corporate clients to share intelligence with special forces in country. But
it would mean that they would not be operating too far away from their
compounds and clients, and doing so in a defensive mode. While control
of territory might be more permanent compared to direct special forces
action, the security constructed by private security companies might be
just as limited in scope.
Moreover, when looking at corporate clients, especially those
working in extraction industries, they not only operate in sometimes
unstable environments, they are strategically interested in a resource
in the first instance rather than in a people. These two may combine
32     Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,”
Parameters 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 7
33     Paul Rogers, “Security by ‘Remote Control’. Can it work?” RUSI Journal 158, no. 3 (June/
July 2013): 14.
34     Gary Schaub, Jr., and Volker Franke, “Contractors as Military Professionals?” Parameters 39,
no. 4 (Winter 2009–2010): 98, 101; Elke Krahmann, “The United States, PMSCs and the State
Monopoly on Violence: Leading the Way Towards Norm Change,” Security Dialogue 44, no. 1 (February
2013): 53–71; Andrew Bearpark, “The Case for Humanitarian Organizations to Use Private Security
Contractors,” in Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations and the
Law, ed. Benjamin Perrin (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012), 159.
35     United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “British Maritime Doctrine,” BR1806, Third Edition,
2004, 252, 278.
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geographically, or people may migrate to seek protection and opportunity, thus providing a potential locus for governance expansion or
hearts and minds activities. However, this may not always be the case.
Additionally, extraction efforts may be good for a state’s tax base, but
they do not necessarily mean that significant numbers of people will
receive the required resources or physical protection.36 Without other
beneficial factors, when security is made both a commodity and set spatially, there will be winners and losers as Peter W. Singer describes: “[N]
ot only are the worst threats deflected from the privately protected areas,
but also those portions of society that cannot afford protection have to
rely on declining, unstable, or nonexistent public means.”37 Similarly,
Anna Leander identifies a resulting “Swiss cheese” approach towards
security. Though companies may not have created these gaps, it is likely
they will remain unfilled as security provisions serve particular purposes
with particular targets.38 These private security companies’ responsibilities and techniques arguably equate to a different variant of liddism on
their own. In imagining a special forces network that includes private
security companies, this may, or may not, be part of the desired outcome
from the perspective of special forces.

Contact

It is debatable, however, whether firms might interact with special
forces in all instances, thus impacting the efficacy of a global network.
While scholars have warned that the very flexibility of networks means
that relationships between nodes are transitory and ad hoc, there is also
the possibility that nodal connections will be denied in the first place.
To explain, among the range of clients, relations with humanitarian
and development NGOs are among the most sensitive. While surveys
have found that a significant number of NGOs utilize contractors for
security reviews if not for protection, many organizations will not publicly acknowledge their interactions with these companies.39 Analysts
and NGOs alike have identified a number of concerns. The former’s
adoption of a “hardened” security mindset, especially one involving
weaponry, cuts against longstanding protective techniques (e.g., consent,
following the humanitarian ethic, living in solidarity among the people
in need, etc.). There is fear that private security companies may usurp
NGO roles or adopt the humanitarian moniker disingenuously. There
is also worry that these companies may impact negatively upon NGO
36     William Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars,” in Greed & Grievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2000), 43–68; Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 82–122.
37     Singer, Corporate Warriors, 227.
38     Anna Leander, “The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences
of Private Military Companies,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (September 2005): 617; Cullen,
“Privatized maritime security governance,” 101.
39     Among the NGO field offices surveyed in 2007 by the Overseas Development Institute,
35 percent reported using international PMSCs. P.W. Singer estimates that 25 percent of “high
end” PMSCs have humanitarian clients. Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico,
“The use of private security providers and services in humanitarian operations,” Humanitarian
Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report 27, September 2008, 9; P. W. Singer,
“Humanitarian principles, private military agents: some implications of the privatised military
industry for the humanitarian community’, in Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in
Military–Humanitarian Relations, eds. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, Humanitarian Policy
Group, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report 22, March 2006, 70.
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independence and neutrality given their relations with other clients,
both in and outside of a country of operations.40
Nevertheless, private security interactions with NGOs have several
rationales as captured by José L. Gómez del Prado, the former chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries:
“Counting humanitarian agencies as clients has multiple advantages for
such companies as enhancing their reputation, providing distance from
the mercenary label, and gaining a foothold in a potentially lucrative
market.”41 Building on this, in crass economic terms, with the rising
insecurity of NGO personnel in recent years (though the catalysts for
this augmentation are a source of debate), private security companies
may be an alternative security solution.42 Moreover, just as special forces
are now a focal point with the major interventions of the 21st century
winding down and Western governments applying themselves less but
still desiring to manage risk, one might also see increased reliance on
NGOs. At the extreme, one might witness the return of another form of
liddism: the 1990s “humanitarian alibi” featured reliance on NGOs so
states could avoid taking essential political measures.43 Just as this alibi
sparked some of the initial interest in NGO and private security company
interactions, contemporary developments may see its heightening.
As a result, companies with, or desiring of, a humanitarian clientele
may set limits on the degree to which they would interact with special
forces given the tensions inherent in private security company dynamism discussed earlier. Firms, as noted elsewhere, relate to “the worlds
of the military, the business world and the humanitarian NGO”.44 While
private security companies may easily move among these “worlds” and
may evoke different imagery depending on the audience, they will ultimately be judged by their actions.45 Given, as Ken Livingstone and Jerry
Hart offer, that “[d]eveloping a positive and attractive image is central
to the private security sector’s bid for professional status,” respecting the
40     Christopher Spearin, “Private, Armed, and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International
Private Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (August
2008): 363–382; Birth Anders, “The Relationship between NGOs and PMSCs and its Impact on
Coordinating Actors in Complex Operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (May 2013): 278–
294; Benjamin Perrin, “Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Organizations: Implications
for International Humanitarian Law,” in Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian
Organizations and the Law, ed. Benjamin Perrin (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2012),
123–156.
41     José L. Gómez del Prado, “A United Nations Instrument to Regulate and Monitor Private
Military and Security Contractors,” Notre Dame Journal of International, Comparative, and Human Rights
Law 1, no. 1 (2011): 40.
42     Perrin, “Private Security Companies,” 129; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Victoria
DiDomenico, “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 Update,” Humanitarian Policy
Group, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Policy Brief 34, April 2009; Olga Khazan, “Where
it’s Most Dangerous to be an Aid Worker,” Washington Post, December 26, 2012.
43     Language taken from Larry Minear, “Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations,”
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (1997), http://www.jha.ac/articles/a018.htm. The humanitarian
alibi is the antithesis of recent integrated whole of government solutions (in which both NGOs and
PMSCs also played contracted roles).
44     Carmola, Private Security Contractors, 27; Joakim Berndtsson, “Security Professionals for Hire:
Exploring the Many Faces of Private Security Expertise,” Millennium 40, no. 2 (January 2012): 305.
45     Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities,
Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on
Social Movements,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, eds. Doug McAdam, John D.
McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), 6; Jutta Joachim and Andrea
Schneiker, “New Humanitarians? Frame Appropriation through Private Military and Security
Companies,” Millennium 40, no. 2 (January 2012): 367; Berndtsson, “Security Professionals for Hire,”
305.
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concerns of humanitarians is valuable.46 Private security company interaction with special forces through a nonclient relationship would lead to
a collision between these worlds, one which might bring about further
closing of the humanitarian space rather than at least contributing to
its stabilization.47 The potential for NGO independence to be compromised and for special forces to influence humanitarian action through
companies would be problematic factors at best in terms of advancing
a global special forces network. Put differently, firms may have derived
some of their skillsets from the state, but one cannot assume that they,
in all cases, are still serving state endeavors to the letter.

Manpower

While one might argue that the recent expansion of special forces
the world-over means that this node is healthy, this stance is debatable.
USSOCOM leaders, for instance, revealed in 2011 that since 11 September
2001, though the command’s manpower had doubled, the actual number
of personnel overseas had quadrupled. Additionally, with conventional
forces withdrawing from Afghanistan, the expectation is that special
forces’ responsibilities will increase. The growing quality of life issues and
fear of burnout, not only among the US SOF community but also in those
of other allied countries, are significant concerns.48 They underscore the
network emphasis noted at this article’s beginning.
However, emphasizing private security companies as part of the
special forces network may exacerbate the very pressures USSOCOM
and others wish to alleviate. Certainly, on the one hand, security professionals may be able to move among the nodes, bringing their expertise
with them but also conforming to the operational boundaries of individual nodes. A 2010 RAND study even suggested employment with a
private security company might be viewed as part of an overall career
path for military personnel.49 On the other hand, when considering
the aforementioned special forces attributes, zero-sum dynamics are
evident with personnel movement from special forces to the private
sector. If quality is important, if mass production is out of the question,
and if standing forces are required to house experience and maturity,
the potential for private employment, alone or alongside other factors,
creates a vacuum difficult to fill. At the very least, it upsets the honed
small team dynamics drilled over time (and at considerable expense to
state coffers).
In the not so distant past, burnout concerns coupled with private
security opportunities catalyzed special forces retention efforts. These
efforts attempted to deny companies of manpower for the sake of
self-preservation; governments were tasking special forces to do more

46     Ken Livingstone and Jerry Hart, “The Wrong Arm of the Law? Public Images of Private
Security,” Policing and Society 13, no. 2 (2003): 161.
47     Humanitarian space: an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and
follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity. Christopher Spearin,
“Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian
Spaces?” International Peacekeeping 8, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 22.
48     Spencer Ackerman, “Special Ops Forces Could Use A Breather: Commander,” February
9, 2011. Alison McMeekin, “SAS Death in Afghanistan Raises Workload Question,” Herald Sun,
July 3, 2012. “Hidden Casualties,” Strategy Page, July 12, 2011, http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/
htsf/20110712.aspx.
49     Sarah Cotton et al., “Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” MG-987-SRF, RAND Corporation, 2010, xiv.
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and more in major interventions involving conventional forces. As an
example, in the United Kingdom, SAS personnel received a 50 percent
pay increase in 2006. Also in 2006, Canada increased allowances for
JTF2 personnel. Later, in 2009, Canada replaced the JTF2 allowances with a Special Operations Allowance covering a wider range of
Canadian personnel. As for the United States, officials employed both
the carrot and the stick over the first decade of the 21st century. There
were stop-loss years preventing the retirement of certain military personnel and the then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, even mused
about noncompete clauses in government contracts that would dissuade
firms from luring active duty military personnel. There also were initiatives focusing on retirement benefits, salaries, bonuses, and educational
incentives.
Today, USSOCOM recognition that private security companies are
potentially part of a larger network implies that the genie cannot be
stuffed back into the bottle. Companies have a perceived utility (though
one should note the limitations and boundaries identified above).
However, the special forces highlighting of private security companies
reinforces the status of these firms as legitimate security actors and
it arguably draws further attention to the industry as an employment
opportunity. With burnout fears returning, this time because special
forces are increasingly working in lieu of, rather than alongside, conventional forces, attention may again turn to additional remuneration
and other retention measures.50 Although care needs to be exercised,
especially given the sky-rocketing costs of conventional military platforms, the heavily special forces-reliant alternative made real through a
networked approach may not necessarily be at low expense—a troubling
point for political and military officials in an era of austerity.

Concluding Remarks

In 2012, Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments offered this observation, one arguably applicable
across the Western context: “Just as defense budgets are declining, the
price of projecting and sustaining military power is increasing and the
range of interests requiring protection is expanding.”51 The augmented
reliance on special forces, and in turn the advancement of a global
network in light of the resulting pressures, stem from such analysis.
This article suggests there are many connections—almost genetic
links—between special forces and private security companies in the
larger network. It is increasingly recognized there are social networks
among different national special forces that allow for cooperation and
integration. Some go so far as to suggest there is a wider special forces

50     In the US case, for instance, the author already notes the bonus matrix, effective February 23,
2012, which emphasizes SOF specialties. Similarly, there was the 2011 internal “sensing” study on
quality of life issues. See http://www.militaryhub.com/article.cfm?id=409; Gregg Zoroya, “Special
Ops Commander Vows Better Life for 66,000 troops,” USA Today, February 16, 2012.
51     Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the Pentagon Should Focus
on Assuring Access,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November/December 2012): 58
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culture.52 If private security personnel indeed transfer their professional
standards and norms to the private sector, one might argue private security companies are perfectly suitable for a global special forces network.
However, this network resides in the wider context of security governance.53 States and their special forces are important, but they are not
necessarily dominant in all cases. By deemphasizing state activism, one
can reveal the varying dynamics by which security is made real, in what
ways, and for whom.54 Thus, in order to realize what firms might have
to offer, one must consider the following: (1) how contractors construct
security and for what reasons; (2) how they rely on others for both commercial opportunities and legitimacy enhancing arrangements; and (3)
how the personnel linkages between special forces and private security companies may impinge on the former in an era of austerity and
increased special forces usage. As indicated above, the private security
defensive focus, the importance of relations with NGOs, and zero-sum
manpower dynamics together highlight a lack of universal congruity visà-vis special forces. Certainly, a lack of shared vision and tactics may
facilitate complementarity, but it may also reinforce division. This possibility builds upon the opinion offered by one retired US General that
“[t]he profit motive never aligns 100 percent with the public interest.”55
While there clearly are limitations and challenges in considering private security companies as partners in a broader special forces
network, one should not completely discount the possibility. Instead,
such networks should not be viewed as crystallized, but rather as phenomena in which the nodes “simultaneously cooperate and compete
within the field of security delivery.”56 Incorporating private security
companies as part of this network should be done with eyes wide open.

52     King, “The Special Air Service,” 659; Anthony King, “The internationalization of the armed
forces,” in Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice, eds. Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema,
and Robert Beeres (New York: Routledge, 2010), 49; Alastair Finlan, “The (Arrested) Development
of UK Special Forces and the Global War on Terror,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 4 (October
2009): 978.
53     Elke Krahmann, “Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North
America,” Conflict, Security & Development 5, no. 2 (August 2005): 247–268.
54     Patrick Cullen, “Private Security in International Politics: Deconstructing the State’s Monopoly
of Security Governance,” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics, 2009.
55     Carmola, Private Security Contractors, 30.
56     Patrick Cullen, “Private Security Companies in the Malacca Straits: Mapping New Patterns in
Security Governance,” in Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits, and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Context,
eds. Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 210.
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Abstract: Research in private military and security companies has
matured over the last fifteen years. This essay reviews past research
and identifies three areas needing further attention; progress in these
areas is critical for guiding security and defense policies and establishing effective regulations.

rivate military and security companies became a topic of research
in the early 1990s, and is a matter of great interest for academics, journalists, and practitioners alike.1 While much progress has
been made in studying this diverse industry, the field has many avenues
that could benefit from further research. This article reviews past research
and suggests a way ahead. It first identifies the major approaches taken
thus far: the field has matured greatly; researchers have moved away from
studying the industry as a whole, and now focus more on non-state clients
and individual contractors and services rather than state-sponsored contracting. Second, the article identifies the field’s most pressing research
concerns, as well as how they can be pursued. Individual research projects are too often disconnected; establishing formal research networks
among interested universities would facilitate cooperation and foster
joint projects. Additionally, regular exchanges between practitioners and
academics would greatly improve the quality of research output, and help
to educate those working with private military contractors.

Prior Approaches

The field of private military and security companies is a relatively
young one, though it evolved quickly over the last fifteen years. During
that period, five general themes characterized the research: (1) the nature
of the industry, (2) normative and ethical concerns (e.g., what should or
should not be outsourced, with how much governmental control, and
whether the use of armed contractors in lieu of soldiers was ethical), (3)
the impact of private military contractors on civil-military relations and
states control of violence, (4) non-state contracting, and (5) laws and
regulation.
The field is clearly concerned with more than just armed security
contractors. Obviously, the potential of armed contractors to use deadly
force has given rise to important considerations regarding regulation and
oversight. However, non-combat services—such as intelligence, security training, logistical support, and risk assessments—are also part of
the industry. In fact, the term “private military companies” has evolved
into broader terms such as “private military and security companies”

1      The more inclusive term “private military and security company” is shortened hereafter to
“private military contractors” for readability.
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and “private security companies,” an evolution which also reflects developments within the industry. For instance, the first private military
contractors to come to public attention in the 1990s were Executive
Outcomes (South African) and Sandline International (British), both
of which offered combat services.2 However, as mentioned above, the
industry now offers a broader range of services.3 Similarly, academic
research once used typologies that categorized types of companies based
on their proximity to the battlefield.4 Nonetheless, while distinguishing
between private military companies and private security companies may
work in theory, it remains difficult in practice. Contractors or firms
develop different profiles based on the types of services they offer and
their clients. Most prefer to call themselves “security” companies to
avoid negative connotations associated with the term “military.”
Research activity in private military contractors has taken place in
three chronological periods or waves: (1) from 1998 to 2003, (2) from
2004 to 2009, and (3) from 2010 to 2014. The first wave tried to describe
the larger industry of contracting basic military services, and make sense
of its evolving role in warfare.5 Discussion typically centered on the rise
of contractors as non-state armies, and the potential end of the state’s
monopoly on legitimate violence.
The second wave of research began after the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
and focused on the US government’s use of contractors.6 It was more
concerned with finding solutions to practical problems than theoretical
or normative issues.7 As the number of contractors decreased in Iraq, the
“Iraq bubble” burst and the industry began to explore new markets in
anti-piracy operations, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and

2      For example, see Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Private Military Companies.
Options for Regulation, Green Paper (London: The Stationary Office. HC 577, February 2002), 10;
Christopher Kinsey, “Private Security Companies: Agents of Democracy or Simply Mercenaries?”
in Private Military and Security Companies Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, eds. Thomas Jäger and
Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 87-104, 94f.
3      This does not mean there is no market for this – but offensive action is not a service offered
by PMSCs. Sarah Percy makes a convincing argument about why companies moved away from
selling combat services. Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), see especially Chapter Seven.
4      Compare: Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003; Gerhard Kümmel, Die Privatisierung der Sicherheit: Fluch oder Segen?
Postheroische Gesellschaft, überlasteter Staat und private Sicherheits- und Militärunternehmen (Strausberg
Sozialwiss. Inst. der Bundeswehr, 2004); Christopher Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction
of Iraq: Transforming Military Logistics (London: Routledge, 2009), 7.
5      For example David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316 (New
York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998). Peter W.
Singer, “Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for
International Security,” International Security 26, no. 3 (2001): 186-220.
6      Compare: Peter W. Singer, “Warriors for Hire in Iraq,” Brookings, 2004.; Congressional
Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget
Office, August 2008); Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Contractors in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
May 2011); Christopher Kinsey, Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming Military
Logistics (London: Routledge, 2009); Deborah D. Avant and Lee Sigelman, “Private Security
and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq,” Security Studies 19, no. 2 (2010): 230-265; David
Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport: Praeger Security International,
2009).
7      Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson, eds., Contractors & War: The Transformation
of US Expeditionary Operations (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2012); Claude Berube and
Patrick Cullen, eds., Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne
Security Risks in the 21st Century (Oxon: Routledge, 2012)
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other areas.8 The third wave commenced in 2010 and was characterized
by themes that were more specific in nature, such as contractors’ selfperceptions, mental health, and gender issues.9 A growing number of
researchers also began addressing military-contractor cooperation. This
research encompassed attitudes of soldiers towards contractors, their
views about becoming contractors, contractor motivation, and military
professionalism.10
While the main clients of contractors have been the governments of
the United States and United Kingdom, the United Nations and many
non-governmental organizations have also bought security services
from private military contractors. In 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan provoked public outcry by suggesting the organization ought
to hire private security companies to carry out peacekeeping tasks and
to administer refugee camps. However, the idea did not garner much
support.11 Nonetheless, researchers found that some UN bodies have
indeed contracted services from private military contractors, though not
to the extent suggested by Annan.12 Non-governmental organizations
are very cautious about admitting to the use of private security contractors, but they too have availed themselves of the industry’s services.13
American scholars have been particularly good at adopting a practical “they’re here to stay so let’s deal with it” attitude, and the field could
stand more of this way of thinking. To be sure, ethical and normative
concerns are important. However, more research is needed in what is
8      Dominick Donald, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, Whitehall Paper
66 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2006). Compare: Krahmann, States, Citizens and the
Privatisation of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); Molly Dunigan, Victory for
Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2011). See also Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War & Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of
Privatized Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for
Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
9      Molly Dunigan, et al., Out of the Shadows: The Health and Well-Being of Private Contractors working
in Conflict Environments (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013); Paul Higate, “‘Cowboys and Professionals’:
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no. 3 (2010): 369-386. Berndtsson writes more specifically about soldier-contractor interaction:
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‘Subcontracting’ UN Peace Operations,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (1999): 43-60, 48.
12      Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico, The Use of Private Security
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The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping,”
International Peacekeeping 20, no.1 (2013): 33-47, 36f.
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NGOs and PMSCs and its Impact on Coordinating Actors in Complex Operations,” Small Wars &
Insurgencies 24, no 2 (2013): 278-294.
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already a reality for many contractors and those working with them.
Unless the United Kingdom and United States change their thinking
about using private military contractors, the industry is here to stay.
That, in turn, means the use of contractors needs to be regulated
appropriately; yet, aside from spikes of interest following controversial
incidents, little has happened regarding regulations. Many aspects of
the business, such as importing weapons into a war zone, are already
tightly regulated.14 However, the crucial issue is enforcement of existing laws and regulations. In 2013, a new association was established
that will monitor compliance with the “Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers.” Signatories have committed to a wide range
of principles governing the use of force, weapons training, selection and
management of personnel, and the prohibition of torture, slave labor,
and child labor.15 Currently, more than seven-hundred companies have
agreed to the principles, among which sixty-four are US companies.16
While the association is not yet functional, it promises to have procedures for addressing complaints, and to conduct field visits. The US
Department of State has announced it might make association membership a prerequisite for the award of contracts, which in turn signals
confidence in the association’s potential utility.17
The next wave of private military contractor research must study
specific aspects of contracting through greater data collection rather
than theoretical analysis; it must also intensify the dialogue with industry, government, military, and non-governmental organizations.

Avenues for Further Research

Which issues warrant further research depends on one’s perspective; clients will have different questions and knowledge requirements
than academics. Nonetheless, future research would do well to address
three areas:
1. Individuals and non-state clients and their cooperation in the field;
2. The expansion of research methodologies, especially the range of
comparative case studies;18
3. The establishment of research “clusters” or networks and the facilitation of regular academic-military dialogues.
First, greater examination of the “soft” end of contractor services
(the health and well-being of individual contractors, their personal
costs, and general effectiveness) would complement previous statecentric research. Non-state clients—such as shipping companies,
14      Birthe Anders, “There is a New Sheriff in Town - But Can He Keep
the Peace?” Strife Blog, 12 November 2013, http://strifeblog.org/2013/11/12/
theres-a-new-sheriff-in-town-but-can-he-keep-the-peace/.
15      International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 9 November 2010, http://
www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_
Company_Names.pdf.
16      The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies, 1
September 2013, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_2013_-_
Composite_List_SHORT_VERSION-1.pdf.
17      “State Department to Incorporate International Code of Conduct into Worldwide
Protective Services Contracts,” Press release, 16 August 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2013/08/213212.htm.
18      My thanks to Joakim Berndtsson for mentioning the need for a wider range of country case
studies.

Private Contractors & Military Professionals

Anders

79

non-governmental organizations, and development contractors—are
interesting to compare to governmental clients; and non-state contracting
has practical implications for military forces. When non-governmental
organizations contract for security services, their choices can affect their
partner organizations in important ways.
Second, scholars must open a broader dialogue about research
methods. Most researchers employ a mix of document analysis and
qualitative methods, with infrequent quantitative surveys. But we need
a debate concerning how to analyze interview data, how to construct
surveys, and how to build on previous research. Most research projects are stand-alone attempts to address specific questions. However,
building on previous research findings would give other outputs more
footing. Furthermore, future research would benefit from comparing a
broader range of countries to identify their contracting choices and how
effective they are in specific situations. These points are, of course, made
from an academic perspective—I would certainly invite a debate about
the kind of research needed from a practitioner perspective.
Third, too much research potential will be wasted if it is not better
connected, transnationally and across disciplines. Formalized networks
have been established, but these consist of scholars working on very
different aspects of the industry. While this was a useful first step,
the further evolution of research networks could form research clusters.
For instance, a “government contracting cluster” could formally link
researchers working on state outsourcing and facilitate development of
future projects. The same approach is conceivable for the other topics
mentioned above, such as contracting by non-governmental organizations, maritime contracting, laws, and regulations. It would also be
beneficial to include experts from fields not directly concerned with
private military contractors. Management scholars might have something
interesting to say about emerging contractor markets; psychologists and
sociologists might offer insights into contractor motivations and selfunderstanding; and regional experts could contribute to our knowledge
of political, social, and legal conditions in specific countries. In addition,
research programming that is more comprehensive would benefit scholars by offering easier data collection; it would also help practitioners by
facilitating their access to scholars working on similar sets of problems.
Regular dialogues help scholars stay in touch with what practitioners consider important. A case in point is a recent meeting
between the “Private Military and Security Research Group” of King’s
College, London, and the faculty and students of the National Defense
University’s Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource
Strategy. Both parties benefitted from an afternoon’s candid exchange.
Military officers learned about ongoing research and preliminary results
before these were published. Researchers gained insights into working
with contractors in different field environments. But such exchanges
should be routine, not extraordinary.
To conclude, research in the field of private military contracting has
matured significantly in recent years. It has evolved from early efforts
to describe and understand the entire industry to address previously
neglected issues, such as private maritime security and the motivations
of the individuals involved. As an emerging field, it would benefit from
a more coherent research agenda. Comprehensive programming and
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research clusters will be crucial to efforts to consolidate the field and to
ensure it informs the security and policy areas most effectively.
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This commentary is in response to Robert A. Johnson's article "Predicting Future War"
published in the Spring 2014 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 1).

The Joint Force Must Get Better at Understanding Combinations, Employing
Asymmetry, Evaluating Risk

T

he article “Predicting Future War” by Robert Johnson provides
a compelling vision for the types of challenges future forces will
face and the military implications of those challenges. Although
“tours of the future” like those found in the article are important, I
believe it is critical the military step back and understand the cultural
reflexes and biases we must cultivate order to address those emerging
challenges. Straight-line analysis of trends and their implications may
drive us to solutions that are wrong or incomplete. Instead, I would
advocate a broader view so the force as a whole can come to terms with
these challenges in a coherent way.
Strategic competition is always a back-and-forth affair. The US
approach to warfare over the last several decades has deeply impressed
potential adversaries and is encouraging speedy military innovation
around the world. This innovation is confronting the Joint Force with
an array of emerging military challenges and threatening to obsolesce,
or make irrelevant, parts of the US defense establishment. From antiaccess challenges in the Pacific, to “masked warfare” in Eastern Europe,
to evolving irregular and insurgent challenges throughout the Middle
East, adversaries are adapting to the “US way of war” and testing new
approaches to limiting American influence and reach.
Although always difficult in a bureaucracy as large and complex as
the Department of Defense, we have to think hard about building a
Joint Force (through conscious design) with keen appreciation for evolving strategic challenges and threats. The Chairman notes 80 percent of
the Joint Force of 2020 is essentially decided. Thus, what we do about
the remaining 20 percent can potentially have disproportional impact
on the success or failure of our future military. Perhaps even more
critical is what we do in doctrine, education, organization, training, and
leadership – in essence, the mental and social “software” that orients
and orchestrates our military capabilities. To get this software right, the
military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key
mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic,
and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s. Coding this mental software also suggests now is the time to step back from individual weapons
or programs and think more broadly about the context within which
future conflict will take place. I see this contextual discussion taking
three distinct, yet related paths.
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First, we must work to understand better the complex threats and
challenges driving military change. Calling it complex is not good
enough; we must clarify this complexity if we do not want to miss the
mark. For me, this complexity is about combinations. Today, we face
novel combinations of threats from an array of adversaries. These
threats frequently transcend neat or tidy categories, cutting across land,
sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum, while
being distributed or reaching across broader geographic ranges. Each
military service tends to have a well-defined range of responsibilities in
which its competence and professionalism are unrivalled. Adversaries,
unable to confront superior capabilities within service domains, are
experimenting with combinations of overlapping capabilities capable of
cutting across seams or boundaries between services, or avoid them
altogether.
Second, these novel combinations of challenges, threats, and adversaries require novel combinations of power in response. To encourage
a future military capable of such combinations, we have to think about
the assembly and employment of complementary mixes of government,
civilian, and military power, which are at once confounding, irresistible,
surprising, and unexpected, to our adversaries. If we do this well, it
will set the stage for affordable and numerous new capabilities, such
as small, swarming robotics capable of taking advantage of the emerging intersection of twenty-first century engineering, manufacturing,
and information technologies. Furthermore, this mental approach will
assist in mitigating the vulnerabilities of our own expensive or hard-toreplace capital assets and overcome the potential limitations of a force
too exquisite to risk using. Before a war, a convincingly flexible force will
serve to deter more effectively. During war, it will be central to victory.
Third, we must better understand how to evaluate and mitigate risk
by integrating vulnerability assessments more comprehensively into all
aspects of our thinking. Risk is inherent every time military power is
employed. However, we often forget the true measure of power in the
international system is the ability to change the behavior of another at
reasonable cost. Critically, we need to get better at uncovering flaws in
our initial assumptions about military problems, and at articulating the
consequences of specific military actions or approaches. Not all problems are dangerous, not all dangers are pressing, not all emergencies
are soluble, and not all solutions are affordable. The defense intellectual
must understand how the US military is able, under modern warfighting
conditions, to provide political leaders flexible military options capable
of uniting strategy and tactics in a world of limitations. In a world characterized by powerful adversaries and perhaps less ample US military
capabilities, it is critical we cultivate a sense of risk management across
the future force.
Our institutional inability to think thorough contextual issues,
such as those I have described above, tends to discount future costs.
We default to easy decisions, such as protecting legacy structure, end
strength, or top-line budget, and put off difficult choices until they are
beyond the point at which they can be optimally solved. The great strategic thinker Colin Gray is well known for articulating the idea that war
is about context. Putting contextual discussions at the beginning of our
future force development activities will help to position the Department
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of Defense and the nation as a whole to seize opportunities rather than
– as is so often the case – be driven by institutional inertia or by reacting
to a more visionary, forward-looking adversary’s plans.
Dr. Johnson’s article surfaces a number of challenges the future
force will face, some will be right, some will be wrong. Critically,
however, I suggest we must understand how − in a world most agree is
(as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is fond of saying) “complex,
uncertain, and increasingly dangerous,” we cultivate the mental agility
to prepare where we can, and adjust to unanticipated conditions when
we must.

The Author Replies
Robert A. Johnson

M

r. Jeff Becker advances ideas that are close to my own and
I do not detect any fundamental disagreement between us,
but rather an injunction to develop our responses to future
trends. We share a critical view of the term “complex,” which Mr. Becker
rightly points out is overused. His observation that it is merely a question
of combination, perhaps in unexpected ways, is spot on. He encourages action “across the seams or boundaries between Services’’; our own
“novel combinations’’ and the cultivation of “mental agility.’’ In this we
are on the same page. Mr. Becker urges the armed services to: “better
understand the cultural reflexes and biases we must cultivate,” but I would
only caution here we also might better understand our usual reflexes in
order to militate against our tendency to reach the wrong conclusions. I
am also a little uncertain if we always get the formula for assessing risk
right. Risk is an inevitable facet of war and cannot be avoided, but he
rightly enjoins us to assess cost, which, in fact, is a far better metric. Mr.
Becker correctly deduces that to get our mental “software” right, “the
military should be thinking more deeply about the nature of these key
mental investments to ensure military change is positive, opportunistic,
and occurs on our terms, not an adversary’s.’’ In this, he is absolutely
right.
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The Shah
By Abbas Milani

I

n early September 1978 the Shah of Iran flew over a churning crowd
of anti-government demonstrators in a helicopter, and was shocked
and alarmed by the size of the demonstration. Turning to the pilot he
asked incredulously, “What have I done to them?” (Buchan, 167). The
pilot refused to answer, but the Shah was badly shaken by the popular
hatred directed against him. He never recovered from the realization that
his nation had turned against him, and he quickly became indecisive,
apathetic, and withdrawn. In the last days of his regime the Shah realized he had developed no large popular following and the Iranian public
was showing nothing but contempt for his very real record of economic
achievement, which he used to help justify the monarchy. He was also
weakened by his chronic lymphocytic leukemia (diagnosed in May 1974),
although this cancer was not the primary reason for his inability to continue leading the state. Iran’s Prime Minister later told US Ambassador
Sullivan, “You must know this and you must tell your government. This
country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind” (Buchan, 202).
How Iran descended into this sorry state and then further descended into
a bloody and vengeful revolution is the subject of a number of recent
books, some of the most important of which are considered here.

Days of God: The
Revolution in Iran
and Its Consequences
By James Buchan
Revolutionary Iran:
A History of the
Islamic Republic
By Michael Axworthy

Unthinkable:
Iran, the Bomb, and
American Strategy
By Kenneth M. Pollack

The Rise and Fall of the Palavi Dynasty

Retired Financial Times correspondent
James Buchan begins his study with a good
overview of the Pahlavi family’s royalist
regime which was established in 1925 by a
semi-literate cavalry officer and carried on by
his son Mohammad Reza (Iran’s final Shah)
from 1941 until 1979. Shah Mohammad
Reza pursued rapid economic development
while expanding the authoritarian nature
of his government. This strategy was based
on the flawed belief that strong economic
progress would stifle concerns over a
corrupt and repressive government. The
Shah was baffled by the public’s indifference to material progress under the Pahlavi
regime, telling a Western diplomat that “I
Buchan, Days of God: The Revolution
have done more for Iran than any Shah for inJames
Iran and Its Consequences (New York:
2,000 years” (212). Yet most of the public Simon & Schuster, 2013). 432 pages. $27.99
felt that such advances had nothing to do
with them. Instead, they were much more focused on the Shah’s megalomania and the arbitrary but sometimes very ugly repression by the
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Savak security service.1 In explaining the Shah’s failure to relate to the
Iranian public, Buchan also notes that the Shah’s psyche had been scared
by several nearly successful assassination attempts, which encouraged
him to withdraw into a security cocoon. To make matters worse, he was
also enormously susceptible to the flattery of his aides who shielded
him from uncomfortable facts and constructive criticism. In this sterile
environment his delusions flourished.
Buchan also vividly illustrates the intensity of the public’s alienation
as the Shah’s regime headed toward collapse. In last years of the Shah’s
rule, large segments of the Iranian public appeared willing to believe
any rumor about him as long as it was sufficiently sinister. A key turning
point was the 1978 Rex Cinema arson fire where around 370 people
were killed in a movie theater. After the revolution, the new government established that Islamic activists acting on their own had started
the fire, but at the time it was widely believed that regime agents were
responsible and attempted to blame the Islamic opposition. The Shah
received no benefit of the doubt in the case of this odious crime, perhaps
because so many ordinary people had such negative experiences with
Savak throughout their lives. Few Iranians believed that either the Shah
or Savak had scruples about the death of innocents. An even more powerful example occurred when a 1978 earthquake struck the ancient town
of Khorasan killing 20,000 people. Immediately after the event, rumors
quickly began circulating that the regime was allowing the United States
to stage underground nuclear weapons tests in the desert regardless of
the negative consequences for the Iranian people.
The Shah’s faltering response to the uprising also undermined the
possibility of serious military actions against the revolutionaries. Rather
than present himself as a strong and decisive leader, the Shah allowed his
military to flounder without providing them with any kind of vision for
victory. Over a 10 month span soldiers were told to fire their weapons into
the air but to do nothing more serious to confront demonstrators, due to
previous overreactions by the military. Some units eventually chose to
abandon their bases to the revolutionaries rather than defend them with
nothing more than empty bluff. Moreover, as the revolution progressed
the army increasingly faced the danger of disintegration, and the government viewed conscript troops as prone to desertion and changing sides.
Lacking empowerment and mindful of their own uncertain futures,
the military command announced that it would remain neutral in the
struggle between the Shah’s government and the revolutionaries, a position Buchan characterizes as a rank absurdity that led to the military’s
rapid surrender. With unmistakable contempt, Buchan states, “So ended
the Pahlavi army in a defeat so rapid and comprehensive, one searches in
vain for its like whether in modern or ancient history” (240).
While the Shah was showing weakness and vacillation, his main
adversary Imam Ruhollah Khomeini was behaving very differently.
Shrewd, manipulative, and absolutely committed to Islamic Revolution,
Khomeini did not back away from confrontation, nor was he squeamish
about the loss of Iranian lives in the ongoing struggle. He had total credibility as an uncompromising enemy of Israel and the United States, the
1     For a nightmarish account of Savak abuses see Ryszard Kapuscinski, Shah of Shahs (New
York: Harcourt Brance Jovanovich Publishers, 1982), 43-51.
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latter of which he accused of seeking to steal Iran’s dignity by treating
it as a vassal state. Shortly before his arrest and exile to Iraq in 1963,
he stated “Let the American President know that in the eyes of the
Iranian people, he is the most repellent member of the human race”
(95). Almost by accident, Khomeini was tremendously empowered by
the events leading up to his return to Iran after 14 years in exile. From
abroad he was able to reject the slightest movement toward compromise with the regime, while jeering at other clerics who failed to attack
the monarchy with sufficient venom. In this environment, Khomeini
achieved a stunning level of empowerment as audio cassettes of his
harsh and uncompromising sermons circulated throughout the country.
Buchan states that after the Shah was driven out of Iran, Khomeini did
not simply come home as a hero. Rather, he returned as a “messiah.”
Once in power, Khomeini quickly moved to consolidate the revolution while seeking to appear above the fray of post-Imperial politics.
Many of Iran’s most important early power struggles were played out
during the Iran-Iraq War with Khomeini strengthening the regime in
the face of a foreign enemy. By October 1981 all the principal offices
of state, with the exception of the prime ministry, were in the hands of
Khomeini loyalists from the Qom seminary. Yet while the Iran-Iraq War
presented opportunities for consolidating the revolution, Iran gained
little from eight years of extremely bloody fighting. In the last battles of
the war, Iranian forces fought with valor but failed to defeat the Saddam
Hussein regime in the face of superior Iraqi weaponry. Buchan ends
this study with death of Khomeini followed by a brief epilogue on the
longevity of the Islamic Republic, which has continued to survive all of
the challenges it has faced.

Waging Revolution and Consolidating the Revolution

Michael Axworthy’s Revolutionary Iran is another valuable study
that offers a great deal of insight on both the revolution itself and the
post-revolutionary Islamic Republic. Axworthy was the head of the Iran
Section of the British Foreign Office from 1998-2000 and is currently a
senior lecturer at the University of Exeter.
In this study, he gives a solid description of
the rise of the Palavi monarchy, while consistently asking what social groups chose
to support the Shah and why they did so.
Axworthy also seeks to understand why the
regime lost its legitimacy, and how the new
regime established its authority and sought
to maintain significant levels of popular
support.
In some of the most important analysis
within this book, Axworthy considers the
clash between Iranian self-identity and the
American cultural presence in Iran, which
some Iranians increasingly thought was
smothering them. Many Iranians viewed
American culture as self-confident and Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A
of the Islamic Republic (New York:
brash, presenting itself as indistinguishable History
Oxford University Press, 2013). 495 pages.
from modernization. This challenge was $34.95
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sometimes viewed as a form of cultural aggression or “Westoxification”
(Gharbzadegi) that confronted the self-identity of Iranians. This concept is
detailed in a study published in 1962 by Iranian author Jalal Al-e Ahmed.
Al-e Ahmad did not directly attack the West, but rather expressed
concern over the uncritical way in which Western values and ideas were
treated by many Iranian educators and elites. Al-e also drew upon an
analogy by Molana Rumi involving a crow which saw a partridge and
was impressed by the elegant way that the other bird walked. The crow
repeatedly attempted to imitate the partridge, but did so awkwardly. It
was never was able to duplicate the partridge and eventually forgot how
to even walk like a crow. The crow, like many Iranians, had lost its
identity in exchange for accepting a caricature of foreign values.
Juxtaposed against this perceived Western cultural onslaught were
Iranian religious values and traditions. Iran’s version of Twelver Shi’ite
Islam had been the state religion since 1501 and is acknowledged as
central to Iranian history and identity. It was sometimes seen in opposition to the pre-Islamic historical heritage presented by the Shah as the
foundation of the Palavi monarchy. Challenging the Shah’s narrative,
Khomeini insisted that the regime’s pre-Islamic symbols and allusions
were blasphemy and that monarchy was abhorrent to the Prophet. This
vocabulary continued to be used following the success of the revolution
when the Shah’s supporters were routinely referred to as “idol-worshipers.” Moreover, in his conflict with Khomeini the Shah had only a limited
reservoir of religious legitimacy since his monarchy was not formally
linked to religion, and he did not officially rule by divine right despite
attempts to appear pious. Rather, Iran’s 1906 Constitution directly stated
that the Shah’s sovereignty was derived from the people as a power given
to him in trust, and therefore not as a right bestowed directly by God.
Axworthy agrees with Buchan that the Shah’s regime had made
tremendous economic progress by the mid-1970s, but that he was also
becoming more authoritarian. As the Shah grew increasingly selfconfident, his rule became more autocratic, and his previously declared
aspirations to democracy faded. Correspondingly, Savak men went into
libraries and bookshops throughout Iran to remove copies of the Shah’s
1960 book Mission for My Country, as its statements about freedom and
democracy had become “out of date.” The Shah no longer wished to be
held accountable for previous promises to democratize, and this change
did not go unnoticed by the educated middle classes. Additionally, antiroyalist sentiment grew among bazaar merchants, religious students,
and lower middle class workers, who found their economic aspirations
frustrated by pervasive corruption, cronyism and rising living costs.
Making matters worse, the Shah fundamentally misunderstood the
entire revolutionary movement, assuming it was foreign-inspired and
perhaps foreign-controlled. The primary culprit in these conspiracy
theories alternated between the United States, the United Kingdom, and
particularly the Soviet Union.
The other side of the revolution involves the opposition to the
Shah and the question of why Khomeini rose out of the myriad of
anti-government forces to take power after the Shah was driven out.
One reason, already noted by Buchan, appears to be Khomeini’s total
commitment to opposing the Shah. Some Iranian secular liberals were
encouraged by the real and tangible concessions that the Shah offered
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as the regime faltered, but Khomeini and his followers were implacable.
Khomeini’s utter self-confidence and total commitment to the destruction of the regime marked him as a revolutionary and not a politician.
Khomeini consequently treated alliances with moderate oppositionists
as temporary conveniences to be discarded as soon as possible since
these groups could never be trusted. Rather, the leaders he brought to
power were his former religious students, including Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, Sedeq Khalkhali, and especially Mohammad
Beheshti, who died in 1981. Khomeini’s surviving son, Ahmad, was also
a key political player in the revolution and the early Islamic Republic.
Khomeini wanted to work with the popular President Bani-Sadr, but
only if Bani-Sadr capitulated completely to Khomeini’s vision of Islamic
government. He did not want the clergy to be seen as governing alone,
but was prepared to tolerate that perception rather than accept actual
power-sharing. Unwilling to acquiesce to these terms, Bani-Sadr fled the
country in 1981, narrowly escaping arrest.
The revolutionary leaders also moved to reshape Iranian society.
Regime opponents were placed on trial for capital “crimes” such as
being at war with God and spreading corruption on earth; charges that
could mean almost anything. Another crime was eclecticism which
essentially involved polluting the ideology with non-Islamic ideas (especially Marxism) for the organization of society. In response to pressure
against them from government-sponsored revolutionary Komitehs,
leftist revolutionaries fought back hard with terrorism. On June 28,
1981 a bomb detonated at the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters killing 70 regime leaders, including the brilliant and influential
Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. The Iranian revolutionary government
responded with mass arrests of leftists and a campaign ruthless enough
to finally marginalize these forces in the competition for power. Later, in
surveying the upheaval, Khomeini’s disgraced former student Ayatollah
Hosein Ali Montazeri stated, “The people of the world thought our only
task here in Iran was to kill” (300).
Axworthy identifies the end of the Iran-Iraq war as a spiritual and
psychological crisis for Khomeini, who believed that God had inspired
and guided him to continue the war against Saddam Hussein. According
to Axworthy, “Khomeini believed he had polished his soul to the point
that his mind had become an instrument for the performance of God’s
will on earth” (282). He expected Iranian forces to seize the holy city
of Karbala in Iraq and perhaps even Jerusalem as the result of a Godinspired decision to continue the war after the Iraqis had been driven
from Iranian soil. Khomeini’s pathological certainty, effective during
the revolution, ran into a wall of reality in the late 1980s as the opportunity to defeat Saddam Hussein deteriorated. In early 1988 it became clear
that vanquishing Iraq was no longer plausible and a staggeringly large
number of Iranian lives had been sacrificed for a victory that God was
apparently unwilling to grant. In the face of this reality, Tehran leadership painfully came to the conclusion that the United States would not
allow them to win the war. Washington would instead indirectly support
Saddam to the extent he needed, while continuing to deny Iran access to
modern weapons and spare parts for US military equipment purchased
by the Shah’s government. According to his son Ahmad, Khomeini was
totally broken by the cease-fire agreement implemented after a series
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of successful Iraqi offensives. Almost immediately after accepting the
agreement, Khomeini fell into a severe depression and lost his ability to
walk. He never spoke in public again and died on June 3, 1989 after a
heart attack following surgery for stomach cancer.
Following Khomeini’s death, the future of the Islamic Republic
was entrusted to a number of his key supporters and aides, the most
important of whom were Rafsanjani and Khamenei. In the aftermath of
Khomeni’s death and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the key contradiction
in the governance of revolutionary Iran again became problematic. This
was the tension in Islamic Republic’s constitution between the principles
of Islamic rule and democracy. Were the Iranian people children that
needed to be guided by the clergy regardless of their own aspirations
(an attitude not unlike that of the Shah), or where they citizens who
had a right to a role in choosing their government? This issue has never
been permanently resolved in the Islamic Republic. These tensions rose
following the election of reform candidate Mohammed Khatami with
70 percent of the vote in 1997.
Khatami’s overwhelming electoral victory against establishment
candidate Nateq-Nuri seemed to set the stage for serious reform and
perhaps even democracy, but this did not occur. Iranians blamed the
hardline right for blocking reform, but they also blamed Khatami for
being unwilling to fight forcefully against the hardliners. Khatami
believed in dialogue to resolve conflict, though it rarely led to redress.
Young people were particularly disillusioned with Khatami’s leadership
failures, consequently providing the groundwork for the rise of Mahmud
Ahmadinejad, a populous politician with a flair for crude anti-American
and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Ahmadinejad came to power at the time the
reform movement was demoralized. The voters did not know much
about him, and his outsider status and lower class origins may have led
to his election. Unfortunately for Iran, his eight years in power led to a
series of economic and diplomatic disasters.

The Shah’s Personality, Values, and Mistakes

Abbas Milani’s brilliantly-written The Shah agrees with many aspects
of the previous studies on the causes of the revolution, but as a biography considers the monarch’s life and personality in much greater depth.
Milani is a distinguished Iranian-American scholar, who has previously
authored a number of books on Iran including an excellent biography
of one of the Shah’s longest serving prime ministers, Amir Hoveyda.
Although, as a young man Milani served time in the notorious Evin
Prison for opposition to the Shah’s regime, he has nevertheless produced a remarkably insightful, nuanced, and objective biography.2 This
powerful study fully captures the tragic irony of a modernizing monarch
seeking to disregard the growing political sophistication of his subjects.
In a strategy that would have been perfectly reasonable 150 years ago,
the Shah felt society owed him a debt of gratitude for the economic
progress and freedoms that he had “given them.” Iranians, touched by
modernity, considered such freedoms to be only a small portion of what
they regarded as their inalienable rights.
2      Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian
Revolution (Washington D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2004), ix.
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Milani maintains that the Shah believed
his monarchy could be a powerful force to
push a traditional society into the modern
age. The Shah promised to build a “Great
Civilization” based on a modern economy,
with Iran playing an important role in
the world. Milani also agrees with the
previous authors that the Shah became
increasingly authoritarian in the later years
of his regime due to a belief he had been
politically strengthened by Iran’s economic
progress. Milani views this issue as key to
the Shah’s downfall. The contradiction
Milani emphases is that modernity demands
a knowledgeable citizenry. The Shah helped
to create an Iranian middle class, which then Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York:
sought some degree of political power. The Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 496pages.
Shah never convincingly articulated why this $22.00
was unacceptable and did not make much of
an effort to offer a serious theory of why monarchy was suited to Iran’s
modern situation. Rather, he made the shallow claim that monarchy is
a “natural system” which was deeply rooted in the “Iranian mindset”
(275), which ironically he had helped to change. He attempted to use
grandiose monuments and imposing public events, such as the 1971
Persepolis celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy, in lieu of offering a
coherent argument that legitimized his rule.
According to Milani, the Shah was neither an efficient dictator,
nor a believer in democratic empowerment willing to accept the constitutional constraints on his power. The Shah’s decision to back away
from democratic reform appeared to be based on the quadrupling of oil
prices. With this much money at his fingertips, the Shah felt he could
buy loyalty with resources rather than by providing political rights. In
cases where oppositionists were not won over by economic advances,
the Savak secret police force was prepared to use an iron fist, although
such instances were expected to be increasingly rare over time. Despite
the Shah’s certainty, this strategy failed. A major reason was rampant
corruption that flowed down from the Shah’s family to a network of
officials throughout the country. Milani maintains capitalism needs
security, rule of law, and the force of the market to flourish and develop.
The middle classes that the Shah helped create from petrodollars wanted
democracy and the opportunity to move forward without dealing with a
massive and entrenched class of parasitic and corrupt officials.
Milani’s analysis vividly underscores the Shah’s ignorance of his
own society. He believed that the clergy could never be the driving force
behind the defeat of the monarchy. The Shah spoke of the clergy’s “little,
empty, and antique” brains (295) and assumed that he could manipulate
them to do what he wanted. In this regard, the Shah saw the clergy as an
ally against communists and hoped to use religion to retard the growth
of domestic Marxism, which he regarded as a greater threat than any the
clergy could present. Such policies allowed the clergy and their nimble
network of organizations an opportunity to expand and dominate the
public domain. As the revolution moved forward, only the clergy were
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able to organize and mobilize the population in ways that could actually challenge the regime. The Shah not only failed to see this problem
coming, but refused to believe the mullahs really led the revolution even
after it occurred.
In the Shah’s view the entire opposition movement was the result of
a conspiracy of outside forces against him. He sometimes changed his
mind about who masterminded the conspiracy, but he never wavered
in his belief that foreign conspiracy was at root of the revolution. After
flying over the massive demonstrations against him mentioned earlier,
he met with British and American officials and informed them that he
held their governments responsible. He ordered his top oil negotiators
to give the West what it wanted to stop the revolution. Later in exile, the
Shah indicated his belief that it was Soviet and Iranian communists who
masterminded his fall. There was almost no foundation for this belief.
The only master spy the KGB maintained in the Shah’s government was
Iranian General Mogharebi who was uncovered and arrested in 1977.
After his capture, the Soviets had virtually no serious assets in Iran.
Milani maintains the KGB in Iran was a weak and often incompetent
organization.
After the Shah fled Iran, his short time in exile before his death was
abject misery. His leukemia continued to progress and very few countries were prepared to host him and thereby alienate the new Iranian
government. Milani describes the ex-Shah as a “dying man, ‘un-kinged’
and hounded by terrorists,” who “was denied even the dignity of a
quiet corner to die” (426). The outcome of the Iranian revolution was
also tragic since the fall of the Shah’s regime led to a form of “clerical
despotism” that was significantly more repressive than the rule of the
Shah (434). People risking their lives on the street for democracy found
themselves with a very different form of government. Milani sees this
sad development as having occurred for a number of reasons. Beyond
the organizational skills of the clergy and their status as authentically
Iranian, Milani sees a brilliant strategy by Khomeini to conceal antidemocratic plans. He was also fortunate to have many Iranians project
their own values upon his nebulous image. Khomeini hid his ultimate
goal and true ideology and took on the guise of a democratic leader.
Ironically, the decades-old ban on his books made them unavailable
to Iranian readers or critics. Thus many of Khomeini’s most extreme
ideas were unknown to the people in the streets challenging the Shah in
his name. Milani notes the “strange reality that nearly all advocates of
modernity formed an alliance against the Shah and chose as their leader
the biggest foe of modernity” (436).

The Threat of Iranian Nuclear Weapons

Kenneth Pollack has produced a different kind of book on Iran, but
it is also a work worthy of comment. Pollack’s book does not address the
Iranian revolution but instead serves as an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the current debate over Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear
weapons. This book is of such clear importance that one could desire
that all U.S. policy-makers be required to read it before making any
decisions on Iran, especially those relating to war. Pollack is a realistic
and reasonable scholar who has put together a deeply thoughtful study,
weighing various options open to the West regarding the problem of
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Iranian nuclear weapons development. He
provides an unvarnished overview of the
current Iranian regime, which he considers
rational but also “aggressive, anti-American,
anti–status quo, anti-Semitic, duplicitous,
and murderous” (302). Currently, Pollack
favors a policy of containment directed at
Iran, although he notes that military measures may become a better option in the
future as circumstances change.
Pollack presents a strong case that Iran
is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and
not exclusively interested in civilian nuclear
power. He notes that the Tehran leadership
has been unable to explain why uranium Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran,
enrichment plants are placed in deep under- the Bomb, and American Strategy (New
ground shelters for a civilian program, York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 560 pages.
nor why Tehran did not follow the more $30.00
economical and conventional approach
of importing enriched uranium from abroad to fuel their civil power
reactor. The Iranians have likewise been unable to explain their preference for nuclear power as opposed to using their vast reserves of natural
gas to meet domestic energy needs. Iran has only one functioning civilian nuclear power plant, a 1,000-megawatt reactor at Bushehr, which
did not come on line until 2011. Tehran has shown only limited interest
in developing more civilian power reactors, and instead is focused on
a program of enrichment, which could eventually produce weapons
grade uranium. According to Pollack, this approach is how a military
program rather than a civilian program, is organized. He also notes that
while Tehran has not yet sought to withdraw from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), likely in fear that such action would provoke
additional sanctions or even military attack.
One of the most refreshing aspects of this book is that Pollack’s
tough-minded views on the Iranian regime have not led him to lose
perspective and exaggerate the dangers presented by future Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. Rather, he states that such an outcome is to
be avoided, while also declaring that, “[t]he world will not end the day
after Iran detonates a nuclear warhead or acquires the wherewithal to
break out of the NPT” (80). He further cautions against the temptation
“to indulge our worst fears when it comes to the Iranian nuclear threat”
(80). Pollack maintains that the United States and its Middle Eastern
allies will face a serious problem if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, but
this is a threat that can be managed without war in most circumstances.
He further notes that there are different levels of nuclear proliferation
and it is unclear at what level the current Iranian leadership could be
contained if it approaches a nuclear capability. He suggests that Iran
may be seeking a limited breakout capability, whereby the components
for a nuclear weapon are in place and can be assembled on relatively
short notice in time of crisis. This effort would probably take place in
conjunction with an Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. A much more
dangerous threat is that Iran would withdraw from the NPT and then
deploy an array of deliverable nuclear weapons throughout the country.
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These systems would then be in place during a crisis, and Iran could
use them as a source of intimidation. Still, Pollack understands that the
United States is vastly more powerful than Iran and that weaker states
almost inevitably back down in situations of escalating dominance.
Pollack suggests that at the present time, the least appealing options
for dealing with Iran may be military strikes by Israel, the United States,
or both countries. According to Pollack, Israel cannot destroy Iran’s
nuclear infrastructure with the conventional weapons in its current
inventory. To set back the Iranian nuclear program significantly, Israel
would have to destroy the hardened underground centrifuge plants at
Natanz and Fordow, the latter of which appears invulnerable to Israeli
conventional ordinance. If Israel attacked alone, the results would be
limited, while Tehran would be able to renounce the NPT by using
the strike as political cover. Such an attack would fatally undermine
International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iranian nuclear
power and international sanctions. Iran could also fire its non-nuclear
ballistic missiles, although it is unclear what their targets would be and
the amount of damage they could do. Covert Iranian attacks including
cyberwarfare and terrorism could be assumed, although some US officials claim the West is “already at war with Iran” in the cyber domain,
and oil prices could also rise dramatically (149).
Many of the same problems presented by an Israeli attack on Iran
would also be present if the United States launched an air campaign
against the Islamic Republic, though there would be key differences.
Unlike Israel, the United States has the capability to present a much more
serious threat to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, and the outcome
would be different in this kind of attack. The US Air Force has 30,000
pound conventional Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs that
can only be carried by large bombers, such as the B-2, which Israel does
not possess. In a US attack against Iran, MOPs could potentially destroy
the Fordow facility, but even this result remains uncertain. The Fordow
enrichment plant may be hardened to the point that non-nuclear ordinance could not destroy it under any circumstances, potentially leaving
this centerpiece of the Iranian program in place even in the aftermath
of a forceful US conventional air attack.
Pollack notes that wars are inherently unpredictable and often
evolve in ways their authors never intended. He suggests that US air
strikes against Iran could start an escalatory process that ultimately
pushes the United States into an invasion of that country. For example,
if US air attacks failed to destroy all significant Iranian nuclear sites,
Washington could be faced with abandoning the effort without meeting
its goals or expanding the war. US leaders could also be hard pressed
to end the war if key Iranian nuclear sites remained intact and Iranian
missiles had scored an important victory akin to damaging a US aircraft
carrier, resulting in significant loss of life. Beyond air strikes, a ground
war with Iran, should it occur, is nevertheless a potential nightmare
scenario. Iran’s conventional military may be small, weak, and technologically challenged, but it has treated resisting a US invasion as primary
mission and is capable of inflicting meaningful casualties. Many more
US ground forces would be required to subdue Iran, with its many paramilitary forces, than were used in the 2003-2011 Iraq War. Moreover, if
the Iranian regime was ousted and the United States decided to occupy
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the country, Pollack suggests that an occupation force of around 1.4
million troops would be needed, and that the ability of such a force to
create any kind of meaningful future for the Iranian people remains in
serious doubt.
In contrast to military strikes, Pollack supports a policy of containment, which he calls “the strategy that dare not speak its name” due to
widespread hostility to the term. According to Pollack, “containment”
has become confused with “appeasement” whereby the United States
will confine itself to symbolic gestures that allow Iran to build and then
expand a nuclear arsenal. He suggests this misunderstanding is unfortunate, and containment is a strategy to be applied when the United States
does not want merely to appease a nation, but is also unwilling to attack
and occupy it. Pollack states that while containment is often viewed as
primarily defensive it also has offensive components. The United States
has been practicing various forms of containment against Iran since
1979 and has employed both passive and assertive aspects of the strategy.
One of the key building blocks of a containment strategy is economic sanctions. Currently, there is extensive evidence of the impact of
sanctions against Iran, though the economy is not in danger of collapse.
Pollack admits that intensifying sanctions will be difficult. He suggests
that so little is left for the vertical escalation of sanctions that any further
intensification will need to focus on horizontal escalation that brings
more countries into the effort. Another building block of containment
is deterrence, including extended deterrence to protect US allies. This
strategy includes deterrence by denial which involves convincing an
adversary not to take an action because it is bound to fail to achieve its
goal. There is also deterrence by punishment in which Iran is forced to
pay a high price for serious acts of aggression. Pollack also notes that it
will be critical to continue to develop and deploy theater defense missiles in the Middle East to help deter Iranian missile attacks by raising
the possibility that they will be ineffective, while still inviting painful
retaliation.
In one of the most controversial sections of this work, Pollack
indicates that Western leaders may be able to negotiate a comprehensive deal with Iran, but would not obtain everything that they want.
Pollack maintains that for the West to negotiate a solution with Iran “we
are going to have to make concessions regarding the Iranian uranium
enrichment program” (141). He states that Iran will not plausibly agree
to do away with this capability altogether. Any negotiated settlement
would therefore leave Iran with some breakout capability, particularly
should it choose to withdraw from the NPT and refuse to accept international inspectors. For this reason, Pollack suggests that any deal with
Iran should suspend, rather than eliminate, the sanctions. If the Iranians
cheat on an international nuclear agreement, the mechanisms already
established by the Security Council would move quickly to deprive the
Iranians of all fruits of that agreement. Such a recommendation seems
reasonable. The Iranian public has already responded with real hope
to the limited relaxation of sanctions experienced under the interim
nuclear agreement, and the prospect of returning to even tougher sanctions cannot help but demoralize the country no matter how often the
leadership fulminates about self-sufficiency and steadfastness.
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The Great War: One Hundred Years Later
Douglas V. Mastriano

T

he Great War is fixed in collective memory as a war of rigid
battle lines and trench warfare. However, it was far from so
simple. It was marked by almost continuous open warfare on
the Eastern Front, while the Western Front witnessed myriad phases
including maneuver warfare, breakout strategies and battles of attrition.
Additionally, few wars experienced so many Revolutions in Military
Affairs (RMAs) entailing the employment of machineguns, airplanes,
chemical warfare, and tanks. Strategic leaders were faced with a complex
strategic dilemma: how to beat an ever adapting foe, and how to integrate
and employ new technologies on the battlefield.
Yet, there was considerably more to this war than battlefield innovation. The First World War was a clash of empires that transformed
societies, changed governments and even created new nations, such as
Syria and Iraq. Despite the upheaval left behind by this terrible war, it is
all but forgotten by large segments of society. Adding to this dilemma
is that many of the books written about the Great War are dry histories
focused on the movements of armies. Due in part to this, the First World
War is an untapped subject with a potentially large audience, especially
as we commemorate the centennial of this cataclysmic struggle. To fill
this historiographical gap, dozens of books are being published to take
advantage of a surge in interest in this often over-looked struggle. The
focus of this review is to consider four of these books that address the
causes and events that triggered the war.

July 1914: Countdown to War

COL Douglas V.
Mastriano, PhD, is part
of the Department of
Military Strategy Plans
and Operations, US
Army War College at
Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Sean McMeekin’s July 1914 is a rare addition to the new Great War
Centennial books recently published. In July 1914, McMeekin grapples
with the diplomatic and political machinations that led to the outbreak
of this tragic war in an understandable and dramatic fashion. The book
begins with the fateful assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Crown
Prince, Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist. From that tragic beginning, McMeekin unveils how this triggered a
European political crisis that led to the outbreak of the First World War.
July 1914 literally gives a day by day description of each political move
and countermove by the Europe’s five great powers. McMeekin takes
the reader to London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg to hear
the discussions, the political discourses, strategy and the hidden agendas
of the Russian Czar, the French President, and the German Kaiser, the
British King, the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and their chief diplomats.
McMeekin personalizes these scenes with dialogues that come alive.
Knowing the outcome of the July 1914 crisis, one feels frustrated at the
many missed opportunities that could have averted war, while reading
McMeekin’s well crafted scenes.
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McMeekin also paints a chilling
picture of the European political and social
condition. As Europe rapidly heads on a
collision course with war, two of the most
important players, France and the United
Kingdom were distracted by domestic
events and because of this, miss the gravity
of the July crisis. Throughout the month
of July, the French were consumed by a
sex/murder trial that reached to a former
Prime Minister. Because of this, the French
press and public took little note of Franz
Ferdinand’s assassination and even less
notice of the growing political crisis that
culminated in the First World War.
Sean McMeekin, July 1914: Countdown to
Meanwhile, across the channel, War (New York: Basic Books, 2013) 480
McMeekin tells us that the UK was con- pages. $29.99.
sumed by Ireland and discussions related
“Home Rule.” Because of this, McMeekin implies that the British were
slow to formulate a coherent diplomatic policy in approaching the July
crisis. McMeekin also paints the British as being out of touch and pursuing a neutral approach to the troubles on the European Continent. Had
the British declared a firm policy to defend the borders of Belgium early
on, McMeekin implies, this would have been enough to deter German
aggression. It was with this goal in mind that Czar Nicholas of Russia
told the French Ambassador on July 20, “Unless she has gone out of her
mind altogether, Germany will never attack Russia, France and England
combined.” (McMeekin, 148). Yet, the British remained circumspect
and coy about their policy until it was too late.
The central theme for McMeekin’s book is that Germany was not
responsible for the war. He sums up this point by saying, “…far from
‘willing the war,’ the Germans went into it kicking and screaming as the
Austrian noose snapped shut around their necks” (McMeekin, 405). He
goes on to place the preponderance of the blame on Russia and its July
25, partial military mobilization order. Although this is not new scholarship, and assigning guilt for who actually started the war is up for debate,
McMeekin does a fine job of making his case, although, downplaying
German guilt via its “blank check” to support the Austro-Hungarians
in whatever course they pursued.
McMeekin’s description of the diplomatic maneuverings is gripping and he does a superb job of making a complex confusing story
understandable. Adding to this readable prose is that the book contains considerable research outside North America. One of the biggest
criticisms of American scholarship is the research rarely includes documentation from European archives. McMeekin, residing in Istanbul, has
used his geographic location to craft a well-researched book. However,
there are some reasons for caution when reading the book. From a scholastic point of view, its weakness is the dearth of endnotes. McMeekin
provides engaging dialogue between the key European leaders and
diplomats throughout the book. Yet, he averages only one endnote per
page. This leaves the reader wondering just how much is actual history
and how much is speculation, or his filling the gaps to tell an interesting
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story. With this caution, July 1914 is worth reading by strategic leaders
who can see how domestic distractions (as in the case of the UK and
France) can blind a nation to impending doom and, even more so, how
personal relationships can make the difference between peace and war.

The War that Ended Peace

Margaret MacMillan’s book, The War
that Ended Peace, is yet another attempt to
understand the factors that led to the outbreak of the First World War. MacMillan’s
approach is rigorous and convincing as
she describes the diplomatic, political,
military, economic and societal environment of Europe and the United States
during the decade (or more) before
1914. The book opens with the 14 April
1900 Paris Universal Exposition and the
excitement that it signified for a prosperous and peaceful future. MacMillan uses
this event to describe in some detail what
message each national display at the expo
is sending to Europe and the world. For
Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended
example, we are told that the Austrian
Peace (New York: Random House, 2013) 784
pavilion was opulent and regal, signifying
pages. $35.00
the rich history of the Hapsburg dynasty,
while the German display denoted some level of exhilaration at being
Europe’s newest power, while, tastefully hinting at a naval rivalry with
Great Britain (which would be a chief contributor to the UK’s participation in the war).
The War that Ended Peace builds upon the promise and excitement
of the 1900 Paris Expo to describe that much of Europe’s elite viewed
itself as sophisticated, believing “. . . that a general war was simply inconceivable in the modern world.” (27) Europe’s elite had every reason to
embrace the idea that state-on-state war was a thing of the past on the
continent as the nations were economically interdependent. Most experts
at the time agreed. MacMillan drives this point home by paraphrasing
a prewar writer, “. . . even if Europe was so foolish as to go to war, the
resulting economic chaos and domestic misery would rapidly force the
warring nations to negotiate peace.” (634)
Yet, despite the elite’s belief that war in Europe was obsolete,
MacMillan brilliantly illustrates that not everything was as it seemed.
Rather, imperial interests tended to clash with those of the other powers.
One example is how the Austro-Hungarians sought to dominate the lands
in southeastern Europe lost by the receding power of the Ottomans.
Yet, the Russians would not sit idly by as the Austro-Hungarian Empire
overran vast regions of Slavs, of whom Russia saw itself as the supreme
protector (in addition to Moscow’s obsession with securing a warm
water port). Such rivalry triggered several Balkan Wars and foretold the
eventuality of a larger European war.
Then, there was the rise of Imperial Germany that began in 1870.
Although new to the European power game, Germany quickly snatched
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up swathes of colonial land in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. In an impressively short period of time, Germany constructed a navy seemingly
destined to uproot the UK’s role as the dominant seapower. Although
at the pinnacle of its power, the United Kingdom felt threatened by
the increasing militaristic policies of Germany as well as the bombastic
rhetoric of its Kaiser. The War That Ended Peace describes this dilemma:
“Political scientists might say that the fact Germany and Britain found
themselves on the opposite sides in the Great War was foreordained, the
result of the clash between a major power feeling its advantage slip away
and a rising challenger. Such transitions are rarely managed peacefully”
(58).
Despite such brilliant insight, MacMillan’s book warrants caution.
At times, the author interjects a curt paragraph attempting to compare
some event or circumstance from the pre-war geo-political situation
with a contemporary issue. An example is when MacMillan unconvincingly compares the Austrian response to the 1914 assassination of Franz
Ferdinand with how the United States and United Kingdom responded
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The logic of such a comparison is difficult to
grasp. Such attempts by the author to compare a pre-1914 event to something in modern times were unconvincing and seemingly an attempt to
vent a leftist political view rather than providing relevant insight to her
argument. Such forays into fancy detracted from an otherwise excellent and well-researched book. Another concern is the author tends to
gloss over the ramifications of the United Kingdom’s incoherent foreign
policy in the crisis leading up to the war. Arguably, had the British
declared early they would stand by France and not tolerate an invasion
of Belgium, they would have deterred the Kaiser, as the German plan
was contingent upon British neutrality. Yet, MacMillan, though willing
to make illogical leaps in comparing Franz Ferdinand’s assassination to
9/11, fails to provide any insight into the ramifications of British prewar
diplomacy. Most scholars agree, had London declared a firm policy early
in July 1914, perhaps the greater European war could have been avoided.

The Sleepwalkers

The Sleepwalkers is yet another retelling
of how the European powers stumbled
into the Great War. Christopher Clark does
a superb job making sense of the complexities leading to the war. Simply put, Clark
tells us that there is no easy explanation
as to how sophisticated European leaders
unleashed a torrent of carnage across the
continent. Yet, Sleepwalkers weaves together
a story of intrigue and diplomatic failures
going back several decades, and helps the
reader grapple with how Europe ended up
in a bloody world war in 1914.
Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How
Sleepwalkers begins not in 1914 Sarajevo, Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York:
as many such works do, but rather in 1903 in Harper Collins, 2012) 736 pages. $ 29.99.
Belgrade where Serb military officers assassinate their king and unleash
a coup. Thus, begins the road to Sarajevo. Yet, there is more to the book
than trouble in the Balkans. Clark desires the reader understand the
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geo-strategic environment that set the conditions for the First World
War. In particular, Sleepwalkers points to three key events that radically
affected the balance of power in Europe and played the central role in
setting the conditions for global conflict.
The first, according to Clark, was the German victory over France
in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. The defeat motivated France to
seek every opportunity to “contain” Germany. This aim, according to
Sleepwalkers, ultimately caused the bi-polarization of Europe, with everything hinging on Russia. Early on, this delicate balance of power was
brilliantly managed by Germany’s First Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck,
who recognized the danger inherent in a multipolar Europe operating
from a bipolar point of reference. However, his retirement in 1890, combined with increasingly bombastic behavior from Kaiser Wilhelm II, put
Germany in a precarious state, and prevented it from pulling Russia into
its camp. Instead, France prevailed, and generously gave Russia money
to modernize its army and national infrastructure with this, Paris could
count on Russian help if it came to another war with Germany.
The second key event Sleepwalkers suggests was the 1904-1905 RussoJapanese War. The war was a crushing defeat for the Czar, and blunted
his ambitions in the Far East. St. Petersburg then focused its attention
on the Balkans, which, according to Clark, amplified its importance in
1914.
The third key event was the 1911 Italian-Turkish War, which Rome
used to wrestle Libya and other colonies from the Ottoman Empire.
The war was the signal to the Balkan’s diverse ethnic groups to move
against the Ottomans. Clark sees a direct correlation between the ItalianTurkish conflict and the Balkan Wars that forever changed European
geopolitical strategy.
Clark brilliantly weaves together how international relations,
regional conflict and the problem of the security dilemma conspired to
draw Europe into a catastrophic war. His linkages to national strategy
and current events are among the best of any book on the causes of
the Great War. Yet, Clark goes on to demonstrate that, even on the
brink of war, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, could
have prevented or contained the conflagration. However, Grey failed
to demarcate British policy clearly regarding an invasion of Belgium.
Clark agrees with most modern scholarship that, had Grey done so, the
Germans would not have attacked France and the conflict would have
been another regional conflict instead of a world war. A century later,
national leaders still struggle with telegraphing clear foreign policy goals
in the face of aggression. The lesson from Sleepwalkers is prevarication
and lack of clarity when facing disturbances to the international order
could cause events to rapidly spin out of control.

The Making of the First World War

The Making of the First World War does not fit well with the previous
books discussed. Beckett is less concerned with the causes of the Great
War, and instead focuses on the seminal events or decisions that shaped
nations and societies during and after the war. Despite this divergence
from the causes of the war, the book includes several chapters related to
the beginnings of this cataclysmic conflict worthy of discussion.
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The Making of the First World War begins
with a forgotten major decision in Belgium.
Dubbing it a turning point of the war,
Beckett brilliantly recounts the circumstances and effects of the Belgium decision
to flood the Flemish plain between Nieuport
and Dixmude. This act, Beckett argues,
prevented the Germans from advancing to
the channel ports and thereby ensured the
survival of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF).
Beckett’s chapter on the Ottoman
Empire covers an event that shaped the
early half of the war. Here, the author
argues the 11 June 1913 assassination of the
Turkish Minister of War, Mahmud Sevek Ian F.W. Beckett, The Making of the First
War (New Haven: Yale University
Pasha, set the conditions for the Ottomans World
Press, 2013). 280 pages. $28.50
to join the war due to the elevation of a proGerman faction in the government. Beckett
then suggests this single act prolonged the war by two years by having
the Ottoman Empire enter the fray on Germany’s side.
The final chapter in The Making of the First World War related to the
beginning of the conflict contends with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Focusing the discourse largely on Emperor Franz Joseph, who Beckett
says, represents the legacy of his empire in many ways. Yet, despite
ruling over a vast, and diverse population, Franz Joseph is portrayed
quite fatalistic when he decided to lead his empire to war, saying, “If the
monarchy has to perish, then it shall perish honorably” (115). Perish it
did, thanks in large part to the “war-mongering” of Franz Conrad von
Hötzendorf, the Austrian army’s Chief of Staff. Perhaps more than any
member of Franz Josephs’ cabinet, Hötzendorf is described as pushing
the emperor into war. Beckett describes von Hötzendorf as a fanatical
adherent of Social Darwinism, who zealously believed the empire would
prevail due to its superior culture and education.
In the remainder of the book, Beckett does a superb job describing
other transformational events or experiences that shaped various regions
and nations. This includes a brilliant chapter on Australia’s identity, the
Russian Revolution, the Balfour Declaration and the rise of Israel, and
several other interesting topics. The book, however, has its challenges. I
was disappointed by the lack of academic rigor as evidenced by a dearth
of endnotes, averaging only one per page. Also disappointing was the
lack of more expansive international research, normally not an issue
with a British author.
Compounding these deficiencies is there are too many chapters
related to the United Kingdom’s experience in the war (four dedicated
solely to this); while there are none on France or Italy. One of the four
chapters was on the impact of the “First Public Screening of The Battle of
the Somme. Although ascetically interesting, the chapter floundered and
made one wonder if there were not more significant strategic events
that should have been in this book rather than this one. Furthermore,
Beckett ignores the importance of the Canadian contribution and how
their war experience forged a national identity arguably more than the
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Australian experience at Gallipoli. Beckett lost a chance to discuss the
Canadians at Vimy, or how they spearheaded the BEF offensive during
the 100 Days Campaign of 1918. Canadian historians often assert that
British writers downplay their contribution to the war, and Beckett
seems to carry on that tradition by completely ignoring them.

Conclusion

The offerings arriving on the bookshelves during the Centennial of
the First World War includes a mix of serious academic studies, to lighter
dramatic presentations of the causes and triggers of how the struggle
began. To be sure, the public has a great opportunity to grapple with
the legacy of the First World War, which arguably we are still living with
today. From the creation of Syria and Iraq, to the demise of the AustroHungarian Empire, to the application of airpower, to the mechanization
of warfare, that cataclysmic experience has changed the modern world.
Each of these works contributes to giving the public an opportunity to
appreciate how the Great War shaped our world. It is my earnest desire
that these books breathe renewed interest on both sides of the Atlantic
in this important epoch of world history.

Book Reviews
Exploring strategy
Strategy: A History
By Lawrence Freedman
Reviewed by James MacDougall, Ph.D, Chairman, Department of National
Security and Strategy, US Army War College, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Eurasia.

E

ncyclopedic in scope and inductive in method, Sir Lawrence
Freedman’s grand volume: Strategy: A History, presents the fruits
of a life-long exploration into the meaning and utility of the
concept of strategy. In many respects an intellectual voyage of discovery, Freedman begins by describing the evolution of strategy through
its pre-Napoleonic history and then, in turns, explores its development
and use in three distinct provinces: military, revolutionary-political, and
business-corporate. In the grand tradition of his British predecessors
who wrote during the age of exploration, Freedman casts a perceptive
and discerning eye on the territory he surveys. The result is a trove of
keen observations and insights owing much for its success to Freedman’s
lucid and engaging prose.
While acknowledging the word “strategy” did not come into common
usage until the early part of the nineteenth century, Freedman takes the
view that strategy in the sense of “practical problem-solving” is as old as
history (72). He thus begins his excursion (Part I) with observations on
the interrelationships bordering communities of chimpanzees; proceeds
to review examples of strategy in the Hebrew Bible and the world of
Classical Greece; reviews the canonical texts of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli
and completes his examination of the origins of strategy with a review
of Milton’s Paradise Lost. A clear dichotomy emphasized throughout this
opening section and one reappraised to good effect in other sections of
the book is the difference between strategies based on force and strategies based on guile; in other words – strategies of strength or strategies
of cunning.1 Subsequently, however, particularly after considering the
advent of the levee on masse, Freedman concludes “[o]nce warfare moved
to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to
what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on
force” (65).
And so in Part II, “Strategies of Force,” the modern history of
military strategy is charted beyond way-points recognized by students:
decisive battle; wars of annihilation or attrition; maneuver; the indirect
approach; deterrence; guerilla warfare; counterinsurgency and a myriad
of others. Here, as well, broader concepts such as geopolitics; continental,
maritime, naval and air power; and game theory with its special relationship to nuclear strategy, are also analyzed. Although the main contours
are familiar terrain, the history and theory covered in this section are
viewed frequently from a unique vantage point revealing fresh insights.
An example is the observation that, while Clausewitz recognized the
1      This dichotomy also is highlighted in Charles Hill, Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)

New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013
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subordination of war to policy, the prevailing assumption at that time
was “a political victory would naturally follow a military victory” and
further “[i]f the assumption was wrong, then strategy’s focus on military
affairs was insufficient” (94). The point is prescient with a continuing
relevance to modern day strategic challenges.
In Part III, “Strategies from Below,” Freedman chronicles in detail
the political strategies of radicals and revolutionaries including Marx,
Gandhi, Che Guevara and others. In the American domestic political
context he surveys the political strategies of Martin Luther King, the
Civil Rights movement, as well as other individuals and causes over the
last several decades. While decidedly underdogs in the political process,
each individual or group struggled to mobilize political forces in efforts
to cause radical change or overthrow existing political elites and make
a claim on political power. For most national security professionals,
this section represents less familiar terrain made more challenging by
the surfeit of biographical detail that at times clouds more salient perspectives on strategy. Nevertheless, some essential points relevant to
strategy in any context may be gleaned. Among them is the significance
of marshaling popular opinion in support of an ideological or political
strategy, by means of, as Freedman notes (quoting Harold Lasswell) “the
management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant
symbols” (339). This point has modern echoes in discussions over
“strategic narratives.” Freedman ends this section with some poignant
observations about electoral politics in the United States and the party
strategies related to the “permanent campaign.”
In the final section of field observations Part IV “Strategy from
Above” Freedman surveys the extensive literature on business strategy
noting the volume of this literature now exceeds that on military strategy.
The search for strategy in business, based on the developing “science
of management” throughout the 1950s and 1960s, led to the relentless
pursuit of optimal solutions based on mathematical precision and calculation. Strategic planning became paramount in large corporations.
Later, when results based on strict rationality proved less satisfactory
than expected, a backlash against rigid planning models ensued. In a
vignette reflecting this changed view, Freedman cites former General
Electric CEO Jack Welch, who cited approvingly a letter to the editor in
Fortune magazine condemning strategic planning as an “endless quest by
managers for a paint-by-numbers approach, which would automatically
give them answers” (504). Subsequent popular approaches to applying
the strategic lessons of history’s great military commanders to the business environment (The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, for example)
also seemed to deliver less than advertised as the basis for sound business strategies.
It is in the final chapter of this section where we begin to see, having
explored the nature of strategy in three distinct areas, the process of
induction moving us from observation to generalization. Referring to
an article by Henry Mintzberg and James Waters, Freedman identifies
a major dichotomy in the field of business strategy as that “between
deliberate or emergent strategies” (554).2 Is strategy a rationally calcu2      Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic
Management Journal 6, no. 3 (July-September 1985): 257-272.
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lated plan, developed at higher echelons and provided to subunits for
implementation, or, rather, a product of fluid decision-making described
by Mintzberg and Waters as “a pattern in a stream of decisions[?]”
Freedman’s answer to this question is one of the central themes of the
book and is therefore worth tracking in some detail.
As early as the book’s opening epigram, the offhandish quote
from the heavyweight prize-fighter Michael Tyson: “Everyone has a
plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth” (ix), the reader is aware of
the author’s skepticism for likening strategy to a calculated plan. This
theme winds throughout the main sections of the book - throughout the fields of military, political and business strategy. From von
Moltke’s famous dictum, “no plan survives contact with the enemy”
(104) to Jack Welsh’s dismissal (noted above) of efforts to fashion a
“paint-by-number” approach to strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman casts
doubt on the idea of strategy as the prescriptive result of a rational
calculation and direction. Indeed, titles of several of the book’s chapters: “The False Science”; “The Myth of the Master Strategist”; and
“Formulas, Myths and Propaganda”, indicate a central objective of
Freedman’s book: to de-mythologize the idea of strategy as a master
plan. By the end of the book, having observed this to be the case in
those domains visited, Freedman concludes: “The various strands of
literature examined in this book all began confidently with a belief that
given the right measures demanding objectives could be achieved on a
regular basis. […] In all three cases, experience undermined the foundations of this confidence” (608).
Sir Lawrence Freedman identifies two basic obstacles to strategy as a
rational progression of deliberate steps: the essentially conflictual nature
of the strategic environment, and the role of chance and unpredictability.
On the first point, given that strategy typically involves interaction with
willful opponents or competitors, predicting how they will act/react
introduces a significant element of uncertainty into strategic calculation. Further, as the second point suggests, chance and unpredictability
bedevil any future-oriented efforts to plan and act. Taken together,
these points call into question the very nature of strategic planning and
strategy making.
Is strategy then an illusion, “not worth an empty eggshell,” as suggested by the ant-strategist Leo Tolstoy (98)? Counseling skepticism, but
not fatalism, Freedman’s answer seems to be “not necessarily.” Although
difficult, and demonstrably not the result of a perfectly rational process,
strategy, Freedman concludes, is still important and necessary. He
counsels: “…we have little choice but to identify a way forward dependent on human agency which might lead to a good outcome. It is as
well to avoid illusions of control, but in the end all we can do is act as
if we can influence events. To do otherwise is to succumb to fatalism”
(622). In this respect, Freedman’s answer to the question of whether
strategy is a deliberate or emergent process reflects Mintzberg’s view:
“strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent” (555). Seen in this light, the simple shorthand of strategists: the
ends-ways-means construct, appears too linear and must be grounded
in a broader understanding of chance, contingency, and uncertainty.
We are reminded of Murray and Grimsley’s observation on Clausewitz’s
remarkable trinity (emotion, chance, and reason). “Although Clausewitz
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intended this trinity to describe the nature of armed conflict, it applies
with equal relevance to the conduct of strategy in peace as well as war.”3
The creative strategist is thus free to roam throughout the realms of
chance and probability, all the while focused on strategy as an instrument of policy.
Like any good volume on exploration, Freedman’s Strateg y is full
of suggestions for profitable follow-on voyages. One such potentially
productive route for exploration is Freedman’s association of strategy
and power. In the book’s preface he provides a brief definition of
strategy as a political art: “the art of creating power” (xii). In political
science, “power” is a fundamentally contested concept with understandings ranging from “power over resources” to “power over outcomes.”
Freedman recognizes this essential distinction in a discussion of revolutionary politics (372-373) but a more detailed discussion of power,
and strategy as the art of creating power, could have been beneficial.
Indeed, in previous work, Freedman focused on the relationship of
power and strategy to good effect.4 Tellingly, in this work, in addition
to examining the concept of power, Freedman defined strategy as “the
art of creating power to obtain the maximum political objectives using
available military means.”5 Given the scope of the book under review,
a working definition of strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain
the maximum _____ objectives,” where the blank might be filled in
alternately with the words military, political, or economic, would seem
fitting. Adding the concept of objectives to the definition precludes
criticism that strategy as simply “creating power” would amount to no
more than a purposeless accumulation of resources. Recognizing at an
early point the conception of strategy in this book is “governed by the
starting point, and not the end point” (xi), it nevertheless seems that
strategy requires both. In fact, Freedman concludes as much later in
the book when discussing strategy as a process of managing emerging
variables: “[t]his does not mean that it is easy to manage without a view
of a desired end state. Without some sense of where the journey should
be leading it will be difficult to evaluate alternative outcomes” (611). The
central idea of strategy that emerges from the book is one that is part
plan, part process - a combination of rational calculation and adaptation
to evolving conditions. This notion is summarized agreeably in the
letter to Fortune magazine quoted by Jack Welch and noted by Freedman:
“Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central
idea through continually changing circumstances” (504).
Strateg y: A History, is a grand exploration and at times takes the
reader through uncharted terrain. The book’s concluding chapters (Part
V, “Theories of Strategy”) offer not so much theories of strategy making
derived through inductive observation, but rather thoughts on how recent
scholarship in cognitive psychology and philosophy might help frame
scripts or strategic narratives useful in advancing the process of making
strategy. Here, as throughout, the observations are keen and suggest
many areas for potentially productive follow-up. Early in the book,
3      Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, eds, The Making of Strategy: Rulers,
States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.
4      Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power,” in War, Strategy and
International Politics: Essays in Honor of Sir Michael Howard, eds. Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and
Robert O’Neill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 279-294.
5      Ibid., 283.
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observing that “apes were astute when it came to working out power
balances” (8), Freedman suggests forming coalitions is a time-honored
and effective strategic approach. Given his focus on the relationship
between strategy and power, additional work on the concept of balance
of power, and its importance in strategy particularly, would be useful.
For the arm-chair traveler (or arm-chair strategist, as the case may
be) Sir Lawrence Freedman’s voyage of discovery through the world of
strategy is enriching and thought-provoking. One hopes he remains
intrepid and continues to help fill the “blank spots” on our mental
maps. One such important spot that receives increased attention is the
province of “grand strategy.” Should Freedman embark to explore this
domain one would be tempted to sign on as a deckhand.

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy
in Historical Perspective
By Hew Strachan
Reviewed by Dr. Richard Swain, COL US Army Retired, Lawton, OK

T

his book, a collection of papers composed over a ten-year period, is
subject to multiple legitimate readings. Some British reviewers have
seen it simply as a critique of contemporary British and American military policy. However, the theme announced by the author, the Chichele
Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is an exploration of “strategy, what we understand by it, and how that understanding has changed”
(4). That seems to be the proper basis for evaluation.
Strachan indicts Huntington’s Soldier and the State with corrupting
professional-political dialog in both the United States, where he acknowledges it may reflect Constitutional norms, and in the United Kingdom,
where he argues it does not (76-77). Indeed, much of the book is engaged
with criticism of institutional arrangements for strategy formulation in
the United Kingdom and United States. Not surprisingly, the author is
better informed about the complexities of the former than the latter;
he probably overstates the influence of the Weinberger and Powell
doctrines, while understating the role of the National Security Council
system and the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He undergirds his
arguments with what he sees as a corrective to an overly Anglophone
reading of Clausewitz (5) and Thucydides (257).
The most prominent idea in the Direction of War is the argument
that the understandings of policy and strategy have become so confused
the distinction between them has been lost, largely to the detriment
of strategic practice. In part, this confusion has been the result of the
intensification of wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
critically in the First World War, when the higher direction of war in
the form of grand strategy came to comprehend the mobilization of all
national (and allied) means in pursuit of military victory. This result was
compounded after the Second World War by the speculative theoretical
flights of deterrence theorists, mostly American academics.

New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013
335 pages
$29.99
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The greatest insight in Strachan’s argument lies precisely in his separation of policy and strategy as distinct and diverging influences with
often conflicting logics, both of which must be accommodated by the
policy maker and strategist. He does this first by pointing to the need to
set strategy in the context of the adversarial nature of war; doing so corrects for what he indicts as overemphasis on the instrumental function
of war derived from Clausewitz’s statement that “war is nothing but the
continuation of policy with other means” which first appears in a Note
of 10 July 1827 and later in Book I, “On the Nature of War.” This is not,
he reminds us, “a statement about the nature of war.” It is a statement
about the use of war, something made clearer, he feels, in Book VIII,
“War Plans.” He then expands on this point with the Policy-Politics
distinction, more or less glossed by Clausewitz’s use of the German term
Politik for both. “Politics,” he reminds us, “are inherently adversarial…
Policy has a more unilateral thrust…a policy…remains a statement of
one government’s intent…War,” he concludes, “is therefore no longer the
unilateral application of policy but the product of reciprocal exchanges
between diverging policies” (13).
In short, Strachan restores competitive reciprocity to the practice
of national strategy, which, in turn, accounts for the unpredictability
of strategic outcomes that reflect not the logical extension of one’s own
efforts but the sum of conflicting efforts of all actors to achieve diverging
goals. Later, looking back at Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke in
World War II, he observes that the policy maker and strategist must be
concerned with “what to do each day in the light of that day’s events,
of the situation on the ground and of real-time intelligence” (242-243).
Evolving strategic possibilities can require changes in policy even as they
conform with it. The effect of this on policy makers should be increased
modesty about the predictability of strategic effects; and on strategists,
increased attention to the need for continuous reassessment and adjustment, notably something Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike
Mullen addressed in his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at Kansas State
University6 (229).
A collection of related essays does not a treatise make and it is probably a mistake to read this one as though it does. Written over time,
for diverse purposes, the essays may address common themes, but
even reworking does not remove discontinuities in thought that result
from new insights or limitations imposed by the essay form. Strachan is
surely right to point out that the instrumental use of war suggested in
Clausewitz’s note of 1827, and Book I of On War, has sometimes been
misunderstood as a statement of some organic condition rather than
a requirement for war’s rational use. In a more comprehensive treatment, the author might be free to begin with deeper reflection on the
implicit distinction between strategy as a noun, defined more or less
as a program or pattern of actions intended to achieve some purpose,
associated as it must be with a predictive theory of success; and strategy
(-making) as an activity or verb, sensitive to the fluid and unpredictable
outcome of the clash of opposing wills and actions by multiple actors.
6      Admiral Mike Mullen, “Landon Lecture Series Remarks; As Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Wednesday,
March 3, 2010.” Available at: http:///www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1336. Henry Mintzberg addressed this phenomenon in his book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles
for Planning, Plans, Planners (New York: Free Press, 1994), 23-29.
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This is the distinction, after all, which creates the contrast the author
highlights between On War’s Book I and the discussion of war-making
in Book VIII, both of which include the “instrumental” insight of the
1827 note.
American readers should take seriously Strachan’s critique of
Huntington’s half-century old thesis on civil military relations, in light
of the quarter-century experience with the results of the GoldwaterNichols Act within the NSC System. Finally, a great deal of thought
must be given about whether the notion of strategy can still be limited
to the use of military forces, on which Strachan insists, or whether, as a
practical matter, the concept has been more expansive for over a century
and is likely to remain so because of the requirements of contemporary
and future conflicts. It is notable the Lawrence Freedman’s recent book
Strateg y, A History (Oxford, 2013) considers the applicability of the idea
in business writing, perhaps clarifying the concept by generalizing its
use.
This collection is in many ways a journal of the author’s own journey
of learning over a ten-year period in which he moved from the writing
of traditional military history to the role of policy advisor. It is a valuable
book that succeeds in reframing the idea of strategy and offers numerous insights into its practice in the direction of war.
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Political-Military Leadership
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
By Robert M. Gates
Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

D
New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2014
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$35.00

uty is Robert Gates’ second volume of memoirs and covers his time
as Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works
(or doesn’t work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central
Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the
only Secretary of Defense asked to stay in office when the White House
changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the book’s
released caused a major stir, particularly in Washington.
Gates’ anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers
and elected officials, including some still holding office drew the most
initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates
indicts Washington’s hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in
particular which he describes as “Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic
constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanagerial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection)
before country.” He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid,
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, and Vice President Joe Biden, at times
resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that
Biden “presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism)
work better than Stan (McChrystal)” even though Biden was talking
about policy and strategy and General McChrystal’s expertise was at the
operational level of war.
Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally
but concentrates on explaining Gates’ position on key issues, particularly the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One theme that will appeal to
military readers was Gates’ fierce dedication to the men and women in
uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excoriates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation “with planning,
equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states,
while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and other forms of
conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.” At times this compelled
him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts
at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming
through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP)
armored fighting vehicles and increased intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one
of the world’s largest and most complex organizations left Gates little
time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no
indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportunity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary.
For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the
assumptions that justified US involvement in Afghanistan even during
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the Obama administration’s major review of US strategy. Gates, like
the rest of the administration, accepted the idea that without a major
American effort, the Taliban would regain control over large parts or
all of Afghanistan and again provide a base for al Qaeda; and that al
Qaeda wanted to restore its base in Afghanistan, and having this would
increase the chances it would pull off another September 11-level attack
on the United States or US targets abroad. The failure to scrutinize the
basic assumptions of American strategy (or to mention such scrutiny if
it did take place) is a puzzling omission since by the time of the Obama
strategic review, much of the American public and Congress had begun
to doubt whether the security gained by US military involvement justified the monetary and blood costs. There are times when policymakers
must grapple with big strategic issues rather than the most immediate
ones. This did not happen while Gates was Defense Secretary.
While Gates did succeed in holding off congressional pressure
and buying additional time for his military commanders, the fact that
neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are likely to be seen as strategic victories
for the United States should send a stark message to the US military. The
United States treated its conflict with a transnational, nonstate enemy as
a war less because doing so was most effective than because the military was the most powerful tool available. This problem has not gone
away. Today the United States remains organized to use its high-tech
and high-quality forces to fight relatively short, politically unambiguous campaigns against other conventional militaries. It is not organized
to fight transnational nonstate enemies, whether ideological ones like
al Qaeda or criminal syndicates, even though every indication is that
this sort of conflict will persist. Gates understood this but there was
little he could do other than implore the rest of the US government,
particularly the State Department, to provide additional resources for
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through herculean and even heroic efforts, Gates helped prevent
Iraq and Afghanistan from becoming utter fiascos. He was not, however,
able to turn them into strategic successes or do more than nudge the
Department of Defense in a new direction. But then no one else could
have, and probably no one could have done more to stave off disaster
than Gates did. The Department of Defense and American national
security strategy were not demonstrably better after his leadership, but
they also were no worse. Ultimately, Duty holds grim but important
lessons for the Army’s current and future strategic leaders: they will
face a hyperpartisan political climate and missions that devolve to the
military less because it is designed for them than because it is the least
bad option. As they read Gates’ memoirs—and all should—most will
share his anger and frustration but, like Gates himself, most will also be
determined to make the best of it they can.
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PROCONSULS: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from
Rome to America Today
By Carnes Lord
Reviewed by Don M. Snider, PhD, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US
Army War College and Professor Emeritus, US Military Academy

Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012
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F

irst, understand that this is a book about a unique form of leadership
at the strategic level, in the words of the author a “generic political
phenomenon seemingly never to have been systematically studied and
which remains a neglected – indeed, virtually an unrecognized – topic of
scholarly investigation and analysis.”
Thus, as the title states, the author’s attempt is to provide such a
systematic inquiry into the role of our “proconsuls.” Skirting scholarly
debates about an American empire while using their language, he further
defines: “the core of the proconsular function is political-military leadership…that in the best of cases rises to statesmanship; its chief challenge
is the coordination of civil and military authority in the periphery and
the alignment with political-military leadership at the center.” Few
authors could attempt such a broad inquiry into uncharted scholarship,
but Professor Lord is imminently qualified to do so, and as we shall
see, does so with remarkably fine results. With two earned doctorates
(Yale-classics; Cornell-political science), over a decade in the nationalsecurity policy arena in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s (National
Security Council; Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Affairs; Distinguished Fellow at the National Defense University), and
three previous books in the field, he was uniquely qualified for such an
inquiry.
While the background is drawn from Rome, the focus of the book
is clearly on America as a modern democracy and great power –“an
effort has been made to include at least some discussion of all of the
most important figures who can plausibly be identified as proconsuls in
the properly functional sense of the term, from Spanish-American War
to the present [2012].” The most prominent among them are General
Leonard Wood and William Howard Taft in Cuba and the Philippines
in the early twentieth century; MacArthur in the Philippines, Japan,
and Korea from 1936-1951; General Lucius Clay in Germany in the late
1940’s; the intelligence operative Edward Lansdale in the Philippines
and Vietnam in the early 1950s; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and
General Maxwell Taylor in Vietnam in the early 1960s; General Creighton
Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby in Vietnam
in the late 1960 and early 1970s; General Wesley Clark in the Balkans
in the late 1990s; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in Iraq in 2003-04; and
General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 [to 2011].
Each era, along with its American proconsuls, is presented in the
richly documented detail expected from an eminent scholar and practitioner of our national security affairs. But to this reader it is not the
individual analyses that are most informative for our work today and
into the future. Rather, it is the synthesis that Professor Lord brings in
the final chapter(s) when he gets to the “so what?” question: “Is proconsular leadership a good thing?” His main conclusion is unremarkable in
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its barest statement—“…that delegated political-military leadership had
been a significant independent variable in American national security
decision-making from the end of the nineteenth century to the present;
or more simply stated, that it has made a strategic difference.” But when
he develops this thesis in two broad directions by drawing from the
chapters of research, we see the major contribution of his endeavor in
the book.
First, with respect to individual proconsuls the author presents what
he considers to be a “respectable balance sheet”—“It reflects, above all,
the high caliber of these men and others like them who have served
the American Republic in high office since the nation’s emergence as a
great power. They were more than mere imperial functionaries. Though
not lacking in personal ambition, they were both American patriots and
change agents who seized opportunities available to them to shape or
steer national policy in the best interests of the United States and what
it stands for. In this regard they exercised leadership in the proper sense
of that term.”
After enjoying the more recent and familiar eras on that balance
sheet—Clark in Kosovo; Bremer in Iraq; Petraeus in the Middle East—
and setting them alongside the less familiar—MacArthur in the Far
East; Clay in Germany, and Lodge, et al. in Vietnam—it strikes me that
the author is a bit too generous in his overall assessment. In contrast,
his individual assessments are correctly negative in several cases, welldocumented and convincingly analyzed.
But it is the second broad direction in which he generalizes that I
believe most readers will find very fruitful insights for the current period
of defense reductions and beyond. In his discussion of whether or not
the institutions, cultures, and processes of national security decisionmaking and policy implementation, and particularly as they enable
the proconsular role, are as functional as they might be, he strongly
reinforces the current consensus. He ruefully notes that while proconsular leadership in the proper sense of the term seems to call for unity
of command in the field, the fundamental problem facing American
proconsuls is that political and military decision making have long been
institutionally split, and still remain so even after the Goldwater-Nichols
reforms of 1986. Here Professor Lord is quite correctly critical, indeed
skeptical, in his assessment: “There is no easy solution to his problem.”
That said, however he does include a very thoughtful set of ruminations
on the urgent necessity to rethink fundamentally the role of our regional
unified commands, and as well the often-adapted Unified Command
Plan which defines them.
While no book can be extended to all of the logical implications of
its main thesis, I find one omission to be worth noting. Given his own
experiences and the richness of the research into individual proconsuls,
their successes and failure, it would have been helpful for Professor Lord
to have advanced his own ideas on the needed professional development
of such future leaders, both civilian and military. To this reader, it is but
one more area in which Professor Lord’s conclusion is apt: “Suffice it
to say, proconsular leadership, which so plainly offers danger as well as
opportunity, is an instrument in need of adult supervision at the imperial
center.”
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Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots
By Dennis Laich
Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and
Their Country
By Andrew J. Bacevich
Bloomington, IN: iUniverse,
2013
192 pages
$28.95

New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2013
256 pages
$26.00

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Leadership
and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

T

hese two books approach the same topic, the all-volunteer force,
from different analytic perspectives. While the term all-volunteer
force is meant to include all armed services, the focus of these works
is the service with the largest manpower component, the United States
Army. Preserving the nation’s security is a critical issue in this age of
fiscal austerity facing the US government amid the struggles within the
Congress, its political parties, and the executive branch. The challenge is
to manage the national debt while providing for the security of American
citizens. All indications point toward significant near-term reductions in
Department of Defense budgets with resulting cutbacks in manpower,
modernization, and readiness. The US military consumes over fifty
percent of the discretionary spending of the federal government. Absent
existential threats, it should be scrutinized for funding cuts.
Laich retired as a major general in the Army Reserve after 35 years
of service; he held command at colonel and flag officer ranks. Bacevich
graduated from West Point and was commissioned an armored officer;
he rose to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Upon military
retirement, Bacevich earned a Princeton PhD and recently retired as
a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
Ironically, both authors have inherited Smedley’s syndrome from “War
is a Racket.” Bacevich opens Chapter 8 with the description of a senior
officer who, “in retirement defects…calling into questions officially
sanctioned truths…[a]fter a decade of unquestioning subservience to
the national security state” (115).
In this case, the “officially sanctioned truth” is the success of the
all-volunteer force as a highly professional force, vastly superior to the
conscripted force it replaced in July 1973. Laich and Bacevich served in
the Vietnam-era draft Army, then during the presumptive validation of
the all-volunteer force in the Persian Gulf War. National security professionals and military members of the touted all-volunteer force will find
portions of these books difficult to accept since their core identities and
motivations are under assault. Military readers will probably find convenient scapegoats in the civilian and political leaders whom they believe
tend to overcommit the force—or with the citizens who go shopping
while service members go to war on their behalf.
In Skin in the Game, Laich offers a simple framework with which
to evaluate the all-volunteer force—fairness, efficiency, and sustainability.
His assessment is presented rhetorically, and he offers the following
disclaimer in the Preface: “This book is not intended to be a rigorous
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academic product or a reference source. In fact, it could be characterized as a very long op-ed piece intended to promote dialogue” (xiii).
The reader must keep this disclaimer in mind as Laich provides a brief
summary of the development of the all-volunteer force at the close of
the Vietnam War, which he regards as a political expedient of President
Nixon. Most informative is his presentation of the rationale conveyed by
the Gates Commission, which Nixon directed to examine the alternative
to conscription. Along with the objectives, assumptions, and nine objections for the all-volunteer force, Laich provides his view of the “reality”
that has transpired over the past four decades since the all-volunteer
force’s inception. Laich believes that the all-volunteer force is not fair
since people across the social economic spectrum do not serve equally
(all-volunteer force soldiers are “poor kids and patriots”). It is also inefficient because the Army has outsourced some logistics and security
competencies to private corporations to conduct its recent operations.
Lastly, the all-volunteer force is not sustainable because of prohibitive
personnel costs required to recruit and retain active component service
members. Those costs include paying for rehabilitation from combat
wounds and psychological trauma as well as retirement pensions.
Bacevich’s Breach of Trust provides a much more scholarly treatment;
it continues the arguments of his previous works The New American
Militarism (2005) and Washington Rules (2010). Bacevich asserts that the
American way of life and its quest for global preeminence has placed the
nation in a perpetual state of conflict and war. In protecting and projecting US values, national leaders have chosen the military instrument of
national power by default, which in turn requires global presence of its
force. The establishment and evolution of the all-volunteer force enable
this presence. For the US political elite, the all-volunteer force is the
blunt instrument for asserting preeminence: For senior military officers,
the all-volunteer force has become the manifestation of a professional
force with the prized autonomy that it entails.
To quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “ay, there’s the rub!” Bacevich
contends that the Departments of Defense and the Army have aligned
with societal views of race, gender, and sexual orientation (most recently
with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Thus, the American public
has little interest or concern about its military, apart from the feel-good
patriotic fanfare at sporting events and occasional encounters with
uniformed service members at airports. The all-volunteer force, with
its complementarity with the National Guard and Reserve forces, was
designed to link US forces with the American people, such that employments of the military would be noticed, felt, and supported by the public.
Alas, that has not been the case, as Rachel Maddow has documented
in Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (Parameters review,
Summer 2013).
With less than one percent of the US population currently serving,
the all-volunteer force has become separated physically and socially
from the American people. Repeatedly, the civilian political elite has
succumbed to the temptation to assert US preeminence and then used
the nation’s impressive and available military force without constraint or
accountability. While several national polls reflect a US military held in
high esteem, Bacevich contends that it has not been effective in winning
current wars and has abrogated elements of its professional jurisdiction
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to private security organizations. He foresees a bleak future characterized by “more needless wars or shadow conflicts sold by a militarized and
irresponsible political elite; more wars mismanaged by an intellectually
sclerotic and unimaginative senior officer corps; more wars that exact
huge penalties without yielding promised outcomes…” (190). Bacevich
decries the warrior-professional who has supplanted the citizen-soldier
through the “conversion of military service from collective obligation
to personal preference [for service]” (79). Accordingly, Bacevich charges
the nation’s political elites, senior military officers, and disengaged citizenry with a breach of trust with American service members.
Both authors buttress their arguments on the founding documents of our nation—The Declaration of Independence and The US
Constitution. They refer frequently to the principle of no large standing
forces. They assert that greatly reduced numbers in the armed forces
would limit leaders’ desire and ability to launch military operations. To
man the forces needed for peacetime engagement, the authors offer
alternatives to the all-volunteer force, but they are equally pessimistic
about the viability of military conscription. Laich proposes a hybrid of
a draft lottery for the reserve component with the option of enrolling
in college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Bacevich
suggests a two-year requirement for national service that would enhance
citizens’ sense of obligation to contribute to their nation. Any form of
mandatory service would have to provide safeguards against the inequities that have plagued past conscription programs. All citizens must bear
equal risk and share the burden of service.
It is appropriate to evaluate the viability of the all-volunteer force
after its inception forty years ago—especially as we face the uncertainty
of future decades. The strategic question remains a philosophical one:
“What do we want the role of the United States to be in the world?” The
answers to this fundamental query determine the role of U.S. armed
forces, its composition, and the capabilities required to secure national
interests. To inform such discourse, national security professionals and
military members should consider the arguments and recommendations
presented in these two works. Our nation can ill afford a breach of
trust between its citizenry and those who serve to secure their collective
interests.

Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower,
Arnold, Bradley
Edited by James H. Willbanks
Reviewed by Major General David T. Zabecki, PhD, USA (Ret.), Honorary
Senior Research Fellow, War Studies Programme, University of Birmingham
(UK)
Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2013
262 pages
$35.00

I

n 2013, the United States Mint issued a set of commemorative coins
honoring the only five officers to achieve the five-star rank of General
of the Army. The half-dollar coin features Henry H. “Hap” Arnold and
Omar N. Bradley. The dollar features George C. Marshall and Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Douglas MacArthur appears on the five-dollar gold piece.
Authorized by an act of Congress that was sponsored by the US Army
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Command and General Staff College Foundation, the reverse of all three
coins depict designs relating to Fort Leavenworth and the Staff College.
Generals of the Army was written as a companion piece to that
special set of coins. Edited by Professor James H. Willbanks, the General
of the Army George C. Marshal Chair of Military History and Director
of the Department of Military History at CGSC, the book contains a
chapter on each of the five-star generals, with an emphasis on their
Fort Leavenworth experiences. The first chapter, “Officer Education
and the Fort Leavenworth Schools, 1881-1940,” by Jonathan M. House,
is an excellent capsule history of mid-level officer education in the US
Army. That chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Volumes have
been written about each of these US Army legends, and all but Marshall
published their own memoirs. Yet, this handy little single-volume reference provides a tightly written set of profiles for comparing these five
very different careers. Those careers also intertwined in different and
sometimes ironic ways.
Douglas MacArthur never really attended a Leavenworth school;
nor did he formally serve there as an instructor. He did serve as the
commander of an engineer company at Leavenworth, and while there
he lectured informally at the General Services School and the Cavalry
School. Perhaps the most controversial of the major figures of American
military history, MacArthur was the only general officer to serve in three
major wars (World Wars I and II and Korea). He also reached five-star
rank as a field marshal in the Philippine army several years before the
rank existed in the US Army.
George C. Marshall never held a command in combat, but he is
widely recognized as the “Organizer of Victory” in World War II. After
the war, he went on to serve as Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing
the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Thanks to his foresight,
Germany today remains one of America’s staunchest allies in the world.
In 1906, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (shortly
renamed the School of the Line). Graduating first in his class, he was
selected to attend the Staff College, and then served for two more years
as an instructor in the Staff College’s Department of Engineering.
Although MacArthur was far senior in terms of rank and time in the
service, Marshall was the first army officer appointed to the newly established five-star rank in December 1944—one day after the promotion
of Admiral William D. Lahey, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. As
Secretary of Defense, Marshall in April 1951 supported President Harry
Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur from his command in Korea.
Marshall also was the only five-star officer who was not a military
academy graduate.
Dwight D. Eisenhower was convinced that his career was on a
dead-end track after he was not assigned overseas during World War
I. Nor had he even attended an officers’ branch school. But thanks to
the mentorship of Major General Fox Conner, Eisenhower attended
CGSC during 1925-26, and graduated first in his class. During the
interwar years, Eisenhower as a major and then a lieutenant colonel
served as MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, first when Macarthur was Chief
of Staff of the Army, and then when MacArthur went to the Philippines.
During World War II, Eisenhower’s rise in rank was meteoric, from
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his promotion to colonel in March 1941 to general of the Army on 20
December 1944. The fact that his former aide received his fifth star only
two days after MacArthur received his, always seemed to be a sore point
with MacArthur. At one point in late 1951, MacArthur was also seen
as Eisenhower’s primary competition for the Republican presidential
nomination.
Hap Arnold was the last promoted of the four original five-star
officers authorized by the Congress for the army. The commander of
US Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold also was a semiofficial member of the ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff. Trained as a pilot in
the school established by the Wright Brothers, Arnold was a life-long
advocate for military aviation. He also had the least promising interwar
career of any World War II senior general. He received less-than-stellar
evaluation reports and, after the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell,
Arnold was exiled to a number of make-work assignments in remote
places. On top of that, he thoroughly hated his time as a student at CSSC
and even considered retiring from the army early because of that experience. Yet he persevered and ultimately presided over history’s biggest
expansion in military aviation. Two years after the US Air Force became
a separate service in 1947, Congress approved changing Arnold’s rank to
General of the Air Force.
Omar N. Bradley was the last American officer promoted to five-star
rank. During World War II, Congress authorized only four five-star positions each for the Army and Navy. But with the conversion of Arnold’s
rank to General of the Air Force in 1949, the Army could argue it had
one allocation left. As the commander of the 12th Army Group during
World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower in
1948, and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was the
natural choice. He was promoted to General of the Army in September
1950. Like Eisenhower, Bradley did not serve overseas during World
War I. Unlike Arnold, Bradley valued his time as a student at CGSC,
and after graduating he went on to Fort Benning as an instructor at the
Infantry School, where he came to the attention of Marshall who was
then the assistant commandant of the school. In February 1941, Bradley
was promoted to brigadier general, seven months ahead of Eisenhower.
As Chairman of the Joint’s Chiefs of Staff, Bradley supported President
Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur, an officer who was already a
brigadier general in June 1918 when Bradley was still a captain.
More than sixty years after the last US Army officer was promoted
to five-star rank, Fort Leavenworth remains the crossroads of the US
Army’s officer corps, and almost every senior officer in the last hundred
years has come through one of the Leavenworth Schools. Those who
made it to the five-star level lived in a far different world strategically
and politically than we do today, and the institution they served has
likewise changed in many ways. Yet there remains a core foundation to
the Profession of Arms that is timeless, and today’s offices can still learn
much by studying the careers of those who preceded us—especially
these five.
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Changing Nature of Power
The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields
and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What
It Used to Be
By Moises Naim
Reviewed by Dr. Joel R. Hillison, Colonel (USA Retired), Faculty Instructor,
Department of Distance Education, US Army War College

O

ver the past sixty years, the US military has gotten into the habit of
planning in an unconstrained environment, whether in developing
budgetary requirements or planning for contingencies. This luxury is no
longer feasible. As Winston Churchill is purported to have said, “Now
that we are out of money we have to think.” It is in this context that
Moises Naim’s, The End of Power, should be considered. Moises Naim
is an eminent scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and former editor of Foreign Policy. His recent book is a thoughtprovoking and insightful examination of the changing nature of power
in today’s world.
As the title suggests, The End of Power suggests that traditional
notions (and levers) of power are outdated: power isn’t what it used to
be. As the extensive literature on globalization has pointed out, power is
becoming more diffuse and accessible. In the complex and volatile world
today, brute force is often ineffective or counterproductive. Traditional
icons in the exercise of power, from presidents to popes, are increasingly
constrained in their ability to translate power into desired outcomes.
As Robert Zoellick mentioned in his Wall Street Journal review of this
book, “seemingly powerful actors in societies have a harder time getting
things done.”
Naim begins with a discussion of power, how to conceptualize it, use
it, and keep it. He does a nice job summarizing the Weberian conception
of power and how bigger became better with regards to the exercise of
power. Max Weber, a famous German social scientist, suggested states
were those entities that maintained a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force within a prescribed boundary. He also advocated stronger, hierarchical bureaucracies as the mechanisms for states to exert authority
and power. Naim explains how this Weberian structure, so successful
after World War I, has begun to crumble. Even as the concentration
of power is increasing in some sectors, the ability to use it to achieve a
desired outcome and the probability of retaining it is more volatile and
uncertain than ever.
Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the typology
Naim establishes to categorize how power has transformed with globalization and other recent changes. This typology discusses a tripartite
revolution against the conventional notions and effectiveness of power:
more, mobility, and mentality. The “more” component expounds upon
the growth in actors, ideas, and world population. All of these factors
complicate the possession and exercise of control by more traditional
actors, such as states. In Weber’s world, barriers to entry and the
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efficiencies of scale reduced the number of potential actors in critical
sectors such as governance and industry. In today’s world, those barriers
have been reduced and the same structures that provided economies
of scale have often hindered the ability to adapt quickly to changing
situations. The “mobility” revolution refers to the expansion of options.
Not only do people and things have greater ability to traverse the globe,
so does information. This revolution has contributed to the reduction of
the barriers to entry discussed above and has allowed a greater number
and diversity of the actors to interact on a local, regional or global level.
Finally, Naim discusses the “mentality” revolution. This development,
closely related to the first two, discusses how rapidly ideas and norms
can proliferate, changing expectations and traditional social contracts.
Again, the revolution is antithetical to the hierarchical structures of
power touted by Weber.
Naim’s argument fits nicely with a much older debate captured by
Jeffrey Issac in his classic, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist
Critique.” In that article, a distinction was made between the “power
to” and the “power over.” The three “M” revolutions have increased the
ability of everyone, including nonstate actors, to exert power in ways that
were unimaginable in the past (power to). Inversely, these same revolutions have decreased the ability of traditional power brokers, such as
states and armies, to exercise or sustain power over other actors (power
over). In addition, power has to be considered within the social structures within which humans interact. Thus, the ability to understand and
explain is as important as the ability to do something about the physical
phenomenon. This context coincides with Naim’s call for a “framework
to help make sense of the changes taking place.”
Overall, this book is well-written and readable. Though much of
what is described is well-known, Naim ties it together in an original
and thought-provoking manner. For those interested in the role of landpower, this book provides some exceptional insights in conceptualizing
the roles and functions of the US Army and Marine Corps. If power is
so dispersed and the problems more complex, how should the Army
define its role? Certainly, the military must retain the ability to dominate
other state-based military threats to ensure the nation’s survival and to
promote the vital interests of the country. However, what type of force
structure is needed to give our national leaders the flexibility they need
to respond to the VUCA international system in a resource constrained
environment? If you accept Naim’s conclusions, perhaps the Army’s
fight to maintain end strength is not a realistic or affordable approach
given the “more, mobility, and mentality” revolutions.
This book is also worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts
and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop
effective policies and strategies during times of fiscal constraint. As
the traditional sources and structures of power decay, senior leaders,
policymakers, and strategists have to adapt. Leaders have to be more
comfortable with a lack of direct control. Success will reside in the ability
to monitor and shape ideas associated with the mentality revolution
from the lowest to the very highest levels. Hypocrisy and mistakes will
be quickly identified and disseminated by various actors. While the military should retain those capabilities where it maintains a comparative
advantage, such as strategic mobility, it must look for more alternative
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solutions to the problems at hand. Knowing the limitations of military
power might be just as important as knowing its capabilities.

Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama
by Stephen Sestanovich
Reviewed by Colonel Michael J. Daniels, student, US Army War College

T

he recent spate of writing decrying the decline of American power
and influence centers on issues of domestic decay and turmoil, with
the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world.
Some authors argue these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of
aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan
Sestanovich, author of Maximalist, shows the current challenges of the
Obama administration are not new, but part of a cycle that can be traced
back to the post-World War II Truman administration.
Sestanovich is a former US diplomat, who served under both
Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of international relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and thorough history of US foreign policy since 1947. The book does not offer
much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author succeeded in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many
anecdotes to retell this story with a slightly new twist. It is a worthy addition to US foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious
student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or
craft future foreign policy.
The book expands on the author’s earlier thesis, regarding the
“maximalist” tradition in US foreign policy, one advanced in a Spring
2005 article in The National Interest. Sestanovich, describes foreign
policy and diplomacy in a continuum cycling between periods of
maximalism and retrenchment. One criticism of the book is the author
never defines these two terms, which are so central to his argument.
The reader quickly summarizes that maximalism equals overreach,
with retrenchment the “do less” corollary that follows when America
must pick up the pieces. The author details the approach administrations have taken cycling between these two extremes: the maximalist
Truman followed by a retrenching Eisenhower; who is then followed by
maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of
retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism
of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and
Clinton; the maximalism of George W. Bush; and finally this current
period of retrenchment under President Obama.
A few unanswered questions linger below the surface of a linear
story long on narrative but short on analysis. My central criticism is
the cycle is described as far too simplistic. Can any administration be
categorized as purely maximalist or retrenching? The author concedes
most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter
to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were
almost always influenced by external events, beyond the influences of
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the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to categorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations cleanly for
these very reasons, and the author notes it was not President George
W. Bush’s initial intent to be a maximalist. The second- and third-order
effects of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The decisions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black
swans such as 9-11 are also responsible for shifts in focus. Campaign
rhetoric and an administration’s “going-in position” rarely survive first
contact with future realities. The author would have been better served
to incorporate more of this dynamic into his analysis, and to examine
why presidents seem so often to misjudge or fail to anticipate events that
shake their preferred interrelationship with the world.
Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy
realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administrations to “go large” or “go small” when pursuing national interests and
exporting American values. This examination is interesting but it is also
incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars, fails to account for
domestic political dynamics and issues that influence our ability to act
globally. It is as if the author believes international credibility trumps
domestic will. This Innenpolitik—Realpolitik interplay and tension—
best explained in Peter Trubowitz’s book Politics and Strategy, is
ground-zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events
abroad can derail foreign policy, so too domestic challenges will often
cause an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovich’s argument would have been strengthened by acknowledging this relationship
and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative.
The author’s lack of detailed analysis weakens his argument that the
United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and be more
a maximalist than a retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader
why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken
by the Obama administration, can be an effective, or at least a suitable
course for present realities. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains
an excellent history of US foreign policy, and provides yet another lens
through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era.
Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take
note.
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Financial War
Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial
Warfare
By Juan Zarate
Reviewed by David Katz

I

n Treasury’s War, Juan Zarate, a former Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime and federal prosecutor, earnestly presents an insider’s view of the US Treasury’s response
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In all, this book is an important, enjoyable
and often contradictory history vital to understanding the contemporary
US practice of financial-based power projection, and the Treasury’s new
role in national security.
The author begins with a brief introduction to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), which is “the US government’s primary tool for
going after the assets of enemy regimes” domiciled within Washington’s
jurisdiction, as well as prohibiting American citizens, banks, or businesses
from transacting with Specially Designated Nationals, (individuals,
businesses, groups or entities) sanctioned by law. North Korea, Cuba
and Iran were all subject to lawful economic sanctions, administered by
Treasury prior to 9/11.
Mr. Zarate’s “Treasury tale” begins after 9/11 with three lawyers,
Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser, his Deputy George Wolfe
and Chief Adviser Bill Fox, crafting the contours of what would become
Executive Order 13224, authorizing Treasury to designate administratively the financial enablers of terrorism and, more importantly, those
associated with them. Zarate, a Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary
of the Treasury for Enforcement, ran the Executive Office for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, which was combined with the Treasury
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, making him the first Assistant
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.
With the stage set, the book’s second half details Treasury’s warfare.
Directed by Executive Order 13224 and armed with section 311 of the
Patriot Act (2001), Treasury began administratively designating enablers
and associates of sanctioned entities in 2005. Weighing the risk of
becoming an “associate” and losing access to US markets, many banks
and insurance companies cut off relationships with sanctioned entities isolating them from the global financial system. Outside US legal
authority or enforcement, designated entities were frozen out of global
markets by international actions in what Zarate termed a “virtuous
cycle of self-isolation.” By all accounts, it was highly successful. From
there, Treasury was off to the races designating Iranian persons, banks
and shipping companies, Lebanese banks, Al Qaeda, Al Shaabab and
Taliban financiers, and Russian criminal networks, among others. Along
the way, the Treasury became the center of gravity for US financial-based
power projection and the de-facto, but explicit, system administrator for
global finance.

New York: PublicAffairs,
2013
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Zarate’s history clearly conveys the intent of Treasury’s approach.
As such, Treasury’s War should be required reading for policy makers.
However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation,
Treasury’s War should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarate’s
assessments of the efficiency, efficacy, coherence and limitations of
Treasury’s policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious,
yet unspoken, limitation of Treasury’s approach is that it does not project
power. It works by reduction, isolating US finance from designated entities and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US
self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered
by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasury’s approach maintains the petite
fiction of domestic legality when, in fact, the policy was designed to
operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplomatic influence has failed. Additionally, much of Treasury’s War operates
on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can
designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate
whether target has either specific knowledge or intent beforehand.
Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the
participants and their talk of pursuing international scofflaws, it is an
exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the
book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. Treasury’s War describes systemic
manipulation of the global financial system for US objectives. Systems
are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interventions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between
specific intervention versus system regulation remains an open question.
The book’s last chapter, “The Coming Financial Wars,” looks at
some emerging challenges to Treasury’s war and serves as the basis for
Zarate’s Parameters article (Winter 2013-14). The author approaches the
finite future of both the dollar as world reserve currency and American
as financial hegemon with a touch of melancholy. This approach leaves
unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to
harness international financial self-interest to its national policy aims.
He approaches networked asset creation—companies such as Facebook,
Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network
position and not of themselves—as problems to solve not horses to
harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate
his due, the epilogue of Treasury’s War contains nuanced musings on the
role and limits of national power projection through financial means.
Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.

Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First
World War
By Nicholas A. Lambert
Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon
9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the Navy

Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012
662 pages
$47.50

N

aval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive
purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats
tried to stifle delivery of supplies. The Dardanelles campaign, the failed
naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to buttress Russia with equipment and keep it in the war. During the conflict,
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this argument goes, blockade predictably weakened Germany slowly, but
only four years of land warfare clinched victory.
Nicholas Lambert now convincingly argues the Royal Navy instead
perceived “economic warfare” as a way to trigger quick collapse. Drawing
from his 1998 Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, Lambert traces the service’s
understanding that a “close” blockade of German ports would be hopeless in the face of new mine, torpedo and submarine threats, but then
sought other measures. After evaluating British vulnerability during the
1905 Moroccan Crisis, the Navy recognized economic warfare’s potential to deprive Germany of materiel and financing. Exploiting Britain’s
central position at the world’s shipping, communications (telegraph
cables), insurance (Lloyd’s) and banking systems offered to deter the
Kaisereich or quickly defeat it. By 1912 the Cabinet-level Committee on
Imperial Defence had “pre-delegated” authority to embargo trade and
credit to Germany, allowing initiation of sanctions the day war started
on 5 August 1914 (178).
Once the world war began, however, market panic worked too
well alongside these measures. The July war scare, with August’s tight
wartime British controls, froze credit worldwide with investors buying
gold or Sterling; every stock exchange closed (187). The plunging US
dollar forced Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to shutter Wall Street
for four months as the market for American cotton collapsed weeks
before mid-term Congressional elections. Despite government guarantees for London banks’ payment instruments, “bills of exchange,”
international commerce halted and employers laid-off workers, raising
the specter of domestic revolution in many countries.
Economic warfare had run off the rails and the British pulled
back to mitigate its consequences. The period to February 1916 saw
arguments on limited blockade. For Lambert, the adversaries were the
Admiralty on one side (albeit with differing views within the service),
with the Foreign Office, War Office (Army) and Board of Trade (the
economics and merchant shipping ministry) generally on the other.
Each agency played a role in counting or controlling trade flow into
Germany’s neutral neighbors, but faced difficulties in so doing. All
leaders ultimately realized the lure of wartime profit was not limited to
Swedish, Danish or Dutch re-export businesses, nor to American oil
firms, but to British shipping companies as well. Economic warfare, a
key ingredient of an “off-shore balancing” strategy some describe today,
needed stringency to function, a non-existent commodity until 1916.
To be fair, politics compelled behavior contradictory to waging war.
Merchant firms, and the Board of Trade, fiercely rejected government
meddling in the free market even to prevent shipments to the enemy.
Despite repeated reports of goods being re-exported to Germany, the
Foreign Office sought to appease neutrals, hoping they would voluntarily stop trade with the Central Powers through quotas on cargoes.
The War Office needed to mobilize arms and food, as well as conscript
personnel, which threatened domestic British political stability (332).
The Royal Navy intercepted blockade runners, only to see British Prize
Courts refuse to “condemn” cargoes because ownership could not be
proven, allowing the merchant vessels to resume passage even when carrying supplies the Kaisereich needed. Atop it all, Asquith’s parliamentary
coalition could collapse if any these constituencies withdrew support.
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Only continued failure on the battlefield and the 1916 conscription
crisis created the circumstances needed for economic warfare to begin
in earnest.
Researched to the limits of remaining sources, Planning Armageddon
is complex. It needs a close reading to master its myriad issues and many
characters, civilian and military, whose roles changed over a decade.
Cruiser operations for sanction enforcement are tangential here, more
the backdrop to Cabinet debate and international diplomacy. But the
book profitably uncovers key elements. Despite war’s public approval
in 1914, British firms traded across the North Sea for eighteen months.
Britain attacked the Dardanelles in 1915 not simply to equip the Czar’s
armies, but to allow export of Russian wheat to stabilize domestic grain
prices (320). Most centrally, in 1912 the British government authorized
the Royal Navy to win a war quickly, a decisive “Schlieffen Plan” from
the sea, (1) before its 1914 decision to put the British Expeditionary Force
into France. That neither the navy nor the government it served properly calculated the measures needed to make economic warfare work
reflected the real height of the goals they sought. Strategic planners
seeking to arrange the same methods in future conflicts ought to read
this book and bear such needs in mind.
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Cartels & Gangs
The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal
Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security
By George W. Grayson
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he Cartels, written by George Grayson, a noted expert on Mexico
and Emeritus Professor at the College of William & Mary, is a noholds barred expose of the criminal violence, corruption, and crisis of
governance gripping Mexico. The author has over two-hundred research
trips to Latin America, two recent books on the topic—one focusing on
Los Zetas (2012; with Sam Logan) and the other on narco-violence and
Mexican failed state potentials (2010)—and three recent US Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, monographs concerning La Familia
cartel (2010), the rise of vigilantism (2011), and Felipe Calderón’s policies
influencing the Mexican armed forces (2013). The reviewer, having read
all of these more specialized works, can see where material has been
drawn from them for this new endeavor. This book, in fact, can be considered Dr. Grayson’s production of a more generalized work on the
subject much akin to Sylvia Longmire’s Cartel (2011), Paul Rexton Kan’s
Cartels at War (2012), and Ioan Grillo’s El Narco (2012).
The work, which was published at the end of 2013, draws upon
very up-to-date Spanish and English language works, interviews, and
email correspondence providing as current a picture as possible when it
went to press. It is composed of preface and acknowledgements, introduction, ten chapters, thirteen appendices, notes, selected bibliography,
and an index. Its chapters can be grouped into four basic themes, each
of which will be discussed in turn. The first theme, comprising the
introduction and Chapter 1, is that of the historical era when drug traffickers were subordinate to an autocratic state. It begins with the story
of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and his Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) successors through Ernesto Zedillo (ending
Nov 2000). The rise of Miguel “El Padrino” Gallardo and the relationship of traffickers to the government are also discussed along with the fact
that, if the rules were not followed, enforcer teams would be dispatched
from Mexico City to levy PRI extra-judicial justice. The second theme,
comprising Chapters 2-4, is that of the transitional era in Colombia,
South Florida, and Mexico when the fortunes of the Colombian cartels
waned and the Mexican cartels become ascendant. It chronicles the shift
in cocaine flow from Florida to Mexico and then provides information
on the Gulf, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO),
Juárez, La Familia (Knights Templars), and Arellano Félix Organization
(AFO) cartels. Also covered is the National Action Party (PAN) policy
shift—under Vicente Fox (Dec 2000-Nov 2006)—of no longer sending
out governmental kill-teams to punish traffickers who got out of line.
The resulting second-order effects, along with other factors, inadvertently contributed to the power balance reversal between the cartels and
the federal government.

Santa Barbara: Praeger
Security International, 2013
328 pages
$63.00
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The third theme, comprising Chapters 5-6, focuses on the Calderón
era (Dec 2006-Nov 2012). It is one of direct confrontation, with the
cartels spurred on by the increasing national security threat they represented to the Mexican state. This second PAN administration’s approach,
one with a kingpin strategy focus, reliance on the armed forces, and
close coordination with the United States, is highlighted. The experiences of the Mexican military are also chronicled; as a mission for which
they were ill prepared to undertake as well as the impacts, including
human rights abuses, this has had on Mexican society. Military engagements (firefights and arrests) with municipal and state police forces in
the pay of the cartels are also detailed. The final theme, comprising
Chapters 7-10, is on the present administration of Enrique Peña Nieto
(Dec 2012-Current). This new administration has engaged in campaign
ploys—like the stillborn Gendarmería Nacional program—and media
spin, downplaying the extent of the cartel threat, to further its public
image and Machiavellian agendas for the benefit of the PRI now once
again in power. The increasing rise of vigilantism in Mexico is also
covered within this theme along with the enablers of organized crime
which include elements of the Church, banking and business interests,
and Mexican state governors, whom (due to the executive-legislative
impasse in Mexico City since the late 1990s) have increasingly gained
in political power and wealth, resulting in their either looking the other
way or directly colluding with the cartels.
Many of components of the work are highly informative and provide
great insights into the relationships and animosities of the cartels to the
Mexican government under the various administrations—both PRI and
PAN—and to each other. Further, the writing benefits from Grayson’s
approach to categorizing information in such a way that it is easily
digestible. For instance, the table with the “Ten Commandment’s of ‘El
Padrino”’ (23) is extremely useful in showing the subordination of the
narco-syndicates to the old PRI political machine. Of note from this
table is how executions of opposing traffickers were to take place north
of the US border, if possible (Commandment 4)—what we would call
spillover. Yet, American civilians were not to be kidnapped, extorted,
or killed either south or north of the border so as not to incur the wrath
of the US government (Commandment 5). Other tables show us the
differences between the drug wars in Colombia and Mexico (96), a
general history of drug activities (228-232), and military desertion rates
in Mexico—which between 1997 and 2012 number over two-hundred
and twenty thousand personnel and beg the question how many of these
individuals have gone over to the cartels (264).
Criticism, of what is otherwise an excellent overview of the recent
history of the Mexican cartels and their interrelationship to Mexican
politics, focuses on the fact that quite a few typos can be found within its
pages; better proofing would have been beneficial. The work is also thin
on analyzing cartel impacts on US security, making that part of the subtitle a misnomer. About two pages discuss corruption of US personnel
(209-211) while the Mérida Initiative, from which the new PRI administration has distanced itself, is mentioned in more sections of the book
(93-104, 175-176) additional analysis of its and other impacts seemed
warranted. While it is recognized that Mexico is the major transit point
of illicit narcotics flow into the United States and anything negative
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taking place in Mexico—such as loss of territories, ongoing corruption
and violence, and regional failure due to cartel activities may have a
direct US homeland security impact—some sort of focused discussion
of these threats vis-à-vis Peña Nieto’s policies in the conclusion would
have been beneficial to the reader.
Still, in summation, The Cartels is a well-researched and highly readable work that would make for an excellent college textbook and be
of interest to more general readers such as military officers and policy
makers interested in this subject matter. The various tables and many
appendices for organizing information are also useful. The work very
much deserves its rightful place in both personal and college libraries
next to other general works published on the Mexican cartels over the
last few years.

Studies in Gangs and Cartels
By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations
and Comparative Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA
and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College

S

tudies in Gangs and Cartels is written by two eminent scholars in the
field of law enforcement and transnational criminal organizations.
Robert J. Bunker was a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; while John
P. Sullivan is a career police officer and an Adjunct Researcher at the
Scientific Vortex Foundation, Bogotá, Colombia. This important work is
the culmination of the authors’ works from the mid-1990s to the present
with new chapters written specifically for this anthology. Readers will see
the progression of gangs and cartels and their nefarious activities from
third-generation or third-phase cartel typologies.
Studies in Gangs and Cartels addresses the broader challenges gangs
and organized crime can present to states. (1) Gangs and cartels in the
twenty-first century have become more than an annoyance to governmental authorities and law enforcement agencies. Crime and criminally
illicit activities have become more global in scope and can destroy the
social fabric of a society while also undermining the authority and
legitimacy of a state. One only has to think of the current situations
in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil to realize the impact of criminal elements in society and its detrimental effects. As Bunker and Sullivan
point out, “extending their reach and influence by co-opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to
facilitate, enhance, and protect their activities, transnational criminal
organizations are emerging as a serious impediment to democratic governance and a free market economy. This danger is particularly evident
in Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and other parts of the former
Soviet Union where corruption has become particularly insidious and
pervasive” (63). The traditional view of crime as a localized issue and
therefore a concern only to the police on the beat is no longer valid in
the twenty-first century. As Bunker and Sullivan argue, “rather than
being viewed only as misguided youth or opportunistic criminals or,
in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social
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or political agenda, more evolved gangs and cartels are instead seen as
developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capabilities” (xi).
Criminal organizations and cartels are emerging phenomena of the
third-generation street gang typology advanced in the Studies in Gangs and
Cartels. According to Bunker and Sullivan, third-generation gangs have
sophisticated political aims. “They operate—or seek to operate—at
the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to gain and
secure power, drive financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type
activities” (3). This proliferation of street-level gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and countries is partially a consequence of the process of
globalization, that is, the greater interconnection of the world due to
advancements in transportation, economics, the death of distance facilitated by the internet, and interdependence. In the globalized world of the
twenty-first century, gangs have become transnational when the following characteristics are present. First, the criminal organization is active
and operational in more than one country. Second, criminal operations
committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country. Third, criminal organizations
are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations. Finally, their criminal
activities and enterprises are sophisticated and transcend borders (3-4).
In the globalized post-Cold War world of the twenty-first century,
gangs and cartels represent a “new warrior class” (41). The “new warrior
class” includes those individuals in society, part of the “bottom billion,”
who have lost all hope of a better future and social advancement, and use
force to partake in the spoils of society. As Bunker and Sullivan point
out, individuals alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of
the new threat to the nation-state (41). As eminent military historian
Marin van Creveld points it out in The Transformation of War: The Most
Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (1991), “in the
future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today
call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly
hit on more formal titles to describe themselves” (Martin van Creveld,
The Transformation of War, 197). As Paul Rexton Kan noted, “drug-fueled
conflicts often produce a wartime economy alongside local disempowerment and steadily diminishing political stability and personal security”
(Paul Rexton Kan, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, 93). This new class of
“warrior,” the disenfranchised of society, will likely fill the ranks-andfiles of private military companies in order to participate in the spoils of
war. Gangs and cartels in the post-Cold War international system, are
“a potential conflict generator: not only do they contribute to violence
in their home community, but given the confluence of a number of
factors they could well emerge as a true threat to national security” (55).
Examples of gangs and cartels as potential conflict generators abound,
but the cases of Sierra Leon, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Mexico, and Brazil are worth mentioning. Third-generation
gangs and cartels are not only proliferating in the post-Cold War international system, but their methods and techniques in the war making
process are also becoming more lethal and more daring. Gangs and
cartels “challenge states in several ways. They undermine the rule of
law, break the state monopoly on use of force, and foster corruption and
insecurity” (186).
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In conclusion, I highly recommend this work to students and academics in the field of political science and criminal justice as well as the
military, especially the US Army, which may be called upon to address
the drug trafficking in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. I also recommend this work to law enforcement agencies dealing with the new
disease of the twenty-first century: third-generation gangs and cartels.
In the final analysis, it is wise to remember the words of Hannah Arendt:
“The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the
most probable change is to a more violent world” (60).
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Stability & Instability
Where is the Lone Ranger? America’s Search for a Stability
Force, 2nd ed.
By Robert M. Perito
Reviewed by Gordon Rudd, Professor, US Marine School of Advanced
Warfighting (SAW)

Washington, DC: United
Institute for Peace Press,
2013
247 pages
$24.95

D

espite an awkward title, this book makes an indisputable case for
interim law enforcement when a failed state is occupied (or liberated) by a military coalition. Robert Perito, a retired Foreign Service
Officer, who had a tour with the Department of Justice International
Criminal Investigative Training Program, argues that the United States
should create a standing constabulary force to manage the disorder and
violence in post-conflict situations, such as those encountered in the
past few decades. He uses four case studies to illustrate the scope of
the law enforcement problem: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, he does not provide any detail or design for an American
solution.
A description of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, and
Spanish Guardia Nationale identifies national police forces that can be
mobilized with cohesion and deployed as para-military formations to
provide law enforcement and training. Such forces are normally under
the control of each country’s respective Ministry of Interior, for which
the United States has no counterpart. The US Department of Interior
operates the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and the Forrest Service; it does not have a national police force. When
the United States has contributed to an international police component,
it has been an ad hoc collection of city police officers, deputy sheriffs,
and highway patrolmen who lack common training, procedures, equipment, and rank structure.
In response to the Bosnian Civil War, a NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) was activated in 1995. Ambassador Holbrooke, the
American diplomat who managed the Dayton Accords which led to
IFOR, argued for an armed and forceful coalition police force. He was
opposed by his European counterparts who did not want an aggressive
police component in Bosnia without a new constitution and legal system
within which it could work. Ironically, American military planners also
objected to a robust police capacity that might compete with the military
coalition going into Bosnia. The result was a modest, unarmed, ad hoc
police component that arrived in Bosnia six months after IFOR intervened, with the capacity only to advise the abusive ethnic-based local
police forces. The gap between the local police and IFOR occupation
forces led to frequent violence and continued ethnic abuses, with IFOR
military forces reluctant to take on police tasks.
In August 1998, the coalition deployed a 350-person police component (later expanded to 750) to Bosnia based around an Italian Carabinieri
battalion that could take on more aggressive constabulary tasks, a proficient formation that might have been established earlier. When a smaller
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coalition military force entered Kosovo in 1999 to provide stabilization,
it included a comparable Italian Carabinieri battalion as a base for 350person police formation to serve in the constabulary role.
In 2003, the Bush Administration dismissed lessons from Bosnia
and Kosovo when it invaded Iraq without a police component to provide
interim law enforcement or to help reform the Iraqi police forces. Officials
in the State and Justice Departments knew better and argued for standing up an appropriate police component before the military invasion, but
Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration would not provide
the funding and believed the Iraqis would use their liberation to reform
the police on their own. When that did not happen and Ambassador
Bremer fired 30,000 members of the Ba’athist Party and disbanded the
Iraqi Army (400,000 soldiers), the American-led coalition encountered
a perfect storm of violent instability for which it was ill prepared. Not
until 2007 were the Italian Carabinieri again called upon to form a paramilitary police component to assist with stability operations.
In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
was deployed in 2002 with 5,000 troops and a modest German police
element to help reform the Afghan police. When internal conflicts
demanded more soldiers and police, the American military component
quickly formed, trained, and employed additional army and police
forces. The large scope of that program provided substantial numbers of
Afghan police with limited training, which failed to make it an effective
force. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan poor planning for the law enforcement followed by excessive police expansion without limited training
produced an inadequate police force grappling with continued violence
and instability.
Each case study makes a compelling argument for early planning
in a post-conflict situation for a robust interim law enforcement component to provide stability, and to help rebuild and reform local police
forces. Paramilitary police such as the Italian Carabinieri have proved
effective for such a role. Perito laments the reluctance on the part of
each coalition to provide military forces with the authority to exercise
law enforcement. That seems to argue for the establishment of martial
law by the military occupation force.
Perito’s plea to stand up an American counterpart to the Carabinieri
is vague in design and not probable during a period of military austerity.
But such a component may exist now in the American military structure.
The United States Army has five deployable military police brigades and
16 military police battalions; in addition, there are about as many military police brigades and battalions in the National Guard and Reserves.
There is a military police training brigade with three training battalions
at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Properly
packaged, large Army military police formations should be properly
prepared to engage in the constabulary role identified.
In an era where post-conflict is engaged with coalition formations,
it is improbable that the United States would take on such a task alone;
thus, the Lone Ranger theme seems inappropriate. Nor is it probable
that the Army would stand up a new single purpose constabulary formation while reducing force structure. It would make more sense to
employ the military police formations the Army has now in better ways.
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The importance of their tasks may be the best reason to protect those
military police formations as Army force structure is reduced.

Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable
Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups:
Insights from Social Science
By David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez,
Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan
Santa Monica: RAND, Arroyo
Center, 2013
116 pages
$27.95 paper/Free
Download

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he research report Improving the US Military’s Understanding of Unstable
Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups by the RAND
Arroyo Center is a densely packed—yet extremely well executed—and
timely work of great strategic interest to Army thinkers and students of
irregular warfare. The Army sponsored this research under contract, and
while drawing upon the social sciences, the product is meant ultimately to
facilitate practical and proactive application by the United States and her
partners. Specifically, it applies to “Phase 0” operations, that is, the preconflict phase that “minimizes both cost and the need for intervention
with U.S. ground forces” (xiii).
The research is a great complement to the ongoing Office of the
Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiative—though not a component of
that program—and documents the progressive Center for Army Analysis
commissioned study “Improving Understanding of the Environment of
Irregular Warfare” from mid-2011 to mid-2012. I was very motivated to
analyze and critique this report because its focus—the problematic issue
of host environments creating and sustaining violent nonstate actors—
played prominently in my earlier Parameters Winter 2013-14 essay.
The report identified twelve factors associated with environments
vulnerable to conflict (key concepts only): (1) external support; (2) government is considered illegitimate or ineffective; (3) history of resisting
state rule; (4) poverty and inequality; (5) local government is fragmented,
weak, or vulnerable; (6) ungoverned space; (7) multiple violent, nonstate
groups competing for power; (8) the level of government restriction on
political or ideological dissent; (9) the level of consistency and/or agreement; (10) groups perceive faltering government commitment; (11) the
capacity, resources, and expertise of violent extremist groups; and (12)
social networks. These factors are said to be neither static nor disconnected. They and their interactions were then applied to two conflict
case studies, selected by the sponsoring agency due to their familiarity,
as proofs of concept—the Shining Path in Peru (1980-1992) and the
Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1997-2006).
With the admission that “…measuring factors related to environments vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism is exceedingly difficult,”
(47) the study then goes on to create metrics (quantitative and qualitative) for detecting and assessing factors along with metric justification
and data sources (47-58). Seven key research findings are then provided
in paragraph form (59-60) that go into Army doctrinal views on this
subject matter and social science utility to irregular warfare. More
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importantly for the warfighter—or in this instance the peacebringer,
four action recommendations for the US Army defense community are
then provided:
•• Incorporate factors and associated metrics into irregular warfarerelated analytic games and models.
•• Evaluate levels of potential instability and extremist violence using the
assessment scheme outlined in this report.
•• Conduct research to probe and map overlays and interrelationships
among factors in specific cases.
•• Develop a prioritization approach based on the factors and assessment
scheme that helps indicate where best to allocate analytic and security
assistance resources (xv).
The report also offers appendices including the “Factor Matrix”
and factor presence in the thirty RAND case studies and the useful
inverse COIN factors (countermeasures to insurgencies) (87-88).
My impressions of the research report (written by a very talented
and eclectic team of social scientists) are highly favorable. It was a joy
to read and the recommendations are timely and well measured. Plenty
of time, effort, and resources went into this project and it shows. This
form of research is critical to our gaining a better understanding of the
unstable environments that create and nurture violent extremist groups
and other armed non-state actors.
A few impressions really hit the reviewer while analyzing the
RAND report. What was found fascinating in the report is the inherent tension between old and new forms of insurgency. While the thirty
detailed COIN case studies used for validation purposes all fall under
the political insurgency paradigm, five of the factor examples are from
Mexico and are cartel and gang—mostly Los Zetas—related (Factors 3,
6, 7, 9, & 11), which fall under the organized crime/criminal insurgency
paradigm. This is a paradigm considered antithetical to more mainstream and traditionalist COIN perceptions. Further, while Factor 1
which addresses external support (eg. money, weapons) may be integral
to political insurgencies, criminal actors draw their resources directly
from the illicit economy such as narcotics trafficking, local taxation via
extortion, and related activities. This variable is partially captured in
Factor 11 concerning resources available to a group, but its importance
appears to be understated especially when illicit economies in the tens
of billions of dollars help to sustain such criminal actors.
Given that criminal entities are growing in strength and capability
(as many regions of Latin America attest) it is the impression of this
reviewer that follow-on research conducted by the Arroyo Center on
unstable environments would greatly increase the relevance and utility
of the product. It would be helpful to model the factors indicative to such
threat groups along with the more traditional violent (political) extremist forms and the hybrid (convergence) entities now rising. Additionally,
while the reviewer agrees that the two case studies set in Peru and Nepal
were required for proof of concept purposes and were something the
sponsoring agency requested, it is pretty clear that applying such analysis to the ongoing situation in Mexico—specifically to Los Zetas, Los
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Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartel—should be considered
one option for the next logical step in its development.

Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and
Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
By David Fitzgerald
Reviewed by David H. Ucko, Associated Professor, College of International
Security Affairs, National Defense University.

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2013
285 pages
$45.00

I

n Learning to Forget, David Fitzgerald traces the effects of the Vietnam
War’s legacy on the US Army’s understanding and approach to counterinsurgency. Fitzgerald, a Lecturer in International Politics at University
College Cork, Ireland, broaches this topic chronologically, assessing first
the role of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War and then how the
memory and lessons of that conflict shaped future institutional attempts
to avoid, learn from, repeat, or even recall whatever it was that happened.
The overarching argument is the memory of Vietnam has been neither
static nor uncontested, but reinterpreted depending on the dominant
context and personalities at any given time. The legacy, thus, remains
“fluid and open to reconstruction” (210-211) and is used to justify a
range of often incompatible arguments. As Fitzgerald implies, this historiographical tug-of-war reveals the long shadow the conflict still casts
over the US Army as an institution.
The book’s strengths include its argumentation and structure; it is
an eminently readable text. It weaves its way from Vietnam and the
codification of its immediate lessons in the 1970s, to the re-encounter
with irregular challenges in Central American in the 1980s, and then to
the peace operations of the 1990s, and their relationship to the Army’s
counterinsurgency legacy. The last two chapters consider the spectacular highs and lows of counterinsurgency during the campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Throughout, counterinsurgency has most commonly
been marginalized as an institutional priority and area of investment, a
trend bucked only by “major traumatic events,” (206) most recently the
fear of utter failure during the civil war in Iraq.
A second strength of the book is its measured tone and analysis.
Fitzgerald has authored a sober and dispassionate study that resists the
hyperbole and sensationalism typical of other related works. Perhaps
Fitzgerald’s distance from the debate, as an Ireland-based academic,
affords him the necessary perspective. Nonetheless, the nuanced take
on this all-too-often overheated topic is refreshing and, also, necessary.
Third, the research is thorough and well documented in over sixty
pages of footnotes. It is clear that Fitzgerald has consulted the relevant
works, which he applies with due recognition of contending interpretations. The eye to detail and fastidious sourcing may be explained by the
book’s origins as Fitzgerald’s own doctoral thesis, something evident in
the book’s initial literature review and primer on methodology.
This last point relates also to one of the book’s two weaknesses.
Whereas Fitzgerald’s analysis is commendably detached, one might
wish he more often established his own view on controversial and
divisive topics. He cites the dominant voices both for and against
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counterinsurgency’s inclusion as a US military priority but refrains from
presenting his own verdict. He covers the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
well, but it is never explained why Fitzgerald thinks counterinsurgency
succeeded in the former yet “failed to produce the tangible results it
needed” in Afghanistan (198). Similarly, he presents all major interpretations of what went right and wrong in Vietnam, but it is difficult to glean
what Fitzgerald himself, on the basis of his research, sees as the more
convincing explanation.
Second, with the multitude of works now available on the US military’s engagement, aversion, and re-encounter with counterinsurgency,
Fitzgerald’s contribution feels somewhat familiar. With the exception
of a few added anecdotes and some notable sources, particularly in the
first half of the book, the interpretation of past and present campaigns
differs in no substantive way from previous accounts, be it Richard
Downies’ Learning from Conflict, Robert Cassidy’s Peacekeeping in the Abyss,
Richard Lock-Pullan’s US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, or my
own, The New Counterinsurgency Era, which covers similar ground and
comes to very similar conclusions. Fitzgerald refers to these works in
his introduction, but his implicit moving past and building upon the
existing literature are not always convincing. The book’s novelty lies
in its emphasis on how the memory of Vietnam, specifically, affected
and was affected by subsequent events, but this focus is not consistent
throughout and can, at times, feel contrived.
On this latter point, it is not obvious how Vietnam and its 58,000
US casualties related to the peacekeeping operations of 1990s; the
discussions appear related to the far more recent traumas of Somalia
and the limited US national interests at stake. Going further, the book
establishes continuity between Vietnam and subsequent “military operations other than war” but never fully integrates the point made by Dale
Andrade, that Vietnam was both a conventional and an irregular effort,
and that US strategy had to counter a credible communist army along
with a potent insurgent foe. Given this balancing act, how comparable
(or even relevant) is Vietnam to the 1994-95 intervention in Haiti or
the Bosnia campaign thereafter? Even the attempt to compare Vietnam
with Afghanistan or Iraq faces serious problems, ones that the book may
perhaps have benefited from broaching more directly.
On the whole, Learning to Forget is a well researched and superbly
written addition to the ongoing study of counterinsurgency and the US
Army. At a time of urgent reflection for the US Army, and the United
States as a whole, Fitzgerald reminds us of the fluidity of historical interpretation and the unpredictability of what we actually learn. John Lewis
Gaddis sees historians as mandated “to interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to managing the future but [critically]
without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances
in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them”
(The Landscape of History, 2002). Michael Howard’s paraphrasing of Jakob
Burckhardt, cited by Fitzgerald, is therefore apt: “the true use of history,
whether military or civil, is…not to make men clever for next time; it
is to make them wise forever” (211). The book is recommended to all
serious scholars of counterinsurgency, the US Army, and intervention.
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One Hundred Victories: Special Ops & the Future of American
Warfare
By Linda Robinson
Reviewed by LtCol Stephen K. Van Riper, USMC

D
New York: PublicAffairs,
2013
416 pages
$28.99

o not pick up this book unless you are looking for a general overview of US Army Special Forces conducting basic Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) in Afghanistan. While an easy read with some entertaining stories, the book omits way too much to be of use to serious students
of irregular warfare.
One Hundred Victories presents two main points as it spins the story
of the successes, failures and challenges of Green Beret Village Stability
Operations and Afghan Local Police Development (VSO/ALP). The
author’s first proposition is that after Special Operations Forces’ (SOF)
initial catastrophic successes in Afghanistan, SOF leadership failed to
articulate a solid game plan to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite having the
training, doctrine, and experience to do so, it allowed conventional forces,
and itself, to focus on combat ops when Foreign Internal Defense and
capacity building should have been the strategy. After years of chasing
targets, in 2009-2010 the Army’s Special Forces finally remembered
their way and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
effort to build security capacity via VSO/ALP. In this endeavor, they
fought against not only the Taliban, but also conventional units and
senior leadership.
Robinson’s second main idea is that a key reason for failures in
Afghanistan was SOF’s lack of a staffed, theater-level command capable
of interfacing with its own and conventional units. Unable to channel
the power of its mature, experienced and intelligent personnel, SOF
could not seize the initial opportunity to shape Afghanistan’s strategy
and this mistake hampered special operations throughout the war.
This second proposition has merit, but Robinson fails to articulate
why SOF preferred to fight by “SOF tribe” rather than as a comprehensive whole, and tries to convince the reader the only relevant SOF
mission is Foreign Internal Defense. By only telling 1/11th of the story
(there are eleven SOF critical activities), she misrepresents the challenges
and complications of establishing a true unified headquarters. Her slant
towards Green Berets, and their primary mission, is evident and prevents the reader from gaining a full understanding of the vignettes she
uses throughout the book.
It is in her thesis that Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building are the keys to success in Afghanistan where Robinson’s biases really
emerge, and where the book truly misses its mark. Despite repeatedly
making the point that stability comes from developing Afghans, all her
good tales focus on raids or combat. She gives short shrift to Military
Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs, various non-military
developmental organizations, and conventional force development initiatives. 1 One Hundred Victories leads one to believe only SOF can conduct
1      One line on page 230.
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Foreign Internal Defense, and the author accomplishes this by neglecting large swaths of the Afghanistan story while focusing on selected
differences between Special Forces and other units. Lastly, it implies
SOF leadership took the lead in turning the war’s focus from one of
hunting Taliban to one of developing police. It does so despite significant evidence, both from Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was conventional
leaders who had to pull SOF out of its direct action myopia and get it
back into Foreign Internal Defense.
A final critique of this book is that it fails to address many of the
questions it brings forward. A few examples include:
•• Why did SOF lose its way in 2003? What factors, other than the lack
of a sizable headquarters, caused it to forget Foreign Internal Defense
and focus on direct action?
•• Were the claims that Special Forces personnel became cowboys true?
And what actions, other than relieving Major Gant, did anyone take
to address this concern?
•• What was the impact of lessons from Iraq toward how Afghanistan’s
Foreign Internal Defense mission was fought?
•• How much of an impact did the establishment of an AfghanistanPakistan buffer zone actually have on the war?
One Hundred Victories is not a great action story. It is too flawed to
provide significant strategic lessons, and the author has obvious biases
that prevent a good historical analysis of the campaign in Afghanistan.
This book is not worth the time of a professional strategic or operational
leader.

Women in Battle

Deadly Consequences: How Cowards are
Pushing Women into Combat
By Robert L. Maginnis
Will integrating women into combat units have "deadly consequences" for US national
security? Three experts—Anna Simons, Anthony King, and John McKay—provide their
evaluations.

A Review by Anna Simons

D

eadly Consequences is a blistering polemic that provides plenty
of facts, figures, and citations to
those who oppose the idea of women being
integrated into direct ground combat units.
Maginnis does not mince words:

Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing,
2013. 244 pages. $27.95.

The incremental process by which the United
States military decided to put women into directfire, close ground combat assignments has been
deceitful. It is the work of political leaders
who naively treat ground combat as an equalopportunity issue and of military commanders
who know better but are afraid to speak the
truth about its adverse effects on readiness (p. 4).

Nor is it just the current Joint Chiefs of Staff Maginnis considers
to be cowards. Essentially, any man who would let a woman serve in
his place deserves scorn. As for why the Joint Chiefs and other senior
military leaders merit particular opprobrium: in Maginnis’s view, they
have succumbed to politically correct pressure. He identifies six myths
any responsible senior leader has to know are untrue:
1) The new battlefield is woman-friendly.
2) Women are clamoring for combat duty.
3) Women are already effective at the front.
4) Good leadership defeats eros.
5) Women are perfectly capable of handling the rigors of combat.
6) Other countries put women in combat.
Maginnis fillets each of these myths, liberally borrowing from and
updating others’ work. He then moves on to eight major risks the military will face should women be given direct ground combat roles:
1) Compromised standards.
2) Failure to match capabilities with job assignments.
3) [Women’s] Physical suffering.

Anna Simons is a
professor of Defense
Analysis at the Naval
Postgraduate School,
and co-author of The
Sovereignty Solution:
A Commonsense
Approach to Global
Security.
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4) Destruction of the warrior spirit.
5) Increase in sexual assaults.
6) Forcing women into combat.
7) Reduction of retention rates and decline of quality.
8) Subjecting women to the draft.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the risks vs myths, Maginnis occasionally shoots his own logic in the foot. For instance, early on in the
book he mentions young people’s “hookup” culture and their penchant
for alcohol and drug-fueled behavior. Midway through, he cites various
studies that point to pregnancy rates among soon-to-be-deployed and
deployed women. Not only does he stress that many pregnancies are
unplanned, but women are clearly indulging in sex on board ships and
in combat zones without using birth control. Yet, eight pages further
he writes, “Men’s inclination to take risks in every aspect of life makes
them better combat candidates” – as if women’s willingness to engage
in unprotected sex is not risky behavior.
I mention this because while I agree with a number of Maginnis’s
points, it is hard not to wince whenever he misfires or over-exaggerates.
For instance, he lambasts radical feminists for wanting to “eviscerate
the military” as a patriarchal institution, yet offers too little evidence for
the anti-military and anti-war campaign he intimates exists. This is too
bad. Because if he could offer a chapter (rather than scattered sentences’
worth) of proof that proponents are more anti-military than anti-male,
he might actually win over more people – to include anyone who worries
about national security or cares about the military as an institution.
Equally unfortunate may be Maginnis’s focus on the nature of
combat rather than the nature of combat units. Maginnis invokes
General Odierno to suggest that the counterinsurgency fights of the
past decade may not presage the future, and while both men may well
be right that the military had better (re)gird itself to be able to engage in
a grimmer, more sustained, high intensity form of conventional combat,
this could lead some readers to wonder what young men at outposts
like Restrepo endured. Consequently, too, Maginnis misses making the
point that wherever the US puts boots on the ground in the future, it is
still likely to need to field small units capable of operating on their own
in austere conditions. No question, physical standards will matter in
such units. But so will group dynamics.
Because meeting physical standards represents a sort of Rubicon
for entering the “boy’s club” of combat units, standards receive a great
deal of attention. However, both sides in the debate may err in pinning
too much on them. Opponents believe so long as standards remain
high – and do not get gender-normed – few women will either want to
serve in the combat arms or be able to make it through selection. Thus,
certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) – they hope – will
remain protected. However, the track recently taken by those who want
all billets opened to women is to question the premise behind each standard. Proponents increasingly point out tasks are rarely undertaken by
individuals alone; instead, every combatant belongs to a team, a platoon,
or a squad. This means members in all units shift and share burdens and
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can surely find creative ways to get the job done regardless of individual
strengths.
But, not only do combat units exist to be sent into harm’s way –
they, after all, represent the thin line in the sand between all of us and
harm – they should never be presumed to be immune to casualties. Let
a unit suffer casualties, and any burden-sharing that might have worked
among individuals during a field exercise, or during practice, is bound to
fall apart. This is inconvenient reality number 1. Inconvenient reality
number 2 is that attrition requires members of combat units be considered interchangeable, even in the 21st century; thus, every member of a
unit has to be capable of accomplishing the same essential tasks. At the
same time, replacements have to be able to fit easily into the group. This
introduces a Goldilocks challenge: the group has to be tight, but not so
tight it cannot absorb new members and still function.
While Maginnis acknowledges the significance of cohesion, he
does not dig very deep. He never explains the havoc that romantic,
and not just sexual, attachments can wreak. Someone else will have
to investigate and explain what makes a combat unit effective (or not).
Maginnis prefers to concentrate on the physical and psychological rigors
of combat instead. One way he does so is to describe battles in Najaf
(circa 2004) and in Vietnam (which is somewhat curious given his earlier
dismissal of counterinsurgency). Yet, no matter how graphically he tries
to render both scenes (along with a shorter description of fighting in
the Chosin reservoir), readers who are not already used to (or enamored
with) reading about combat sequences are likely to remain unmoved.
Here is where, without necessarily meaning to, Maginnis exposes
the real communications gap: how can he and other opponents make
their arguments stick? How can combat veterans convince skeptics the
presence of women really will be disruptive, and it will take away from
– rather than add anything to – combat effectiveness? One might especially wonder how opponents of lifting the ban can make the case in light
of the fact, as Maginnis points out, Hollywood and media depictions
have helped convince many Americans that women are just as capable as
men: just look at how well they have held their own in firefights.
Of course, no movie has yet been made depicting the ways in which
a woman’s presence might actually wreck a unit or doom a mission, let
alone what might happen should a female fail to uphold her end in a
prolonged battle. Imagine, though, the subliminal impact such imagery
could have, particularly if the plot was compelling and the acting realistic. Crime scene reenactments influence juries, which is why they are
increasingly popular. Or, just consider Kony 2012.
Arguably, with the "right" kind of footage it might well be possible
to shift public opinion dramatically away from wanting to see women
introduced into direct ground combat units. Indeed, at this point in
time, one or two well crafted YouTube videos could well have a more
profound effect than any book will, no matter how vividly written.
Could Deadly Consequences itself be turned into a movie or a documentary? Certainly Maginnis’s book is a very easy read for anyone who
already leans in his direction. However, in the next round (whether print
or film), it would surely help the overall argument if all the sub-arguments were carefully presented and the tone were less inflammatory. In
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Maginnis’s defense, his aim has clearly been to (re)sound the alarm and
rally the base. Not only is time running out, but it is hard not to agree
with him given the gravity of the military’s mission to protect us all,
that Congress has a duty – nay, an obligation – to treat this issue with
far more gravity and ecumenicism than it has thus far. In fact, that may
be the most significant point this book makes.

A Review by Anthony King

T
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he official silence following Leon Panetta’s rescission of the
restrictions on women serving in the combat arms has been surprising, but it should not be taken as evidence of approval within
the armed forces. On the contrary, informally, widespread dismay has been
reported among many male combat veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Robert Maginnis’s engaging book, polemically subtitled "how cowards
are pushing women into combat," might be read as a corrective to this
silence. Incensed by Panetta’s decision and the pusillanimity of General
Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maginnis rejects the
decision as jeopardizing national security.
Maginnis is not completely against women’s service in the armed
forces. He honors Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, the first woman to
win a Silver Star, and numerous other female combat veterans (67):
“Some women in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated valor under fire
in protecting their units and themselves” (68). Yet, Maginnis does not
take their combat performance as evidence that, in the future, a small
number of exceptional women might also be able to serve in combat. On
the contrary, he concludes his encomium with a decisive qualification:
“We should celebrate their courage but not abandon logic by pretending
that they are case studies of women successfully joining in sustained,
conventional combat” (68).
This is the foundation of Maginnis’s entire argument. While women
may have served successfully in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, these
campaigns were low-intensity operations. “With some notable exceptions, counterinsurgency is best compared to high-intensity police work,
not high-intensity conventional combat”(40). Since the United States is
currently trying to reorient itself to conventional maneuver warfare, the
prospect of a return to high-intensity war invalidates all the evidence
about women in combat from Iraq and Afghanistan to justify a reprise
of the central and long-standing objections to female service. Yet, some
of the evidence he discusses is valid and interesting.
Predictably, Maginnis focuses on physical capacity. He cites a British
military study which showed an increased rate of injury among women
of 7.5 times when “training to the same standards” as men; “women
could produce a much greater long-term medical bill for the Pentagon
than men” (132). Problems of female hygiene and pregnancy are discussed at length.
Naturally, Maginnis highlights the issue of sex. For instance,
under “Myth No.4: Good leadership defeats eros,” he notes that sexual
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fraternization was endemic at Kandahar Airfield; “nothing [the] chain of
command did could stop these nightly liaisons” (69). “As if consensual
affairs weren’t bad enough, our armed forces also face an epidemic of
sexual assaults” (71). Finally, Maginnis notes that women are at greater
risk of sexual violence than men if taken prisoner; Private Jessica Lynch
“now acknowledges that she was raped and sodomized by her captors”
(146).
Maginnis’s arguments can be challenged and, in many cases, rebutted; some women are physically capable of combat, sex has not always
been endemic to, or universally undermined, the cohesion of combat
units, and men can also be sexual victims. Indeed, Maginnis admits
some women are capable of passing even the most rigorous selection
process uninjured: “I watched some Olympic-caliber women athletes
run through the [SEAL] obstacle course better than certainly many of
the SEAL candidates do” (112).
Yet, Maginnis’s argument collapses on a more fundamental point.
Even if the next US conflict is a conventional interstate war, Maginnis
is unjustified in dismissing the experience of combat troops in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Operationally, counterinsurgency campaigns are less
intense; they cannot be lost in a day. Yet, at the platoon and company level,
on days when the enemy has been engaged, the fighting in places like
Ramadi, Fallujah, Sangin, or the Korengal Valley seems to have been no
less difficult and dangerous as anything the infantry of the Second World
War or the Korean Conflict faced. At this level, the fighting provides the
best evidence currently available on whether women can perform in
combat; with important caveats, some of which Maginnis describes, the
evidence suggests a small number of women can. Maginnis’s argument
is based on an unjustified conflation of the levels of war.
Yet, his work remains useful, not least because it provides an insight
into an increasingly strident and radical segment of United States society;
the Republican and religious right. Thus, his valedictory acknowledgement is instructive: “Above all, I acknowledge my heavenly Father,
without whom this book could never have been written” (198). Writing
as a Christian, Maginnis is disgusted by a society, corrupted by liberalism and radical feminism, could have so disastrously ignored the sanctity
of the female role as mother and wife and profaned the institution of
the family: “It is no surprise that a culture that so degrades and devalues
women is untroubled by sending them into combat. Americans once held
women in high esteem, but, today, chivalry is practically dead. Respect
for women went the way of marriage thanks to radical feminists who
want to destroy that institution” (41). In this, Maginnis perhaps reveals
his true objection to female integration. He also shows that perhaps the
greatest obstacle to female accession may lie not in their physiologies but
in contemporary American culture, which is increasingly polarized into
secular and liberal versus conservative and religious factions.
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obert Maginnis’s book singularly examines the consequences of
placing women in front-line infantry units. The author is a West
Point graduate, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel with
germane Pentagon experience, and a Senior Fellow for National Security
at the Family Research Council. Deadly Consequences effectively synthesizes much of a debate informed by emotive conjecture, parochialism, and
ideologically tainted discourse. An injudicious choice of title and sensational dust-jacket blurbs suggest, quite unfairly, that Maginnis advocates
a limited perspective. Regretably, they demean the author, misrepresent
what he convincingly argues, and are sure to alienate the broad readership
the book deserves. His thesis merits considered study. In Maginnis’s view,
proponents of female integration into front-line ground combat units
falsely conflate the sociocultural tropes of “gender neutrality” and the
“lifting of gender barriers” with the indispensability of combat effectiveness. The two phenomena are distinct and distinctly incompatible. He
excoriates what he sees as pusillanimous, disengaged, and disingenuous
behavior on the issue by senior civilian and uniformed leadership within
the United States government. He singles out high level military leaders
for censure for their facile pronouncements on the complex and poorly
understood topic of placing females in front-line infantry units.
Deadly Consequences is an informative, nonacademic, lucid treatment of an important subject. There is commendable range in this book.
An impressive amount of research went into it: Congressional testimony;
interviews; pertinent United States and foreign government documents
and studies; archival findings; and, contemporary and historical examples—a more nuanced examination of the Soviet Union’s (WW II) and
Israeli (past and current) use of females in ground combat formations
would have strengthened the book’s argument. Proponents of placing
women into front-line infantry units either conveniently ignore or, in the
shrillness of the moment, lose sight of a good deal of that background
material. Maginnis cites authoritative medical research and findings
giving evidence of the increased physical and psychological tolls (and
concomitant short- and long-term medical expenses) associated with
women compared to men in combat environments. He also examines
the pernicious effects of sexual rivalries and the negative impact on unit
cohesiveness.
One of the official US government documents Maginnis cites
is the March 2011 final report of the Military Leadership Diversity
Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership
for the 21st Century. Emblematic of much of the government’s official justification for integrating females into front-line infantry units,
the report is a flawed document: the Commission’s purpose was not
to consider the enhancement of combat effectiveness but rather to
advocate guardianship under “demonstrated diversity leadership,” a
fuzzy concept with no relevance to battlefield lethality. Further, the
Commission’s findings are primarily based on the analysis of three
nonauthoritative reports, omitting even passing reference to the 1992
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed
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Forces (also cited). The report significantly underrates the differences in
strength and physical capacities between men and women. The issue of
pregnancy is completely ignored. Any absence of evidence contradicting
or challenging the Commission’s findings failed to prompt additional
studies. Tellingly, the paucity of ground combat experience, notably of
sustained—three or more days—close-in, ground combat experience,
distinguishes the Commission’s membership. That critical expertise
and experience was (and is) readily available and appears to have been
ignored in selecting the Commission’s membership. Maginnis quotes
several individuals who have given long and serious consideration to the
issue well above the current level of debate. Further, the Commission
premised its findings on the templates of Iraq and Afghanistan, disregarding high-intensity conflict. In addition, potential foes such as the
People’s Republic of China and North Korea are not mentioned.
Maginnis traces incremental changes in institutional ethos brought
about with the increasing integration of women into the military. The
fact the all-volunteer force could not sustain itself without female volunteers, and their critical contributions, cannot be denied. But Maginnis
also cites figures of a higher suicide rate among female veterans compared to male veterans.
In today’s culture, it is difficult to see how the issue will receive the
impartial, objective airing it deserves. Nevertheless, Maginnis makes
sound recommendations for addressing it. Foremost among these is
Congressional hearings. According to Maginnis, there have been no full
hearings in the House of Representatives on women in combat since
1979; and, none in the Senate since 1991. Deadly Consequences begs for
more critical analysis.
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